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ABSTRACT 
Since the mid-1970s, some electoral analysts have observed the declining capacity of 
class-based party alignment to explain electoral outcomes in westem democracies, 
including Australia. While this observation has never been entirely unchallenged, it is 
now broadly accepted within the discipline that while party alignment is still a 
significant factor, dealignment is gradually occurting. 
One consequence ofthe decline of party alignment is that the discipline of electoral 
analysis must seek new theories and models to explain the activity of those voters 
who do not vote in accordance with party alignment. A number of explanations have 
been advanced, including "issue voting", based upon voters making rational 
judgments on contemporary policy issues; and "image voting", based primarily upon 
the public relations image ofthe party and leader. 
One theory which has been advanced to explain a proportion of the vote in a limited 
number of Queensland electorates is connectional politics. 
Connectionalism occurs where a candidate, regardless of their party label or 
independence, obtains electoral support on a personal basis as a resuh of their position 
within, and "connections" within, the community. This position of leadership must be 
developed over a long time, and it is suggested that the strength ofthe relationship 
between the community leader and the community can, under some circumstances, be 
translated into electoral support. 
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The concept was first described by Reynolds in Connectional Politics - The 
Queensland Case.' This paper described a series of occurtences of connectional 
politics, but did not endeavour to explore the mechanics of connectional politics. It 
introduced the concept, but left the way open for further work to explore how, and 
under what circumstances, connectionalism can be effective. This thesis undertakes 
some of that further work, in an effort to describe the operations of connectional 
politics. 
This research extracts from Reynolds' paper a series of "connectional indicators" 
related to the candidate, the community, and the electoral circumstances, then tests 
those indicators in five substantial case studies, observing potentially connectional 
candidates in various campaigns in the 1992, 1995, 1998 and 2001 state general 
elections. 
The result of this research is first, confirmation that cormectional politics in 
Queensland does occur, supporting Reynolds' initial contention. Second, however, 
this research identifies some important factors which contribute to a successful 
cormectional campaign. 
The results of this research indicate that connectional politics occurs most readily in 
communities which consider themselves to be in need of instrumental services which 
must be provided by the central govemment. This sense of need is often coupled with 
a sense of neglect; a perception that the central govemment is neglecting the 
' Reynolds, P. (1991a) Connectional Politics, The Queensland Case, paper presented to the 33^** 
Conference ofthe Australasian Political Science Association. 
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important needs ofthe community. 
In order for these needs to be realised, the community requires a "champion" whose 
primary purpose is to enter state politics in order to ensure that the state govertiment 
provides support for the community's self-identified needs. Such a "champion" is 
usually a person who is already a leader within the local community. They may, for 
instance, have served in local govertmiem, or taken leadership positions in local 
associations. 
This research suggests that if such a leader emerges, and if the core of his/her 
campaign is their desire to overcome the "neglect" shown by the central govemment, 
they can obtain significant electoral support regardless of their party label (or lack 
thereof). 
This conclusion is important, but carties a number of important caveats. The first is 
that this research is based upon five case studies. The studies were undertaken in 
some depth, and provide a stable foundation for the research conclusions, but they are 
still only five in number. This research will become stronger if studies such as these 
are undertaken by future researchers, during future elections. 
Second, the operation of connectionalism is constrained by circumstances. The 
community must have the necessary characteristics; the candidate must exhibit the 
necessary characteristics of leadership and community commitment; and the wider 
electoral circumstances must be amenable to the operation of connectional politics. 
Vlll 
This research does not conclude that connectionalism takes place in every electorate, 
nor in every election. But it does occur reasonably frequently in Queensland, and is 
capable of startling results. 
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
Research Question 
Electoral behaviour is the sub-discipline of political science within which the mission 
of this thesis falls. The study of electoral behaviour began in eamest in the years 
following the Second World War, and seeks to answer the question "Why do people 
vote the way they do?" This fiindamental question provides the first, most broad 
objective of this research. If this research is successful, then it should increase the 
capacity ofthe discipline as a whole to explain why people vote as they do, and to 
predict how they might vote in future. 
For several decades, from the Second World War (and possibly earlier) until the mid-
1970s, this question provoked little excitement in Australia. The formation ofthe 
Labor Party in the late nineteenth century and its development into a formidable, 
disciplined parliamentary force in the first years ofthe twentieth, established the basis 
for a party system which emerged to advance the political aspirations of various social 
classes. Non-Labor parties were established in response to Labor's development, 
resulting in a class-based political cleavage which, reinforced by other factors such as 
sectarianism, was so dominant that by the end ofthe Second World War, it was an 
accepted orthodoxy that most people were socialised into life-long support for the 
party appropriate to their social class. Voting, according to this orthodoxy, was not a 
friennial expression of choice; rather, it was the habit of a lifetime (and because ofthe 
tendency for this habit to be transmitted through generations, quite possibly the habit 
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of several lifetimes). Australia was far from the only polity to experience this form of 
voting - class alignment was also by far the strongest predictor of voter behaviour in 
the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and most of Europe. 
In the mid-1970s, statistically grounded studies began to demonstrate a gradual 
process of dealignment. Class was losing its capacity to ftilly explain electoral 
outcomes. The "habif of aligned voting was losing its strength. It remained 
powerftil - certainly by far the most powerful predictor of voting outcomes - but its 
explanatory strength was waning. This observation, once confirmed, led to two major 
questions for electoral analysis: "why is dealignment occurring?" and "if some 
people are not voting according to their class alignment, they why are they voting the 
way they are?" This thesis addresses the second of these questions. This nartows 
somewhat the research question for this thesis, which now might be "Why do people 
who do not vote according to class alignment vote the way they do, and what can 
political candidates do to attract these votes?" 
A number of plausible answers to this question have emerged. For instance, studies 
have suggested that people vote on the basis of issues; others have suggested that they 
vote according to their perception ofthe image of major political players. Reynolds' 
1991 paper Connectional Politics: The Queensland Case^ offered another suggestion, 
applicable under a limited set of circumstances. He suggests that some political 
candidates, through their participation in the community, can establish a base of 
political support which does not rely upon class, party, or state level politics. Instead, 
' Reynolds, P. (1991a) Connectional Politics: The Queensland Case Paper presented to 33"* Annual 
Conference ofthe Australasian Political Science Association. 
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it is buih upon the candidate's "connectedness" within the community. Reynolds 
introduced this concept by discussing eight Queensland seats which were held by the 
Liberal Party, but which, according to class based politics and the party system in 
Queensland, they should never have won. In each case he presented evidence that the 
successful candidate had won support on a connectional basis. 
This research seeks to test and build upon Reynolds' proposed answer to the question 
of why non-class-aligned electors vote the way they do. So, finally, the research 
question for thesis becomes "Does connectionalism explain how candidates can 
attract votes from people who do not vote according to class alignment?" 
Value ofthe Research Question 
At its simplest level, the importance of this research question emerges from the 
development traced above. If class based alignment is decreasing, then the discipline 
must either find new ways to explain voting outcomes, or suffer a reduced capacity to 
complete its fundamental task of explaining why voters vote the way they do. If 
connectional politics can explain some portion ofthe voting outcome, it improves the 
discipline's overall capacity to explain voting outcomes. 
This argument, however, begs the question of whether it is important to understand 
why people vote the way they do. It might, for instance, be suggested that as long as 
the votes result in the formation of a govemment, the reasoning behind those votes is 
irtelevant. This thesis submits that an understanding of why people vote the way they 
do is important for two related reasons. The first of these begins with the concept that 
in the voting booth, the elector is faced with a choice. This choice reflects two or 
more competing sets of policies; two or more competing candidates for local 
representation; and ultimately, two or more competing Premiers, Ministries, and 
Govemments. By casting a vote, the voter implicitly endorses one or another of these 
altematives, and commissions them to govem. However, the reason for this 
endorsement underpins the relationship between the govemors and the govemed. 
During the heyday of class-based politics, for instance, a Labor govemment could 
clearly understand that it was elected by working class voters, who expected the 
govemment to implement policies beneficial to them. The expectations upon the 
govemment therefore emerged from the reasons behind the vote. 
If an electorate supported a candidate because of their position on a particular issue -
for instance an Australian Greens MP elected on the basis of opposition to logging 
operations - then the MP could be clear that the electorate expected them to oppose 
logging. One might speculate that if a connectional politician was elected by the 
community, on the basis of their support for the community, then they might be 
expected to support policies beneficial to the community. The reason for the vote, 
then, subtly underscores the relationship between the voters and their representatives. 
The political parties who present choices to the voters obviously have ambitions of 
claiming office. In order to do so, they must obtain as many votes as possible. 
Understanding the reasons why people vote the way they do, then, is of critical 
importance to political parties and candidates. Their understanding of why people 
vote as they do is likely to provide strong direction for their campaign. A Liberal 
candidate who considered most of thefr support to be class-aligned Liberal Party 
support, for instance, might campaign by emphasising the value of Liberal policy and 
the persona ofthe party leader; a Liberal candidate who hoped for support from small 
business operators might campaign on the basis of a desire to eliminate payroll tax. 
The shape of their campaign, then, is fundamentally based upon their understanding 
ofthe factors motivating the support of their voters. 
The result of this is that an understanding of why people vote the way they do 
suggests an understanding of what people expect from political candidates, and what 
they might expect from the successful candidate once in office. It also guides the 
campaigns of those seeking election. If this is so, it is clear that a more complete 
understanding of electoral behaviour is important, and that if this research can 
contribute to the development of such an understanding, the research is worthwhile. 
Existing Literature 
The body of literature antecedent to this research will be discussed in Chapters 2, 3 
and 4. The literature of electoral analysis relevant to this thesis examines three central 
arguments. The first of these is the body of evidence to indicate that dealignment has 
actually occurted. While, as noted above, the declining capacity of class alignment as 
a predictor of votes was first identified in the mid 1970s, it took some time for this 
proposition to gain wide acceptance. In part this arose because class aligned voting 
continued (and continues) to account for a massive proportion ofthe vote. Although 
this thesis will focus on voting explanations other than class, class voting is still, in 
most electorates, considered to be the influential factor. Its salience has decreased 
noticeably, resulting in questions for investigation, but it is far from a spent force, and 
critics of dealignment theories have consistently pointed to this continuing strength as 
a counter to claims of dealignment. This dialogue has resulted in a considerable body 
of literature. 
Second, among those researchers who accept that dealignment has occurted, there 
emerged various schools of thought regarding other explanations of voting outcomes. 
Researchers have suggested various altemative explanations, among them issue-based 
voting; "image" voting; realignment, where class is foregone for another social 
cleavage; and personal voting, where the candidate obtains votes directed personally 
towards them. These theories appear to have some degree of validity, but none of 
them approach the explanatory capacity of class-based alignment; and none are 
sufficientiy encompassing to account for the totality of voters who have abandoned 
(or never developed) a voting alignment. 
Third, there have emerged theories which do not endeavour to explain any particular 
voting dynamic, but which provide conceptual instmments to illustrate the way in 
which various influences over the vote may coexist, all bringing some level of 
influence to bear upon individual voters, and upon electorates as a whole. In 
particular, this thesis will concentrate on the Funnel of Causality, a model which 
shows how various influences, acting upon voters and interacting with one another, 
across the course of a lifetime, culminate in a final voting choice. 
It is clear, then, that a substantial body of literature exists to respond to the first two 
research questions raised in this introduction. All ofthe literature referted to above 
addressed the question of why people vote the way they do; and the second and third 
groups of work addressed the question of why they do so in the absence of class-
based alignment. However, there is virtually no pre-existing literature regarding the 
final research question, that is, whether connectionalism might explain how 
candidates can attract some ofthe votes of people who do not vote according to their 
class alignment. The term "connectionalism" first arose in passing during Reynolds' 
discussion ofthe Liberal performance in the 1977 election. He took up the notion 
again in the 1991 paper previously cited as the basis for this thesis. 
Reynolds' paper was clearly a scoping exercise, rather than an endeavour to present a 
fully developed thesis. He selected tmly anomalous results which appear to show 
connectionalism at its most obvious and, in exploring them, his purpose was to 
demonstrate the existence of connectionalism rather than to explore the mechanics, 
constraints, and reasons for connectional politics. Reynolds' work leads to a further 
set of research questions which underpin the core research questions discussed above. 
The first of these asks whether connectionalism does in fact exist. It may be that the 
anomalous results discussed by Reynolds tmly were anomalous, and carmot properly 
be joined within a theoretical framework. It may also be that they are expressions of 
another phenomenon altogether. If this thesis identifies connectional politics in 
Queensland elections other than those discussed by Reynolds, then this discovery will 
tend to support Reynolds' basic assertion that connectionalism exists. If, on the other 
hand, this research fails to identify any such instances, despite specific endeavour to 
do so, this may either suggest that cormectionalism did not exist, or that it was limited 
to very few examples, possibly including those cited by Reynolds. 
If the existence of connectionalism is not supported by this research, then fr will 
obviously not be possible to discuss its dynamics. However, if connectional politics 
is discovered, then this thesis will address a number of fiirther questions. First, this 
research will endeavour to leam what types of community or electorate are likely to 
entertain connectional politics. Reynolds clearly identified the link between 
connectional politics and the local community - if the connectional candidate obtains 
support because of their connectedness with the local community, then it stands to 
reason that the community itself must exist, and that it must constitute an important 
political frame of reference for its members. This thesis will endeavour to leam more 
about the characteristics a community must possess in order for connectional politics 
to become important. 
Second, it is clear that not every political candidate will be able to attract connectional 
support. A candidate who is not well-connected into the community, or who is not 
part ofthe community at all, is unlikely to attract connectional support. This thesis 
will explore whether more precise information can be found to suggest what political 
and personal characteristics a candidate must possess in order to benefit from 
connectional support. 
Next, this research must establish how connectionalism is established, and how fr 
reaches electorally significant levels. Is it, for instance, simply the case that with 
appropriate candidate mnning in an appropriate community, comiectional support 
inevitable? Altematively, it may be necessary for the candidate to undertake certain 
activhies in order to promote their comiectional characteristics or activate latem 
an 
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connectional support. If such activities are necessary, fr is important to leam what 
they are, and how they must be conducted. 
Finally, Reynolds suggests that the influence which connectionalism brings to bear is 
rather fragile, and that during elections where the wider forces of politics are 
mobilised resulting in strong state-wide swings, connectional factors are likely to be 
overwhelmed. If this is so, then this facet of connectionalism provides an important 
limitation upon the capacity of connectional politics to explain voting outcomes. This 
research will, therefore, test Reynolds' proposition that connectionalism is 
overwhelmed relatively easily; and if this proposition is bome out, this research will 
endeavour to leam more about the nature and magnitude of the political circumstances 
which are likely to overwhelm connectional politics. 
Methodology 
The methodology for this research will be discussed more fully in a later chapter, but 
it is usefiil at this point to discuss briefly the methodological orientation of this 
research. Electoral analysis, particularly in the United States but also to a 
considerable degree in Australia, has often been conducted as a statistical exercise. 
Elections generate a wealth of statistical material before, during and after the contest 
itself The formal statistical retums generated at the polls are supplemented by private 
polling, demographic data (for instance, from the national census) and official reports. 
Analysts have developed some extremely sophisticated mathematical models which 
can manipulate this base of statistical data to predict and explain electoral results. 
Statistical analysis will play a part in this thesis, but a relatively small part. The 
nature of connectional politics, emerging from interpersonal and community-based 
relationships and networks, is such that statistical analysis would be unlikely to yield 
answers to the research questions posed above. Instead, this research will be based 
upon a series of five case studies, which will consist of interviews with candidates and 
documentary research, undertaken in order to build up a qualitative picture of how 
each candidacy progressed. These case studies will be guided by, and assessed 
against, a framework of "connectional indicators" which will be developed from 
Reynolds' paper. In this way the case studies can combine to test Reynolds' 
conclusions and address the research questions for this thesis. 
It should be acknowledged, at the outset, that this methodological approach carries 
limitations. Even if this research is successftil in identifying five clear, obvious 
connectional campaigns, such a limited number can have no statistical significance. 
This research will not provide a basis for sweeping, defensible conclusions about the 
existence and operation of connectional politics. Such conclusions must emerge over 
time as (and if) other research takes up and tests the conclusions of this paper. 
However, within these acknowledged constraints, this research aims to develop an 
understanding of connectional politics substantially beyond Reynolds' initial offering. 
Outline of Chapters 
This thesis is divided into three major components: a discussion ofthe various bodies 
of theory which may assist the conduct ofthe case studies and an understanding of 
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connectionalism; description ofthe case studies themselves; and analysis ofthe case 
studies and the conclusions which flow from them. 
This introduction serves as Chapter 1, and explores the thesis questions, the reasons 
for conducting research into them, and the basic approach to be taken in doing so. 
This chapter has been written from a very general perspective, to provide a basic level 
of orientation before proceeding to the argument proper. 
The first substantive chapter, Chapter 2, will present a discussion ofthe study of 
electoral behaviour, first from a theoretical perspective, then in a more applied sense, 
focussing at first on Australian politics generally, and then on Queensland politics in 
particular. This chapter will begin with a discussion of class based aligned voting 
which, as noted above, was virtually the only voting influence considered for some 
years, and which remains one ofthe dominant influences over voting outcomes. The 
chapter then goes on to discuss the development of dealignment theory, before 
examining two ofthe more prominent theories advanced to account for some ofthe 
"dealigned" vote. 
The first of these, issue voting, hearkens back to ideal demographic notions of an 
informed public making informed choices based on policies and the issues of the day. 
Issue voters are held to undertake a series of steps in determining their vote: they 
identify issues important to their pohtical choice; identify their own position with 
respect to that issue; identify the party whose position most closely approximates their 
own; and then cast a vote in favour of that party. However, the level of political 
knowledge among voters tends to suggest that many are unlikely to be issue voters. 
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The second altemative discussed will be "image voting," where voters respond to the 
images projected by parties and their leaders, both during the election campaign and 
during the entire term of office. Image voting is similar in some respects to 
commercial product advertising, where promoters certainly endeavour to provide a 
rational explanation ofthe benefits of their product, but also concentrate heavily on 
the "image" ofthe product, by presenting cues to the viewer in order to associate the 
product with positive feelings in the viewer's mind. 
Finally, this chapter discusses two models of voting behaviour, the "Funnel of 
Causality" and the "Lifetime Leaming Model." These have been developed in order 
to allow electoral analysis to make sense ofthe (relatively) new situation where no 
single, overwhelming voting influence exists. They provide a means for analysts to 
consider how varying electoral influences, acting in the short, medium and long term 
may combine, each exerting some level of influence on the voter, until the net effect 
of all of these forms of influence resolves into a voting decision. 
Chapter 3 discusses the literature of Queensland political culture. While 
connectionalism may be a wider phenomenon, this thesis seeks only to examine 
connectional politics in Queensland. It is therefore necessary to provide an initial 
assessment ofthe pohtical culture within which connectionalism must operate (if it, in 
fact, does operate in Queensland). This chapter is in two parts - the first examines 
Queensland political culture from a historical perspective, tracing the development of 
the state and its politics until the late 1980s, while the second examines the course of 
Queensland politics since the 1980s in somewhat more detail, as this period (the 
elections from 1992 until 2001) represents the period from which the case studies are 
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drawn. The point of demarcation between the historical and more recent components 
has been set at 1987-1989 for two main reasons. The first is that 1987-1989 
represented the period ofthe Fitzgerald Inquiry into official cormption and, 
subsequently, the election which ended decades of National Party govemment. This 
period therefore represents the end of one era and begirming of another. The second 
reason is more practical - as the fieldwork for this research was undertaken between 
late 2000 and late 2001, it was unrealistic to expect interviewees to have a detailed 
recollection of campaigns prior to 1989. The third reason is that, given that 
Reynolds' paper was delivered in 1991, the case studies would all represent political 
activity conducted after the campaigns discussed by Reynolds. 
Chapter 4 discusses the literature of community studies, which emerges from the 
disciplines of anthropology and sociology. This body of theory is important to the 
study of connectionalism because connectional activity clearly emerges from the 
nature ofthe community itself. If the basic thesis of cormectionalism is that 
candidates can obtain support arising from their connectedness into the local 
community, then any understanding of coimectionalism must be informed by an 
understanding of those communities. Some relevant material is presented in this 
chapter. Further, the methodologies used by community researchers provide some 
guidance as to how the case studies might be undertaken for this thesis. 
In Chapter 5, the basis for the case studies is established. This chapter contains three 
important components. The first establishes a series of connectional "indicators", 
which are drawn from a detailed analysis of Connectional Politics: The Queensland 
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Case^. These indicators represent the premises which underiie Reynolds' argument, 
but which he does not make explicit. They provide three sets of specific proposals to 
be tested during the case studies: factors relating to the community, the candidate, 
and to electoral circumstances. 
The second part ofthe chapter outlines the methodology proposed for the case studies, 
drawing upon the methodologies used to develop the community studies considered in 
Chapter 4, the approach used by Reynolds, and more general qualitative research 
techniques. Finally, this chapter demonstrates how the five case studies were selected 
for analysis. This process was essentially a statistically-driven exercise to identify 
electoral outcomes which supported one of two propositions suggested by the 
connectional indicators, and held to be likely to suggest connectional activity: that in 
seats where connectionalism operates, the vote for independent candidates is likely to 
be higher; and that in seats where connectionalism operates, the vote for a 
connectional candidate may diverge from the state-wide swing, either exacerbating a 
positive swing, or minimising a negative swing. Once seats supporting one of these 
two propositions were identified, a process of elimination resuhed in the seats to be 
examined as case studies. 
Chapter 6 presems those case studies, in chronological order. At this stage the cases 
are presented as nartatives, with only incidental analysis, so that they represent a body 
of fieldwork which can then be analysed together. The five case studies to be 
examined are the better than expected perfonnance of Liberal Kel Ryan in Caims in 
1992; the victory of Graham Healy for the Nationals in Toowoomba North in 1992 
^Reynolds (1991a)/Z>/^ 
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which came as a resuh of a plummeting Liberal vote; the stronger than expected 
support for Independent Liz Cunningham during her unsuccessful 1992 campaign in 
Gladstone, followed by her victories in Gladstone in 1995, 1998 and 2001; the 
eventual success of Liberal Frank Tanti in the general election of 1995 and the re-
election of 1996, and the failed challenge of Labor's Tony Mooney against Tanti in 
the 1996 campaign; and finally the stronger than expected support for One Nation's 
John Kingston in Maryborough in 1998, followed by his unexpected victory as an 
Independent in 2001. These campaigns represent political activity as far north as 
Caims, and as far south as Toowoomba on the Darling Downs; they represent 
campaigns undertaken by all three major parties plus One Nation and Independents; 
and they represent political activity in every general election since 1992. While, as 
admitted above, this body of research caimot be statistically representative of wider 
Queensland politics, these case studies represent a varied set of campaigns, as 
opposed to the tight focus of Reynolds' original work (on unexpected Liberal 
victories). 
The analysis of these case studies begins in Chapter 7 with a discussion ofthe likely 
impact of electoral factors other than connectionalism. If it emerges that the basic 
question of "why people voted the way they did" can be successfully answered for 
each case study without resort to connectionalism, then there seems little point in 
pursuing connectional analysis ftirther. If connectional factors cannot explain an 
unexplained proportion ofthe vote, it is open to question whether the concept has any 
value from the perspective of electoral analysis. Even if some portion ofthe vote 
remains unexplained, the analysis undertaken in this chapter is important because it 
gives some indication of how influential connectional factors might have been. If a 
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great portion ofthe vote remains unexplained, it may be that connectionalism was 
exfremely influential; if only a nartOW portion remains unexplained, then the potential 
influence of connectionalism is diminished. 
Under ideal circumstances, this fortn of analysis might be undertaken using statistical 
tools (in particular, factor analysis). The data for such an analysis is not available. As 
a resuh, this chapter adopts a more general approach, seeking to identify the existence 
of an unexplained portion ofthe vote, and seeking some assessment of hs size, 
without endeavouring to specifically quantify it. In the chapter, fr emerges that an 
unexplained portion ofthe vote remains for all but one case (that one being Tanti in 
1995/96). 
Then, in Chapter 8, the connectional indicators developed in Chapter 5 are used to 
discuss whether the unexplained vote identified in Chapter 7 is likely to be explained 
by connectional politics. If it is, these indicators explore how the connectional 
support was established in each case. 
This analysis leads directly to Chapter 9, which discusses the resuhs ofthe analysis 
and the outcome ofthe research. This chapter assesses the usefiilness ofthe 
connectional indicators, and presents a model for connectional politics developed as a 
result ofthe analysis presented in this thesis. 
Finally, Chapter 10 provides a summary and conclusion for this research, and 
indicates some possible avenues for ftiture research. 
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CHAPTER 2 - THE STUDY O F ELECTORAL 
BEHAVIOUR 
This chapter begins by exploring three major factors which have been found to 
influence voting. The first, and probably most important of these, is social class. For 
three decades (until the mid 1970s) social class was almost unquestioned as the 
primary factor, influencing voting behaviour by providing the basis for party 
alignment. Since the 1970s, various researchers have speculated upon, and/or 
attempted to prove, the declining importance of social class as an influential factor, 
generally asserting issue voting as its replacement. Issue voting, in which the voter is 
held to make a rational judgment about whom to support, is the second factor to be 
considered in this chapter. Finally, the impact of image as an influential factor will 
be discussed. Image works in a similar fashion to issues, but requires much less 
knowledge and hence less rational behaviour from electors. 
This chapter will not try to resolve the ongoing debate as to the relative importance of 
these factors, but will present them on the understanding that they all demonstrate 
some validity, and all have some demonstrated influence on voting behaviour. Given 
this assumption, models are required to chart how a single voter, making a single act 
(the vote) may be influenced by any or all ofthe above factors. Two such models will 
be discussed. 
The first of these, the Funnel of Causality, conceives that influencing factors are 
contained within a funnel, where the broad end ofthe furmel represents factors distant 
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in time from the vote, and where the funnel nartows as fr approaches the voting act. 
Long tertn factors, such as class, will occupy positions in the broader part ofthe 
ftinnel, and shorter-tertn factors like issues and image will be in the nartower part of 
the furmel. 
The second model to be considered is the Lifetime Learning Model, which orders 
influencing factors sequentially based upon time. Thus class socialisation occurs 
eariy in the sequence, and images and issues much later. This ordering of factors is 
then used as the basis for a mathematical factor analysis of actual voting behaviour. 
This approach shows that influential factors can culminate to explain a very great 
proportion ofthe vote. However, because the process of factor analysis can only be 
brought to bear on actual voting behaviour, the Lifetime Leaming Model is more 
useful as an explanatory tool than as a predictive one. 
The chapter as a whole introduces concepts and models which will be referted to 
throughout the thesis, and therefore it serves both as general background reading on 
electoral behaviour, and it contains the specific antecedents to this thesis. 
Class 
Class aligmnent theories of electoral behaviour suggest that voters' social class has a 
profound influence on how they vote during their lifespans. Essentially, it is held that 
class naturally aggregates the population into identifiable - and usually competing -
groups with different political needs and wants. These classes then contest for the 
greatest possible share of political power, in order to satisfy those needs and wants. 
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One of these important contests takes place during elections, when members ofthe 
different classes are aligned with and support the political party which seems to offer 
them the greatest chance to realize their political (including economic and social) 
goals. 
Class-based party alignment was first identified as a factor influencing voting pattems 
in The People's Choice, a study ofthe 1940 and 1944 presidential elections in the 
USA. The authors found that: 
As the social characterization ofthe respondent becomes more 
detailed a closer relationship to political affiliation can be 
established. The wealthier people, the people with more and 
better possessions - these people were usually Republicans. The 
poorer people, the people whose homes and clothes were of 
lower quality, the self-acknowledged laboring class - they voted 
Democratic. Different social characteristics, different votes.^ 
Of course, the timing of this study does not imply that class only became an important 
political factor in the 1940s. In a later study, Berelson, Lazarsfeld and MacPhee 
claimed the phenomenon was "as old ... as the Republic itself""^ In Australia, class 
has been important during the entire lifetime of our party system. 
What is Class? 
^ Lazarsfeld, P., Berelson, B., Gaudet, H. (1948) The People's Choice, Columbia University Press, New 
York, 21 
•* Berelson, B., Lazarsfeld, P., McPhee, W. (1954) Voting, Chicago, 55 
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Despite - or perhaps because of- the importance of class as an analytical concept, 
there has never been substantial agreement within the discipline of political science as 
to precisely how class should be defined. Various factors such as occupation, income, 
education, market strength, amount and quality of possessions, residence (including 
housing type) and self-identification have all been used by various authors to describe 
class groupings. Even where different authors agree on the basis of class 
descriptions, they may vary in how they group classes and where they draw the 
boundaries between one class and the next. 
Despite the various means used to describe the details of class definition, most authors 
seem to share a common intmtive understanding of what class is; that as one 
progresses up the class system one encounters more prestigious occupations, higher 
income, better education, and so forth. While differences of definition continue to 
occur, these do not prevent class from being a useful analytical concept. 
Class Consciousness and Class Conflict 
For class to be important in detennining electoral activity, citizens must first identify 
themselves as belonging to a class; that is, they must have an awareness both of their 
own interests, and of which class in society shares those interests. Withom this 
awareness, the voter has no reason to align with any party on the basis of class 
interest. 
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One familiar view of classes in society is that they are disposed to conflict. Class 
conflict describes agitation among the classes for a greater share of political and/or 
economic power; or at least for a greater opportunity to realise their own needs and 
wants. "Classes are seen as in competition for scarce social resources - money, 
prestige and political power." 
In elections, this class conflict may be formalised by competition between different 
political parties, each aligned with different class interests. It follows that voters will 
be disposed to vote for the party which champions their class interests: 
At its most obvious, the connection between class structure and 
party system is one of economic interests. The working class are 
generally held to have different economic policy interests from 
the middle class, especially if one adds welfare and social 
service provision to the economic interest. One political party, 
the Labour Party, was created by working class institutions, the 
trade unions, directly and deliberately to represent these 
working class economic interests. 
This flow of logic, that a voter identifies with a class, realises that classes are in 
conflict, and votes for the party representing their own class, is class-based party 
alignment in a nutshell. However, class conflict is not necessary for class to 
influence voting behaviour. If voters merely identify with a class, and recognise a 
^ Rose, R. & McAllister, I. (1990) The Loyalties of Voters, Sage, London 65 
* Robertson, D. (1984) Class and the British Electorate, Basil Blackwell, London 14. 
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particular party as the champion of their class, that is sufficient to allow class to 
influence thefr party aligrunent and hence their voting behaviour. ".. .Electors [may 
be] able to see clearly enough that their party looks after the interests of their class, 
but not much beyond that." 
Alignment as Disposition 
As this chapter has already implied, class has an impact on voting by instilling, within 
the voter, an alignment in favour ofthe party which champions his/her class interests. 
This party alignment, once generated, is effective for a long time - plausibly for a 
lifetime. "Partisanship is a habit, the strength of which grows with the length of time 
one has had the habit. "^ 
However, this does not mean the voter automatically votes for the party with which 
they are aligned. Rather, voters aligned to (for instance) the Labor Party will vote 
Labor unless the political circumstances ofthe moment compel them to vote for 
another party. Pulzer probably put it best: 
Class voting, I have argued, does not mean that every 
individual's vote can be predicted from his occupation, merely 
that his occupation is a better predictor than any rival 
characteristic.^ 
^ Butler, D. & Stokes, D. (1974) Political Change in Britain MacMillan, London 81 
Nie, N., Verba, S., & Petrocik, J. (1976) 77?^  Changing American Voter, Harvard Univerity Press 
Cambridge Mass. 59 ' 
Pulzer, P. (1967) Political Representation and Elections in Britain, George Allen & Unwin, Londnn 
109 
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Class in Australia. 
Class has been an integral part ofthe Australian party system since its very begirming. 
In fact, the modem party system began as a result ofthe Trade Union movement 
seeking political, rather than militant, means to advance the position ofthe Australian 
working class: 
The inauguration ofthe Labor Party with a deliberate aim to 
appeal to, seek support from, and represent the working class 
acted as a lens to focus the development of a party system based 
on class. 
Faced in parliament by a working class party which was disciplined and professional, 
the middle classes of Australia had little option but to organise themselves politically 
to oppose Labor. Thus the conservative forebears to the current Liberal and National 
parties came into existence. 
This Labor/Non-Labor dichotomy has persisted through to the present. Other parties 
have occasionally played a part in the system (most notably the Democratic Labor 
Party (DLP) and the Australian Democrats) but these have never been represented in 
the House of Representatives, and have therefore never been a factor in the creation of 
a govemment. 
'° Jaensch, D. (1989) Power Politics, Allen & Unwin, Sydney 61 
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In recent decades, the dichotomy has been under challenge. A declme in the relative 
magnitude ofthe blue-collar, Labor oriented working class was expected to resuh m a 
decrease ofthe strength of party alignment in Australia. The principal inhial 
exponent of this view was Kemp, who wrote: 
Class, religion, region and the urban/rural cleavage are of 
decreasing significance politically because of structural trends 
in these societies which are altering the bases on which 
perceptions of political interests are formed. 
As late as 1982, Aitkin opposed Kemp's view, stating: 
In summary, neither British nor American experience has 
obtained in Australia where, despite the political turbulence of 
the 1970s and the diminished esteem in which the parties and 
institutions of government are held, the importance of party and 
party identification is apparently as great as ever. 
1 '^  
However by 1983 Aitkin confirmed a "weakening ofthe class-party link" on the 
basis of evidence comparing party identification and occupational grade among men 
in 1967 and 1979. He concluded that "on the basis ofthe evidence ... class, as 
" Kemp, D. (1978) Society & Electoral Behavior in Australia, UQ Press, St Lucia 348 
'^  Aitkm, D. (1982) Stability and Change in Austi-alian Politics, 2"*^  ed, ANfU Press, Canberra 290 
'^  Aitkin, D. (1983) "The Changing Australian Electorate" m Penniman, H. (ed) Austi-alia At The Polls, 
The National Elections of 1980 and 1983, American Enterprise Institute, Sydney 20-21 
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measured by occupation, is not as powerful as it used to be in determining party 
preference."' 
McAllister and Ascui explained part of Labor's success in the 1987 election in terms 
ofthe decline of class-based party alignment: 
The second reason for Labor's success is the increasing 
openness of electoral competition. WhUe party identification 
and socioeconomic status are still very much the bases ofthe 
major political parties, the proportion of party loyalists in the 
electorate - those who claim to have voted consistently for one 
party throughout their electoral lifetime - has swung in favour 
of Labor. Election outcomes are now, more than ever, 
determined by the defectors who are not solely wedded to the 
support of one political party. ^ ^ 
Papadakis confirmed this emerging trend during his assessment ofthe 1990 federal 
election: 
Although the 1990 election did not bring about a major shift in 
the social bases of support for political parties, it provided 
further evidence of a weakening of ties or dealignment from 
them. Insofar as a standard measure of party identification is 
of any use in identifying such trends, the decline in strong 
'" Aitkin (1983)/6/W, 20 
' ' McAllister and Ascui (1988) "Votmg Pattems" in McAllister and Warhurst (eds) Austi-alia Votes, 
The 1987 Federal Election, Cheshire, Sydney 220 
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identification with political parties that occurred in the 1980s 
was not reversed. 
While appearing to agree with the general proposition ofthe decline of class-based 
party alignment, Jaensch has suggested that the declme has more to do with the 
strength of party alignment: 
The increasing volatility in recent elections ... and the increases 
in the size and diversity of shifts of electoral opinion are the 
external indications of change. But the cause may well be a 
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change in the patterns o/sfrength of party identification. 
Kemp, identifying the pattems of dealignment in Australia in 1977-78, wrote during a 
period where the Liberal Party had experienced a lengthy period of near-hegemonic 
rule at the Federal level, broken only by the Whhlam intertegnum of 1972-1975. 
Since then, the Labor Party govemed for 13 years, from 1983 until 1996 under Hawke 
and Keating - hardly the performance of a class-based party representing a declinfrig 
class. 
Part ofthe reason for hs success during the 1980s was that, perhaps anticipating a 
decline in the working class, the Labor Party deliberately extended its appeal towards 
white-collar workers and middle Australia. Politics, for much ofthe two decades 
since Kemp's book, has been about "possession of middle Australia" rather than about 
^^  Papadakis, E. (1990) "Minor Parties" m Bean, C, McAllister, I. & Warhurst, J. (eds) The Greening 
of Australian Politics, Longman Cheshire, Sydney, 50 
'"^  Jaensch, D. (1995) Election! ,Allen & Unwin, Sydney 120 
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simple, almost gladiatorial representation of class interests. 
However, it is still largely the case that the Labor Party extends towards the middle 
from a solid working-class base, and the conservative parties extend towards the 
middle from their middle-class, professional, and farming base. The main contest 
may be for the middle, swinging vote, and the proportion of such voters may be 
increasing, but significant and critical support still comes to each side ofthe political 
divide from their traditional support bases. 
Class in Queensland 
Class-based politics in Queensland has, in many respects, followed the path outlined 
above for the rest ofthe nation. However there are a number of important 
distinguishing characteristics in Queensland's development which bear examination. 
The first of these is that in Queensland the workers' movements which founded 
organised labour began in rural and agricultural areas. It was the rurally-based farm 
workforces, the shearers and farmhands together with miners and railway work gangs, 
who first organised themselves politically, not the urban industrial proletariat. Few 
other examples of such development may be found anywhere in the world: 
[Queensland is characterised] by the presence of a highly-
organised workers' movement in a community whose welfare is 
based largely upon primary industry. In the United Kingdom 
and most other parts ofthe world rural workers were the last to 
be organised. In Queensland the first major unions developed in 
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the western pastoral areas, and their successor, the Australian 
Workers' Union, is still by far the most powerful single union in 
10 
the State. 
Infrially, these workers' movements were dominated by mihtant groups who favoured 
strike action as a means of bringing about change. However such methods were 
unsuccessful owing to the readuiess ofthe colonial govemment to use force -
including troops - to break the strikes. The most well-remembered of these, the 
shearers' strike near Clermont ui 1890, was crushed by armed soldiers and the leaders 
were held in prison for more than three years. Another reason for the failure of 
militancy was the organisation ofthe employing classes - a level of organisation 
rarely found in other polities: 
Aside from ruthless employment of state coercion against 
strikers, the other salient feature ofthe 1890s strikes was the 
unprecedented solidarity ofthe employers. With their greater 
fiinancial resources and the backing of like-minded governments, 
employers were seen as a class that was demonstrating its ability 
to smash even the most hard-fought workers' struggle. The 
working class was then left to face the bitter years ofthe 1890s 
depression in disarray. 
With the failure of uidustrial militancy, the workers' movements tumed towards direct 
18 Morrison, A. (1960) "The Govemment of Queensland" in Davis, S. (1960) The Govemment ofthe 
Australian States, Longmans, London252 
Fitzgerald, R. & Thomton, H. (1989) Labor in Queensland, UQ Press, St Lucia 5 19 
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political representation. Their first efforts met with limited success but by the tum of 
the century the new Labor Party had achieved stability, discipline, and a measure of 
respectability. This had been increased in 1899 when factional fighting in the 
Griffith - Mcllwraith 'continuous Ministry' led to the formation - albeit for just 8 days 
- of a Labor govemment. As Queensland Labor supporters never tire of noting, this 
was the first Labor govemment anywhere in the world. 
In 1915, Labor began a period of 52 years of near-unbroken rule which lasted until 
1957. During this period of rule the Labor party was very much a class-based party: 
Labor's electoral base in Queensland lay in the rural working 
class and among sections of small family farmers. Queensland's 
economy was largely dependent on rural industries employing a 
large itinerant and highly unionised workforce ... These 
agricultural sectors ... were a vital source of votes for any 
workers' party seeking office in Queensland.' 
The manufacturing sector in "Queensland has lagged behind most other states. 
Manufacturing establishments tended to be tied to processing primary products, and in 
employment and value added they were below national averages." As a result, 
although Labor dominated voting in Brisbane, it relied upon rural workers and 
numbers of small arable farmers for the bulk of its strength. 
°^ hi 1929 Labor was defeated at the outset ofthe depression but regained office in 1932 as its 
Coalition successor was blamed for the privations ofthe depression. 
'^ Fitzgerald & Thomton (1989) ibid 162 
^^  Hughes, C. (1980) The Government of Queensland, UQ Press, St Lucia 8 
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As with the rest of Australia, Queensland has suffered a steady declme in the number 
employed both in manufacturing and m primary fridustry, and as a resuh the 
Queensland Labor Party has followed the Federal Party in seekmg votes from middle 
Queensland. However, fr is still true that Labor domfriates the capital and the major 
regional centres, while the Nationals dominate the countryside and the Liberals, until 
the 2001 election, were limhed to a few affluent Brisbane seats. 
Other bases of Alignment - the Rural/Urban Cleavage 
To this point, class has been focussed upon as the factor appears to orient or align 
voters towards the party which represents or champions their class. However, it has 
been suggested that other factors, such as region, ethnicity, gender or religion can also 
align voters towards a political party. Of these, there is little doubt that class is the 
most useful predictor of voting. Before concluding this section the rural/urban 
cleavage which, especially in Queensland, has some capacity to align voters, will be 
briefly described. 
Country people in Queensland are held to form a distinct constituency with interests 
often sharply at odds with urban dwellers. Political appeals to the friterests of rural 
dwellers may align those voters with one or another party. The Country Party (now 
the National Party) has, for most of hs history, been the beneficiary of this alignment. 
It has been seen as the champion of country interests, and "relies for its support 
almost entirely upon farmers, dairymen and pastoralists."^^ 
^^  Morrison (1960) op cit 293 
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Reasons for the salience of the urban/mral cleavage are many and varied, but two 
appear to be of prime importance: First, the rural dweller, more than the city dweller, 
has a sense of identity and parochialism defined at the local, rather than the state or 
national level. They look, therefore, to the party most likely to represent those 
interests in parliament. Second, and probably more importantly, the economic 
interests of rural dwellers may be starkly different to those of city dwellers, different 
enough to require representation by a separate pohtical party. 
Like the class cleavage, the rural/urban cleavage seems to have declined during recent 
decades, and for much the same reasons. Where proponents of class dealignment 
might claim that class is declining in electoral importance owing to the 
embourgeoisement of manual, blue collar workers, proponents of mral dealignment 
claim the rural vote is declining owing to a falling proportion of Queenslanders living 
in country areas. While the Labor party has been relatively successful in reorienting 
its image to broaden its supporter base, the Nationals have been less successful and 
are still largely conflned to country electorates, despite a push, in the 1970s-1980s, to 
move into Brisbane electorates. 
The emergence ofthe One Nation Party into Queensland Politics in the 1998 election, 
at the cost of National Party heartland and some Labor provincial city seats, may be 
an indicator of mral disenchantment with their representation by the National Party, 
and of more rapidly declining identification between rural populations and the 
National Party. It is, however, too early to make these claims with any confidence. It 
is just as likely that One Nation's success in 1998, in the light of its decline in 2001, 
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will be seen as an interesting abertation in Queensland pohtics, rather than as the 
harbinger of a new political era. 
Issues 
As noted above, smce the 1970s researchers have found indications that aligned 
voting, and particularly voting aligned by class, appears to have a diminishing 
capacity to explain or predict voting outcomes. The challenge for the discipline, then, 
was to establish which factors were uifluencuig electoral behaviour. Infrially, most 
attention focussed on Issue Voting, also described as Rational Vothig. 
The basic thesis of issue voting is that voters, freed from the constraints of habit, 
consider their vote afresh at each election and vote for their party of choice. Voters 
are held to have no ongoing commitment to, nor preference for, one party over 
another. Rather, during each election campaign (and perhaps throughout the entire 
term of office) they remain well informed about the political issues ofthe day, and 
make a voting choice based upon a rational decision about which party is more 
worthy of their vote: 
We can think ofthe individual's voting decision as resulting from 
an overall judgment on which party best represents his [sic] own 
views on how the country should be govemed, or best looks after 
the interests he [sic] shares.^'^ 
'* Sarlvik, B. & Crewe, I. (1983) Decade of Dealignment, Cambridge Universty Press, London 248 
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The concept of informed intelligent chizens, carefully considering their vote, is 
central to an idealised notion of democracy, but this concept has generally been held 
to live more in rhetoric than reality, except by Rational Voting theorists, who insist 
that we are much closer to this ideal than we realise. 
Which Issues? Parties Choosing their Battleground 
Duruig the course of any election the total number of issues available for 
consideration probably outnumber the total number of voters available to consider 
them. Even the most forthright proponents of rational voting do not claim that voters 
can be informed on all issues. A question then arises: why do some issues gain 
prominence, while others are not fully considered? 
Any number of groups within the political system have the capacity to promote issues, 
particularly political parties which spend considerable time and effort in "choosing 
their battleground", that is, choosing to promote issues where their position is strong 
or popular, and where that of their opponents is weak: 
The issues that come to the fore in an election campaign are 
likely to acquire more importance as determinants of voting 
behaviour than they would have had under other circumstances. 
It follows that it is advantageous for a party to try to focus the 
attention in a campaign on the issues on which the underlying 
'balance of opinions' is favourable. 
25 Sarlvik & Crewe (1983) ibid 195 
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hi Australia, manoeuvring by the parties to try to brmg to the fore their strongest 
issues has always been a part of election campaigning: 
The Prime Minister's announcement attempted to set the 
campaign agenda. 'This will be an election about leadership' 
fCanberta Times, 28 January 1996). Paul Keating nominated 
industrial relations, health, the republic, and the environment as 
the issues on which the government chose to fight ... Howard, in 
reply, chose the economy, policies for small business and 
families, foreign debt, inflation, and a decline in values and 
standards as the important issues.' 
Promoting the Party Position 
97 
Butler and Stokes developed a series of criteria against which to judge whether issue 
voting occurs. One important criterion was that the voter must perceive the parties to 
have different policies on the issue at hand. It follows, then that, once an issue has 
crossed the threshold of publicity and become one ofthe election issues, parties must 
promote their own position on the issue, and differentiate their position from that of 
their opponents. Sarlvik and Crewe concurted: 
Warhurst, J. (1997) "Promises and Personalities" in Bean, C , Simms, M., et al. The Politics of 
Reti-ibution: The 1996 Federal Election, Allen & Unwin, Sydney 5 
^^  Butler and Stokes (1974), op cit, ch 13 - U, passim 
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In general, an issue will clearly have the most impact on the 
party division ofthe vote when two conditions are fulfilled: when 
opinions on the issue 'make a great deal of difference' to 
individuals and at the same time the distribution of opinions in 
the electorate as a whole is weighted in favour of one ofthe 
parties. ... A balance of opinions in favour of one of the parties 
on one ofthe issues thus indicates that a comparatively large 
portion ofthe electorate could be attracted to that party (and 
repelled by its opponents). 
In order to further differentiate their own policies from those of their opposition, and 
in order to maximise their potential support, parties will not only promote their own 
issue positions as 'good', but will also promote those of their opposition as 'bad'. A 
"fear campaign" style of electioneering in fact concentrates more on criticising one's 
opposition's positions than on promoting one's own. 
Issues and Aligned Voting 
It is often difficult to assess the impact that issues may have had on electoral 
behaviour. Awareness of an issue, combined with a class alignment, and an awareness 
ofthe favoured party's position on that issue, may result in a voter claiming to hold 
that position. However, the position held would not necessarily be the result of 
rational consideration, but rather of successfully received cues from the party of 
preference: 
^^  Sarlvik & Crewe (1983) op cit 270 - 271 
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The individual actively searches for the party and/or candidate 
which seems most likely to implement policies which he favours 
and whose style of government he can respect Force ofhabU 
will affect the degree to which attitude-fiU is relevant - the habU 
of avoiding a particular party being as signifiicant as always 
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voting for the same party. 
In the same manner, voters who have, for a particular election, behaved in a textbook 
like rational maimer, and engaged in research, debate and long agonizing, may vote 
for the party they have always voted for, but on the basis of an issue position rather 
than because of alignment. In post election survey research, such a person will 
probably report "Oh, I voted Liberal as usual" and may therefore be counted as an 
aligned voter. 
Political Knowledge and Rational Voting 
Finally, the most telling crhicism regulariy levelled against the importance of Rational 
Voting , focuses on the suggestion that if a rational voter is to make a rational choice 
on the basis ofthe pohtical issues ofthe day, then she/he must have a store of 
knowledge upon which to base that choice. However, field work has regularly 
demonstrated that, overwhelmmgly, the vast majorhy ofthe voting public is ill-
informed. Two quotations will serve to illustrate the tone of findmgs across the 
discipline: 
29 Himmelweit, H. et al (1981) //ow Voters Decide, Academic Press, New York 73 
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The simplest evidence about the extent of popular attention to the 
affairs of government must challenge any image ofthe elector as 
an informed spectator. Understanding of policy issues falls 
away very sharply indeed as we move outwards from those at the 
heart of political decision making to the public at large. 
In the real world, uncertainty and lack of information prevent 
even the most intelligent and well-informed voter from behaving 
in precisely the [rational] fashion we have described. 
Although these criticisms have merit, they may not entirely invalidate Issue Voting. 
Certainly at a national level, knowledge of issues may be so poor as to make rational 
voting unlikely. However at a local level, and especially in small communities, 
knowledge of particular issues may be much greater. Local affairs are promoted in 
local newspapers, much more prominently than are national issues. They are 
discussed within the community, and they are more easily comprehensible. Voters 
who are unable to form an issue position on cortective services and criminal 
rehabilitation generally may nonetheless be able to determine whether or not they 
want the new gaol the govemment proposes to site in their town. Such a 
determination may well influence their vote in favour of- or against - the party 
proposing the gaol. Such behaviour would constitute an issue vote. 
°^ Butler and Stokes (1974) op cit 277 
^' Downs, A. (1957) An Economic Theory of Democracy, Harper Collins, New York 45 
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Image 
Image-rational votuig is based upon the proposhion that voters respond to the image a 
party presents during its pohtical campaign, and during frs normal activity in pohtics. 
A party with a positive image, which is seen by the voters as possessing many 
poshive attributes, is likely to receive votes on ofthe basis of those attributes. 
Creation of an Image 
The creation of a party image to be promoted during a political campaign parallels the 
creation of a 'product image' to be promoted during an advertising campaign. The 
objective is to associate the party/product with positive feeling from the 
voter/consumer such that they are more likely to vote for the party/purchase the 
product. This means that the party must be associated with certain values that the 
voters feel are 'good'. Butler and Stokes put fr thus: 
A party should be 'wise' rather than 'foolish', 'strong' rather than 
'weak', 'expert' rather than 'clumsy', perhaps even 'united' rather 
than 'split'. The presumption that this is true explains why party 
managers invest so much effort in projecting image properties to 
the mass electorate. ^ ^ 
32 Butler & Stokes (1974) op cit 340 
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Each party attempts to project not only a positive image of itself, but also a negative 
image of frs opponent in much the same manner as they present their own, and their 
opposition's, issue positions. 
Each party seeks to project at least two images, one of itself and 
one of its principal rival, and to tie each to particulars which 
provide verisimilitude. Each emphasises the threat which its 
opponents present as strongly as, if not more than, the benefits 
which it has brought itself and will bring again. 
The presentation of an opposition's negative image must be done with great care. The 
electorate is quick to criticise any 'mudslinging' or ad hominem attacks by parties or 
leaders upon one another. This may be explained by Lazarsfeld, Berelson and 
Gaudet's assertion vis-a-vis American voters: "Whatever people may think of minor 
politicians, they apparently prefer to believe that the nominees for the highest office in 
the land are worthy men."^ "* 
While this may be tme, some leaders have been able to use a confrontational, 
insulting style without any loss of support - indeed, their style may bring them 
additional support. Prime Minister Paul Keating's use of the term "Scumbag" and 
other epithets to describe successive Liberal leaders appeared to bring electoral 
support; on the other hand. Prime Minister Gough Whitlam's characterisation of 
Queensland Premier Joh Bjelke-Petersen as a "Bible-bashing bastard" had the reverse 
" Hughes, C. (1969) Images and Issues, ANU Press, Canberra 25 
^^  Lazarsfeld, Berelson, Gaudet (1948) op cit 38 
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effect, fr is possible that some pohticians, like Keatmg, who develop their ovm 
image, through a lifetime of pohtics, as somewhat brash and hard-fighting, may 
derive benefit from an attacking style consistent with that image, hi the case of 
Whitlam, however, the epithet did not result from characteristic toughness but rather 
from an uncharacteristic loss of temper - the resuh, in the mind of the Queensland 
electorate, as seen in the resuh ofthe 1974 Queensland election, was a win for Bjelke-
Petersen for engineering this loss of temper. 
Image in Government 
In opposition, a party is essentially free to mould its political image as it wishes, albeit 
within broad historical constraints. When in govemment, though, the party's image 
will be fashioned as much by the electorate's assessment ofthe govemment's recent 
performance as by any conscious image-making undertaken by the govemment itself 
It is a double-jeopardy situation for any govemment: h may (and most certauily will) 
claim any credh arising from a situation changing for the better, whether it changed in 
response to govemmental initiative or not, but govemment is often blamed when 
thmgs go wrong (e.g. high unemployment, high inflation), even if the situation is 
beyond its control. 
Image in Australian Elections 
The similarities between the constmction of a political image and the construction of 
a product image for an advertising campaign were described above. One factor which 
renders these so similar is that they are conducted before a mass audience, through the 
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mass media. The growth of image as a major factor in Australian politics can 
therefore be traced through the mass media. 
The breakthrough of image as a pohtical tool came in the 1972 federal election 
campaign, when Gough Whitlam led the Labor Party to an epic win over the Coalition 
parties, which had govemed continuously since 1949. Labor's 1972 campaign slogan, 
"It's Time" lent itself to a variety of uses in the mass media. It was short and punchy. 
It was used in song, written on T-Shirts, and could be splashed across a single 
television screen in large letters. 
The centrepiece ofthe campaign was a television commercial^^ which began with a 
single singer, singing short, positive messages: 'It's time for freedom /It's time for 
moving / It's time to begin, yes it's time"". Soon the initial singer was backed by a 
chorus of Australians representing a wide cross-section of society - old, young, male, 
female, conservative, radical, clean shaven, unshaven, and so on, all singing the same 
messages. Eventually the singing was punctuated by images of Gough Whitlam as a 
boy; at university; getting married; as a bartister, and so forth. The commercial was 
at least halfway through by the time a recognisable picture of Whitlam was shown, 
and the word "Labor" was not mentioned until the official voiceover at the end. The 
critical thing about this commercial is that it did not, in any way, seek to make any 
substantial policy statements. There were no promises, no reasoning, just pure 
positive image - yet its impact on voters was remarkable. A McNair exit poll showed 
^' The author is mdebted to staff at ScreenSound Australia (The National Film and Sound Archives), 
Canberra, for locating a copy of this commercial. 
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that the greatest single reason Labor voters had for voting Labor in 1972 was "It's 
time for a change" . 
Since Labor's 1972 victory, television election advertisements have become a critical 
part of each party's campaign, and millions of dollars are spent to make them 
successftil. The Labor Party had a long association with advertismg expert John 
Singleton, who handled the successftil advertising campaigns durmg thefr period of 
office from 1987 to 1996. His commercials were a crhical part of each campaign, but 
he dealt in images, not in substantial information: 
Labor's advertising campaign began with four television 
commercials featuring Hawke sitting at a shiny desk in brown 
suit, light tie, crisp white shirt, crowned with silver hair, looking 
confident and confiding, the most natural PM since Menzies. 
When John Singleton made the commercials he was amazed at 
Hawke. "A professional actor couldn't have done it any better, " 
Singleton said. 
Kelly's account ofthe 1990 campaign does not tell us what the message behind the 
commercials was, nor what the issues dealt with were - because those were 
unimportant. The image crafted by Shigleton and delivered by Hawke was the 
purpose ofthe commercials. 
^^  McNau- Surveys Pty Ltd (1972) Reasons For The Swing To Labor, pamphlet prepared for the ABC. 
" Kelly, P. (1992) The End of Certainty, Allen & Unwin, Sydney 572-573 
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Image in Queensland 
The impact of pohtical image also came to Queensland in the 1970s. Initially, Joh 
Bjelke-Petersen was, by any standards, a poor performer on television. He delivered 
tortured syntax, possessed a quick temper, and exhibited little tolerance for television 
interviewers. Interviews where the Premier became agitated, then angry, and one 
when he walked out during the interview made excellent television - and a very poor 
image for the Premier. 
This changed in 1971 when Alan Callaghan, formerly ofthe Australian Broadcasting 
Commission, was hired as the Premier's media adviser. Under Callaghan's tutelage, 
Bjelke-Petersen became an unlikely master ofthe media game. 
The Queensland premier, under Callaghan, became so much of a 
media exponent that while federal ministers in Canberra were 
accused of hiding from pressmen, Bjelke-Petersen couldn't see 
them enough. At least once a day he met with reporters, jokingly 
calling them his chooks - "1 have to feed them every afternoon. " 
He would threaten on occasions to stop talking regularly to the 
press but they were really as important to him as he was to them 
-perhaps more so. 
^^  Lunn, H. (1978) Jo/z, UQ Press, St Lucia 103. This quote is from Ch, 7, "Switching on the New 
Image", which gives extensive details of Bjelke-Petersen's image-building machine under Callaghan 
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Wayne Goss, who led the ALP to victory in 1989, was also an accomplished media 
performer, whose style became known as the Goss Gloss. Both Goss and Bjelke-
Petersen (or, perhaps more accurately, their staffs) developed their expertise to a point 
where they came to dominate the relationship with the media, manipulating media 
outlets m a process described as "news management". 
Regular discussion, direction from the centre, and experience in 
working as a team ensured the Goss government's media 
operations maintained control of images and announcements 
throughout the first term. 
Image and Television 
It is no coincidence that, at both the state and federal level, the importance of political 
images in winning elections was linked to the first effective use of television as a 
campaigning medium. Image can be formed in other ways (political cartoons in 
newspapers spring immediately to mind) but no other medium can deliver images as 
strongly and continuously, and to as wide an audience, as television. 
The swinging voter is culturally adrift with little appreciation of 
how the society works and even less understanding of what is in 
his or her interests. This makes him or her a prime target for 
emotional political appeals; for impressions and imagery rather 
^^ Davis (1993) "Executive and Policy Co-ordmation" 40 m Stevens, B. & Wanna, J. (1993) The Goss 
Government - Promise and Performance of Labor in Queensland, McMillan, Melboume 
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than political issues; for political advertising rather than policy 
speeches. When it comes to this sort of appeal, it is television 
that has the most impact, not the press. 
Personal Voting 
Another theory advanced to explain votes which are not cast in accordance with party 
alignment is that those votes are cast on a personal basis; that is, that they are cast for 
the candidate themselves, rather than for the candidate as the representative of a 
political party. Connectionalism, it will be shown, is one form of personal voting. 
This section will describe personal voting in more general terms, with a focus on 
incumbency and "constituency service" as means of explaining the personal vote. 
Does Personal Voting Exist? 
The existence and importance of personal voting has been sharply contested. Aitkin's 
view provides the orthodox position against personal voting: 
Yet a candidate's personal qualities are the final gloss on his 
[sic] image: essentially he is the standard-bearer of his party, 
and for most electors he is nothing more. And without the 
standard of one ofthe three major parties, he is nothing at all. 
"" Wmdschuttle, K. (1988) The Media, Pengum, Melboume 311 
''^  Aitkin, D. (1977) Stability and Change in Australian Politics, ANU Press, Canberra 258 
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Bean, however, analysed data at a federal level from the 1987 Australian National 
Social Science Survey, and found that personal voting did exist at statistically 
significant levels: 
Indeed, despite the fact that the figures derive from a very 
conservative estimate ofthe vote-winning power of local 
personalities, only party identifiication and attitudes to party 
leaders had a greater direct impact at the federal election of 
1987.^^ 
This debate, however, is far from resolved, and little academic attention has been paid 
to the operation of personal voting at a state level. Speculation about personal voting 
has largely been left to political joumalists attempting to explain electoral outcomes in 
their immediate aftermath. If this thesis demonstrates that connectional voting does 
take place in Queensland, this result may increase the strength of arguments in favour 
of personal voting. 
Personal voting, Incumbency and Constituency Service 
Personal voting in the USA and the UK has received somewhat more attention than it 
has m Australia. Many of these studies Imk personal voting with the advantages of 
incumbency: 
42 
Bean, C. (1990) "The Personal Vote in Australian Federal Elections," Political Studies, v.38, 267 
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Sitting Members of Parliament (MPs) [in the UK] have inbuilt 
advantages over their challengers in that they enjoy the powers 
of office and the benefiits of publicity throughout the life of a 
parliament and can also draw on their record of constituency 
and parliamentary work. Since British MPs have less individual 
power and are more tightly tied to Party than are their American 
congressional peers, incumbency advantage in the United 
Kingdom is less substantial than in the United States. 
Nevertheless, it does exist. 
The difficulty with claiming the success of incumbents as proof of personal voting is 
that the retention of seats by incumbents is exactly what one might expect to see in a 
situation where party identification was strong and stable. A strong, stable majority 
vote (based on party alignment) for one or another party will assure the retum ofthe 
incumbent for as long as the demographics ofthe seat remain stable. 
The strongest argument linking personal voting and incumbency is also alluded to in 
the quotation above, which states that incumbent candidates can "show their record of 
constituency ... work." Several authors have linked constituency work or "casework" 
with the success of incumbents. Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina (1987) argue, in The 
Personal Vote, that 
In both [the USA and UK] constituency service is a major 
''^  Pattie, C , Johnston, R., Fieldhouse, E. (1995) "Winning the Local Vote: The Effectiveness of 
Constituency Campaign Spending in Great Britain, 1983-1992" American Political Science Review, 
Vol. 89 No. 4, December 1995, 975 
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component of the personal vote and probably an increasingly 
important component of constituent support for Members ... MPs 
as well as congressmen engage in constituency service at least in 
part as a means of enhancing their prospects of re-election, and 
at least in part their efforts pay off 
This view has not, however, been uncontested. Nortis et al describe the casework 
undertaken by incumbent UK Members as "Service Incumbency." They set out to 
test the hypothesis that "hard-working MPs who concentrate on local casework 
develop a greater personal vote than those who devote more time to committee work 
or parliamentary debates."''^ They found no "Service Incumbency" effect for 
Conservative MPs, and a very modest benefit for Labour MPs."*^  
One study in the USA found that consthuency service was unlikely to obtain 
addhional support, because h was expected, and therefore unworthy of particular 
praise: 
Voters, essentially, are ingrates. Casework fails to produce a 
signifiicant effect on the vote because constituents fully expect 
their congressman [sic] to render such personal "bureaucratic 
unsticking services "for them.'^^ 
'' Cam, B., Ferejohn, J., Fiorina, M. (1987) The Personal Vote, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
MA, 194 * 
'' Norris, P., Vallance, E., Lovenduski, J. (1992) "Do Candidates Make a Difference? Gender Race 
Ideology and hicumbency" Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 45 No. 4, October 1992 498 
ibid 507 
' ' Johamies, J., McAdams, J. (1981) "The Congressional hicumbency Effect: Is it Casework, Policy 
Compatibility, or Something Else? An Examination of the 1978 Election." American Journal of 
Political Science, Vol. 25, No. 3, August 1981 537 
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Constituency service has not been systematically studied in Australia. Bean"*^  found 
some advantage, but noted that 
There is clearly no simple relationship between a local member's 
number of years in office and an 'incumbency advantage' as 
such. The idea of MPs 'building up' a positive personal vote as 
their length of tenure increases receives no support here ... If the 
personal vote is based largely on constituency service then the 
efforts of local members need to be maintained over time. MPs 
cannot rely on building up a good reputation among their 
constituents and then rest on their laurels ... 
Bean suggested that the incumbency effect peaked between 4 and 10 years service, 
rising quickly at the beginning because new Members "may put in a good deal of 
effort in the first few years in order to establish a favourable reputation .. ."^' 
This suggests a phenomenon known as the "second-time surge" where Members 
facing their first re-election do better than expected. This phenomenon was noticed in 
1987 in the UK, when the "class of 1983" did better than expected in the House of 
Commons elections and in the Australian House of Representative m the 1996 
election, when the Coalition's "1993 Freshmen"^"* did better than expected. 
48 Bean (1990) op cit, passim, but see 268 
^' ibid, 268 
'° ibid, 264 
'^ ibid, 268 
^^  Norris et al (1992) op cit 508 
" Norton, R. & Wood, D. (1990) "Constituency Service by Members of Parliament: Does if 
Contribute to a Personal Vote?" Parliamentary Affairs, Vol 43, No 2, April 1990 pp \96-2Q%, passim 
•^^  Bean et al (1997) op cit 223. The term "Freshman" is used m the soiu-ce with apologies to 
"Freshwoman" Judi Moylan MP. 
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The "second time surge" may well suggest the importance of constituency service in 
generating or protecting the benefits of incumbency, but the value of personal voting 
is still far from agreed. 
Models Of Voting Behaviour 
It is apparent that Class, Image, and Issues all have some capacity to predict or 
explain voting behaviour. Yet none of them comes close to completely accounting for 
voting pattems, and while they represent the most important factors hifluencing 
voting outcomes, there are any number of other factors which may also have an 
impact at least some ofthe time for at least some ofthe people. Models are therefore 
required to link different determinants of voting, to try to chart the multitude of 
influences on voters, and to make some sense of their voting decisions as a result. 
The two most commonly cited models are the Funnel of Causality, developed by 
Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes^^, and the Lifetime Learning Model, 
developed by Rose and McAllister^^. 
The Funnel of Causality 
Writing at the height ofthe popularity of class-based aligned voting, Campbell et al 
broadly accepted the importance of social class as a determinant of voting behaviour 
but rejected the notion that it stood alone m importance. Instead they saw their task as 
Campbell, A. et al (1960) The American Voter, Wiley, New York, especially pp 24 - 32 
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Rose, R. & McAllister, I. (1986) Voters Begin to Choose, Sage, London, especially chapter 11 
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"to account for a single idea at a fixed point in time.... that stems from a muhitude of 
other factors". They accounted for the combined effect of these factors by 
considering them within a "Funnel of Causality", described thus: 
...let us imagine that the axis of the funnel represents a time 
dimension. Events are conceived to follow each other in a 
converging sequence of causal chains, moving from the mouth to 
the stem of the funnel. The funnel shape is a logical product of 
the explanatory task chosen. Most ofthe complex events in the 
funnel occur as a result of multiple prior causes. Each such 
event is, in its turn, responsible for multiple effects as well, but 
our focus of interest narrows as we approach the dependent 
behaviour. We progressively eliminate those effects that do not 
continue to have relevance for the political act. Since we are 
forced to take all partial causes as relevant at any juncture, 
relevant effects are therefore many fewer in number then 
relevant causes. The result is a convergence effect. 
Long-term factors resulting, as described in the discussion of class, in a 
predisposition, would be placed in the widest part ofthe funnel, far back in 
time. Other factors, such as childhood socialisation, would also be in this 
part ofthe funnel. Further into the funnel would be factors such as a 
person's voting history (given that the act of casting one's first ballot 
usually comes later than the inheritance of one's social class, and certamly 
" Campbell et al (I960) op cit 24 
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later than one's childhood socialisation, and partly takes frs nature from 
each of these). Closer to the nartow end ofthe funnel would be events and 
experiences during the previous parliament, and closest of all would be 
events which occur duruig the campaign itself, culminating in the final 
attempt to influence voting - the handing out of how-to-vote cards within 
metres ofthe polluig booth. Voting intention is distilled through each of 
these factors, and the resuh which emerges from the funnel's point is the 
single voting act. 
It is worth noting in passing that, in compulsory preferential elections, the 
voting act is not comprised of one decision. Rather, there are a number of 
decisions: for whom to cast the primary vote, for whom to give the next 
preference, and so forth. In an optional preferential system, such as 
currently operates in Queensland, at each stage voters have a ftirther 
decision - to indicate a preference or retire the vote? This caveat does not, 
however, substantially detract from the model as described: instead ofthe 
funnel producing a single act, it produces the limfred range of acts which 
constimte a single vote. 
Cross-sections of the funnel 
This broad view ofthe funnel is a useful conceptual tool for building an 
overall picture of how any number of factors could have an influence on 
voters, but it is less useful as a tool to predict or explain voting behaviour. 
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For this further level of analysis, the authors suggest that a cross-section of 
the funnel, at any point in time, be examined: 
Now let us take a cross section ofthe cone of the funnel at any 
point, erecting a plane at right angles to the axis. Let us imagine 
that we can measure all events and states as they stand at the 
moment theyfiow through this plane. We would expect two 
results. First, we would have a congeries of variables that would 
be, in a peculiar and limited sense, ofthe same "conceptual 
order, " that is, owing to their simultaneity. Second, this array of 
variables should be able to predict the dependent behaviour 
perfectly, provided that we know the necessary combining 
laws. 
The final sentence of this quotation defines the challenge for the rest of The American 
Voter. The authors responded by devising fairly simple mathematical graphs, upon 
which they represented the various influences on votmg behaviour. The purpose of 
the graphs was to balance different attitudinal positions based upon different voting 
influences. However, their overall contribution to debates about electoral behaviour 
was the model itself, and not their attempt to create "combining laws". 
In a sense, the same quotation sets the challenge for this thesis, to demonstrate what 
causes voters in Queensland to act hi a "connectional" fashion; therefore, the task is to 
demonstrate which pohtical, social, or other factors, combined in different ways. 
^^  Campbell et al (1960) ibid 24 
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produce a fmal votuig act which can be described as "connectional". To this end the 
funnel of causality remains a useful tool. 
The Lifetime Learning Model 
Another model which attempts to order various hifluences on behaviour is the 
Lifetime Leaming Model, developed by Rose and McAllister^^. This model, like the 
Funnel of Causality, seeks to determine the impact of a muhfrude of factors on a 
single voting act: 
The division of academic labour normally concentrates attention 
upon a single set of influences upon voting behaviour, whether 
pre-adult socialisation, social structure, political principles, or 
the relatively transitory events of a Parliament or election 
campaign. However, the distinctive feature of an election is that 
voters are subject to all these influences simultaneously. 
As with the Fuimel of Causahty, the Lifetime Leaming Model first orders various 
influences along a time axis. First in their scale comes pre-adult socialisation, as 
environment, parental leaming, and the many other factors of childhood socialisation 
combine to produce, in the person, a disposition likely to favour one party or another. 
Other factors such as class position and adult socialisation follow during the voter's 
early adulthood, and then, for each election, factors such as party performance during 
'^  Rose & McAllister (1986) op cit ch. 11 
*° Rose & McAllister (1986) ibid 126, emphasis m the origmal. 
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the previous term, and events ofthe electoral campaign have their effect. 
The major distinction between the Lifetime Leaming Model and the Fuimel of 
Causality is that, in the Lifetime Leaming Model, the effects of various factors are 
held to be cumulative, to occur essentially in a sequential fashion. One cannot take a 
"cross-section" ofthe Lifetime Leaming Model and leam anything useful from it. 
Rather, it is retrospective, the explanatory capacities of various factors accumulating 
until the authors' claim to have accounted for virtually the whole voting choice. 
Dangers of application ofthe Two Models 
Both the Lifetime Leaming Model and the Funnel of Causality are useful analytical 
tools, but there are potential dangers in the interpretation of each model. Both focus 
on the passage of time as the central axis ofthe development of a vote, and consider 
each factor within the model as one of many independent variables acting 
cumulatively to produce a single dependent variable (one's vote). 
However, factors which impact on voting outcomes should not just be considered 
separately. They interact in what should be visible and measurable ways. For 
instance, if a voter found the Labor Party's image attractive, he/she may be more 
likely to identify with the working class and to vote in that maimer. Likewise, if a 
party consistently takes issue poshions that a voter agrees with, that voter is likely to 
regard the party as being "wise" or "right-thinking" or "sensible"; in other words, 
agreeable issue positions point to a positive image. There are endless numbers of 
similar possibilities, all of which appear to arise out ofthe interaction of different 
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influential factors which the two models described above would consider as discrete 
elements. 
The present thesis will not treat various influential factors as discrete and unable to act 
upon one another except in a cumulative fashion. The factors identified as promoting 
a connectional vote will be held to act upon the voter, and upon one another. 
Accounting for this interaction's existence and effect will be one ofthe major 
challenges in the argument which follows. 
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CHAPTER 3 - QUEENSLAND POLITICAL CULTURE 
Connectionalism, as will be argued in a later chapter, is a communhy artefact. It arises 
from the community's everyday life, as may be expressed in the ballot box. The 
communities to be studied in this thesis are all located within Queensland. They are 
distinct, with their own cultures and characteristics, but they are also Queensland 
communities and, as a result, are variations upon the Queensland cultural theme. It is 
thus necessary to examine the political culture of Queensland, to place data, collected 
in the field, in a political and cultural context. 
Unfortunately, there is no large body of recent research into Queensland political 
culture upon which to draw for this chapter. Existing studies of Queensland political 
culture date from the Bjelke-Petersen premiership of 1968 -1987, which present an 
account of Queensland before the Fitzgerald Inquiry and before the subsequent period 
of rapid political change and reform. Prior to 1989 there had only been three changes 
of Govemment in sixty years (1929, 1932, 1957). In the ten years since 1989, there 
have been three changes of Govemment (1989, 1996, 1998). Two of those 
Govemments have been minority Govemments, requiring the support of 
Independents.^ A new political party, One Nation, entered the fray and initially 
claimed eleven Assembly seats, then all but disappeared within one political term. 
Queensland, in the last decade, has thus been a political entity distmct from the 
Queensland described in earlier works on political culture. As a result, the earlier 
' It should be noted that one of these, the Beattie govemment, which took office in 1998, obtamed a 
majority in the Assembly by winnmg a by-election after six months as a minority Govemment. 
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sttidies are of historical importance, but have a limfred capacity to explain 
contemporary Queensland pohtical culture. 
The first part of this chapter will describe the political cuhure of Queensland before 
1989 to provide an historical context, while the second part will describe subsequent 
events, to better assess the curtent nature of Queensland political cuhure. 
The Traditional View of Queensland Political Culture 
Early radicalism 
Records of early Queensland described a colony which could claim to be politically 
radical. As a new democracy, and as a colony settled by those who sought a new 
lifestyle far from British social norms, Queensland was ideally positioned to enact 
radical political ideas: 
It was only in the years after Bjelke-Petersen's 1972 victory 
that Queensland became identified as an entrenched anti-
Labor, anti-progressive, anti-union state. It was easily 
forgotten that Queensland was the first Australian state to 
bring in compulsory voting (1915), to abolish hanging (1922), 
and to eliminate its upper house (1922), not to mention having 
the first Labor Government.^ 
'Lunn (1978) opc/n34 
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The abolition ofthe Legislative Council was a profound victory for radical 
democracy: Labor, with the Opposition's collusion, effectively overthrew a house of 
appointed members, on the basis that the elected Govemment should be able to 
govem unimpeded. While other states have, since 1922, reformed their Upper Houses, 
none has adopted the simpler solution of abolition. 
However, political radicalism was much more characteristic of rural Queenslanders 
than of city dwellers. As noted above, trade unionism in Queensland began amongst 
bush workers, and early militant industrial action was concentrated in regional and 
rural areas. Brisbane, on the other hand, was steady and conservative: 
The later reputation that Queensland sometimes justifiably 
gained for being a centre of nationalism and radicalism was 
rarely due to Brisbane, but to the traditions ofthe West, 
Centre, and North. From its earliest days Brisbane was often 
described as a quiet and boring town; the other side of this 
coin was the boast that it was a very law abiding community. 
However this picture of Brisbane as a centre of law, order, 
and dullness, contrasted greatly with the more colorful and 
often violent lifestyles in remoter parts ofthe colony. 
^ Attempts were made m NSW to abolish the Legislative Council in 1943, 1946, 1952 and 1959. None 
was successful. However, when self-government was bestowed upon the Australian Capital Territory 
and the Northem Territory, there was no thought of establishmg an Upper House. 




Another aspect of Queensland pohtical culture, the genesis of which can be traced 
back to the state's foundation, is its decentralisation. Historically there were two 
pattems of settlement in Queensland: first, a penal settlement established at Moreton 
Bay, the precursor to the state's caphal, Brisbane. Second, large numbers of settlers 
pushed up from northem New South Wales into the fertile Darlmg Downs region. 
They established thefr local capital in Toowoomba, with the colony's capital in 
Brisbane being, for them, largely irrelevant. 
Farming regions continued to open up as settlers pressed northwards, and a string of 
ports opened up along the coast, each serving their hinterland. Road and rail 
infrastructure still reflect these arrangements, with rail lines and highways running 
parallel to one another, east to west, from farms and mines to coastal ports. The north-
south rail link connecting Brisbane to Townsville was only completed in the 1920s 
while the poor state ofthe Bruce Highway linking the ports continues to be a matter 
of perennial complaint. 
Queensland therefore grew as a collection of regions, each focussed upon their major 
port. Decentralisation therefore bred regionalism, and Queensland pohtics (and indeed 
Queensland society) has since been characterised by intense regional compethiveness. 
The resuhs of this regionalism took a number of forms: fr promoted the political goal 
of development, fostered the notion of country life as morally superior to city life, and 




Regionalism brought with h an intense and competitive desire for the development of 
local communities; that is, for the development of infrastmcture to guarantee 
Queenslanders the standard of living they felt was their enthlement, regardless of their 
geographical location. 
The success of colonial Queensland was initially measured in 
the development of pastoralism and mining, and later 
agriculture. Inter- and intra-regional rivalry was seen to be 
the major determinant of railway, town and port development 
in Queensland. 
Every town felt it was entitled to its bank, its post office, its police station, its church 
or churches and its school. The desire for development led to the building of roads, 
bridges and dams; it led to the laying of thousands of kilometres of rail. Regional 
centres constantly competed to see which could achieve the highest level of 
development. 
Queensland commitment to development resulted in a perception that the role ofthe 
political system was to provide materially for the commimity. Govemments were 
judged by the size and nature of their development projects, and mdividual Members 
^ Smith, P. (1985) "Queensland's Political Culture" m Patience, A. (ed) The Bjelke-Petersen 
Premiership 1968-1983, Issues in Public Policy, Longman ChesWre, Melboume 22 
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of Parliament claimed new roads or new bridges chief among their pohtical successes 
at election time. Hughes indicates that such a perception of Govemment: 
May well derive from the nature of beliefs about identification 
with fellow citizens, which is seen as a passive joint receiving 
of benefits from Government, rather than an active collective 
striving to master the machine or to change society. 
Such an instmmental view of Govemment is inherently conservative because fr leads 
almost hievitably to the devaluing of intellectualism in politics. If the purpose of 
politics is merely to provide materially for the community, and if Parliament is just a 
major committee in that process, rather than a fomm for the discussion of new ideas 
to meet future aspirations, then academic pursuits, which build no roads and fence no 
paddocks, will seem unimportant. This is the case for Queensland political culture. 
In stating that "Queensland Labor leaders have seldom been men of ideas, let alone 
socialist ideas," Fitzgerald and Thomton are in effect saying no more than that 
Queensland Labor leaders have been fairly typical and usually successful Queensland 
politicians. 
The Moral Superiority of Country Life 
The decentralisation of Queensland, combined with the notion that the great wealth of 
the state was to be gained m mral areas through primary industries, led to the 
* Hughes, C. (1973) "Political Culture" in Mayer, H. & Nelson, H. (eds) Australian Politics: A Third 
Reader, Cheshire, Melboume 140 
^ Fitzgerald, H. & Thomton, H. (1989) Labor in Queensland, UQ Press, St Lucia 168 
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development within Queensland culture, and especially (but not exclusively) withhi 
country Queensland, ofthe notion that rural life was morally superior to city dwelling. 
The country folk, who worked and sweated to wrest prosperity from the land; who 
dweh in often uncomfortable condhions far from the convenience of modem life; and 
who embodied the 'frontier spirit' were seen as the 'real' Queenslanders. They had "a 
shared commitment to rural life as morally, politically and economically sound." 
City dwellers, in Brisbane, on the other hand were seen as effete, over-comfortable, 
and living off the riches provided by those who dwelt in country communities. 
The moral value of country living was constantly used to justify the electoral 
malapportionment which was characteristic of Queensland politics from 1949 until 
1991. Country people, it was argued, required more representatives in Parliament 
because country electorates based on one-vote-one-value were so vast as to defy being 
serviced by a single representative. More importantly, it was inherently unfair to 
have a Parliament where those who generated the wealth of Queensland were under-
represented in comparison to those for whom the wealth was generated. In fact, "all 
three main parties were agreed that the 'Western and Far Northem' zone comprising 
the true 'outback' seats should be given a special loading." 
In Queensland; the National Party does not believe in 'One-
vote: one-value'. Its arguments are long and not a little 
sophistic; in simple terms, they reduce to the fact that extra 
^ McQueen, H. (1979) "Queensland: A State of Mind" Meanjin 38 (1) 43 
^ Hughes, C. (1977) "Malapportionment and Gerrymandermg in Australia" in Johnston, R. (ed) People, 
Places and Votes. Essays on the Electoral Geography of Austi-alia and New Zealand, UNE, Armidale 
106 
63 
Parliamentary representation in some ways compensates for 
distance and climate. ImplicU in the National Party argument 
is the assumption that life in the bush is somehow more 
virtuous, more rewarding and more valuable than life in the 
city, which is effete, easy, and quite possibly degenerate as 
well. "They have good roads, water, electricity, television and 
shops, " the bushies seem to be saying, "Why should they want 
fair representation as well? " 
Rejection of Outsiders 
The intense regionalism and regional competition described above combined to 
generate, within Queensland communities, a resentment and distrust of outsiders. Not 
only was country life morally superior to city life, but Queensland life was morally 
superior to life in southem states. As a result, Queenslanders mistrusted 'Southemers', 
and most of all those from Canberra, as the power ofthe Commonwealth, especially 
after the Uniform Taxation Decision (1941), steadily eroded state power. 
The rejection of outsiders is often focussed, by rural Queenslanders, against Brisbane. 
"George Street Government"'' is often considered to be no more capable of properly 
understanding 'real' Queenslanders than is "Canberta Govemment." Head tells us 
that: 
10 Charlton, P. (1983) State of Mind: Why Queensland is Different, Methuen Haynes, Sydney 60 
Queensland's Parliament buildings and many ofthe public service offices are located along George 
Street m Brisbane. 
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In the eyes of a genuine North Queenslander, however, the 
material and cultural conditions of living and dying in North 
Queensland are neither understood nor respected by 
1 9 
'outsiders' whether in Brisbane, Canberra or overseas. ' 
The political culture, then is distinctly conceived of in 'us' versus 'them' terms. It was 
therefore possible for political leaders such as long-time Country/National Party 
Premier Joh Bjelke-Petersen to manipulate this feeling to his personal and partisan 
advantage, by claiming to champion 'us' against 'them'; purporting to be the hardy 
champion ofthe local area battling the morally inferior (but politically strong), 
insensitive federal Govemment. Outside or intemal opposition groups who attacked 
the leader were portrayed as attacking the entire society, which was urged to respond 
to the threat by pulling even more determinedly behind the local champion. Such 
leadership styles are characteristic of populist leadership - where the leader comes to 
embody the entire society against perceived outsiders, or those 'disloyal' elements 
within the society. 
Populism 
Populism is a political philosophy guided by a notion of popular will, "which is taken 
1 ^ 
as sovereign over class divisions, political parties and self-mterested groups." 
Those who appeal to populism often feel that the instimtions of society curtently 
subvert this sovereign popular will, and as a result "populists are hostile towards 
'^  Head, B. (1986) "The Queensland Difference" Politics 21(1)118 
" Jaensch, D (1996) The Australian Politics Guide, Macmillan, Melboume, 179 
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intellectuals, liberal democratic institutions, civil liberties, large corporations and 
bureaucracies because they believe that these remove power from the people and 
create unnatural divisions among them." 
Instead of relying on institutions to interpret and carty out popular will, populists 
often embody the will ofthe people in a single leader, who is held to be 'ofthe 
people' and m almost mystical contact with them. An attack on the leader is an attack 
on the people as a whole, and the leader is justified in whatever means are required to 
defend the people against such attacks. The leader is required to personify the will of 
'the people' and to prove himself (or herself) by regularly battlhig 'outsiders'. In 
Queensland these 'outside' forces are usually perceived to emanate from Canberta, or 
from the dominant states of New South Wales and Victoria. In her preface to The 
Premiers of Queensland, Cribb notes that "all [Queensland Premiers] were parochial 
in many respects, stout defenders of their state's best interests at all times and not 
above whipping up and using state chauvinism for their own political purposes."^^ 
The "state chauvinism" described by Cribb is one element of a populist platform, and 
has been used to great effect by populist premiers in Queensland, who sought to 
embody the will ofthe people against the outside ehtes from Canberta. However 
state chauvmism is a distinct concept, based on a "Queensland first and foremost" 
philosophy without necessarily relying on the notion ofthe sovereign will ofthe 
Queensland people. It is, for example, possible to hold pro-Queensland chauvmistic 
views without opposing intellectuals, liberal democratic mstitutions, civil liberties, 
" Penguin Macquarie Dictionary of Austi-alian Politics (1988) p.269 
' ' Cribb, M. et al (1989) The Premiers of Queensland, UQ Press, St Lucia xxi 
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large corporations and bureaucracies. So by asserting that all Queensland Premiers 
used state chauvinism as a political tool, Cribb is not necessarily suggesting that they 
were all populist. 
It is clear that Queensland politics always had a tendency towards state chauvinism, 
and the potential to become a populist state. Decentralisation, competition, fear of 
powerful central Govemments, a feeling of moral superiority in some regions, and an 
electoral system of single member electorates (where local notables could be elected) 
all combined to set the scene for populism. They required only the appropriate 
'champion' or leader to activate them, and such a leader was most lately produced in 
Johannes Bjelke-Petersen, who represented a generation of "populist Premiers... who 
grew up in rural Australia in the first half of the twentieth century and who reflected 
its provincial, Protestant ethos in their values and leadership style."'^ It is quite clear 
that Bjelke-Petersen became the master populist, in recent times, for Queensland: 
the Premier gained a public relations team led by Allan 
Callaghan, which presented him as 'the people's' leader, that 
is, as a populist leader, and from the early 1970s Bjelke-
Petersen came to typify a populist leader with his emphasis on 
the close tie between him and 'the people'. In the Premier's 
words: 'All Pm interested in is what Queensland people think. 
'* Wear, R. (1992) "Wayne Goss - A Leader in the Queensland Tradition" m Stevens, B. and Wanna, 
R. (1992) op cit 23. Bjelke-Petersen is perhaps the archetypical authoritarian, populist, state-
chauvinistic Premier but he was not the first such Queensland Premier. Wear and Cribb (ibid) both 
note that Bjelke-Petersen's leadership style represented a continuation of leadership traditions which 
were already firmly established in Queensland, dating back to the 19 Century. 
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They support me strongly... I only want to be the servant ofthe 
people. 17 
Having established himself as the people's champion, Bjelke-Petersen was carefiil to 
cuhivate an obvious enemy, and to regularly battle that enemy, hi fact, he created two 
enemies - Labor 'Socialism' and Canberta - and activated whichever was more 
convenient. Coaldrake describes "his careful cultivation ofthe equation that anything 
Labor was un-Queensland, anti-Queensland, Socialist, Canberta-based and, therefore, 
wrong."'^ These 'enemies' were, of course, straw men, but the battles agamst them 
were sufficiently well staged for Bjelke-Petersen to appear, to the uncrhical, to be 
fighting on behalf of Queensland and against frs putative enemies. He was also careful 
to ensure that attacks on him were portrayed as attacks on Queensland. He said that 
"If anyone condemns me or our state, they condemn themselves. Crhicism doesn't 
concem or worry me, because I know the people know me." 
Summary 
Queensland began with an early flourish of radicalism, but came to be dominated by 
regionalism, the result of decentralised settlement and commerce. This regionalism 
sparked an intense battle for development, and cast the political system in 
instrumental terms: as a supplier of goods and services rather than as a forum for 
ideas. With regionalism came regional chauvinism in the form of a belief that country 
'^  Mullins, P. (1986) "Queensland: Populist Politics and Development" in Head, B. (1986) The Politics 
of Development in Australia, Allen & Unwin, Sydney 153 
*^ Coaldrake, P. (1989) Working the System, UQ Press, St. Lucia 3 
^'^ The Age, 1 April 1972 
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life was morally superior to city life, and that Queensland life was superior to 
Southem life. Outsiders were rejected, and perceived attacks on the state vehemently 
opposed, and strongly resented. 
Such incipient populism was most recently activated by Bjelke-Petersen who became 
first the country champion, and then the Queensland champion, doing battle against 
Canberta and the Labor Party, trade unions, and their supporters in Queensland. 
Populism, reinforced by an electoral system which skewed representation in favour of 
country electorates, established the Country Party in a politically hegemonic period 
for three decades, with Bjelke-Petersen in personal control for all but two of its last 
twenty years. 
The Fitzgerald Revolution 
In May 1987 the ABC "Four Comers" program aired an hour-long documentary 
entitled "The Moonlight State". The documentary, which came on the heels of a 
sustained series of articles in the "Courier Mail," authored by one of its joumalists, 
Phil Dickie, alleged widespread cormption in the Queensland Police force. It was 
90 
alleged that police, up to and including the then Commissioner, Sir Terence Lewis 
were receiving bribes and protection money from brothels, illegal casinos, and illegal 
SP (Starting Price) Bookmakers 21 
°^ Lewis was later stripped of his knighthood and served time m prison. 
^^  So called because they took fixed-odds bets on horse racmg and hamess racing based upon the 
starting price listed in the Courier Mail each moming. 
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Lewis had been promoted to the poshion of Assistant Commissioner late in 1976, 
largely on the basis of Bjelke-Petersen's support (at this time all promotions above the 
rank of Senior Sergeant were approved by Cabinet). Lewis' appointment outraged 
Commissioner Ray Whitrod, who had spent five years conducting a largely 
unsuccessful battle to modemise the Queensland Police. Whhrod had identified Lewis 
as a major figure in a 'Rat Pack' of cormpt police and sought at all costs to prevent 
the Lewis appointment. However neither Cabinet nor the Premier were prepared to 
hear his arguments and Whitrod resigned in disgust chfrig, as his reason, interference 
in his job from pohticians, waming that Queensland risked becoming a police state. 
On Whitrod's resignation Cabinet appomted Lewis, who had been Assistant 
Commissioner less than a month, to the post of Commissioner, once again reinforcing 
99 
the link between Bjelke-Petersen and Lewis. As subsequent revelations of cortuption 
before the Fitzgerald Inquiry were being made against the police and Lewis, attention 
tumed to the possibility that Bjelke-Petersen and his police ministers, together with 
other members of his Govemment and entourage, were implicated in the ever 
widening cfrcle of cormption. 
Police Minister Bill Gunn began by publicly supporting the police, statmg that he was 
'unconvmced' by allegations of cormption and that Sir Terence Lewis was "a good 
policeman doing an excellent job for the force."^^ However withhi a week ofthe 
documentary going to afr, Gunn proposed that the allegations raised by "The 
Moonlight State" be deah with by the Police Complamts Tribunal. When this 
AVhitton, E. (1989) The Hillbilly Dictator, ABC Books, Sydney 20-AQ passim 
Courier Mail 17 May 1987 
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suggestion met with widespread crhicism, he proposed that Judge Pratt, the Chairman 
ofthe Police Complaints Tribunal, conduct a judicial inquiry. This proposal, too, drew 
sustained criticism from the Opposhion and from civil liberties groups as Pratt was an 
ex-police officer who, m his capacity as chair ofthe Police Complaints Tribunal, had 
never found against the police in any ofthe complaints brought before him. Despite 
the opposition of Bjelke-Petersen, Gunn convinced Cabinet to refer the allegations to 
a Commission of Inquiry which, at the insistence ofthe Attomey General, Paul 
Clauson, was to be headed by Tony Fitzgerald QC, a retired Federal Court judge then 
in private practice as a barrister in Brisbane. Fitzgerald's appohitment was widely 
supported, but Gunn drew further criticism relating to the Commission's Terms of 
Reference, which were narrow, and prohibited any investigation of allegations or 
events prior to 1982. 
In Jime 1987, Fitzgerald sought and received an extension to his Inquiry's terms of 
reference, allowing him to subpoena witnesses, offer indemnities for police who 
assisted the Inquiry, and to examine events occurting as far back as 1977.^ "* 
The Fitzgerald Inquiry then became the biggest show in Brisbane and, during its 
sitting days, a large proportion of Brisbane television nightly news bulletins were 
inevitably devoted to the latest revelations before him. Day by day it became clear 
that the Queensland Police Force nurtured a fundamental culture of cortuption. 
Bjelke-Petersen, who had a close relationship with the Queensland Police Union and 
the Commissioner, was tainted by cortuption. Later in the Inquiry more specific 
allegations were made against Bjelke-Petersen. Attention focussed on 'donations' of 
^'^ Courier Mail 26 June 1987 
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$50 000 and $60 000 which he had received in brown paper bags from an un-named 
sources. Attention then swung to a defamation payout of $400 000 by businessman 
Alan Bond to Bjelke-Petersen, and a telex from an executive ofthe European Asian 
Bank which reported that, in order to do business in Queensland, h would be 
necessary to provide preferential loans to the Bjelke-Petersen family company, 
Ciasom. The underiymg theme was that Bjelke-Petersen had become part of an 
institutionalised system of bribery and cortuption surtounding the Queensland 
Govemment. As the Inquiry progressed, greater cortuption was revealed, and less 
tenable became Bjelke-Petersen's poshion as Premier. 
At the end of November 1987 Bjelke-Petersen was overthrovm as leader ofthe 
National Party. His replacement was a polhician of a very different type, partially 
reflecting the Nationals' perception of a new pohtical era, but mostly because there 
was no-one in Bjelke-Petersen's mould in the curtent Parliamentary National Party 
who could credibly succeed him. Mike Ahem had, as Minister for Primary Industry, 
then Minister for Industry, Technology and Small Business and latterly as Health and 
Environment Minister, built up a reputation as a reformist. He had campaigned in 
Cabinet for the inclusion of social and sex education in schools, for the placement of 
condom vending machines in public toilets and for the initiation of a needle-exchange 
program for drug addicts. He had, for many years, been the only univershy graduate 
in the Parliamentary National Party as a Bachelor of Agricuhural Science from the 
University of Queensland. Ahem was essentially a conservative, reform-minded 
technocrat, with a style far removed from the popuhst leadership of Bjelke-Petersen. 
^^  It should be noted that Bjelke-Petersen has never been convicted of cormpt activity. The only 
charges brought against him (perjury) were dropped after the trial ended vwth a famously hung jury, m 
which the lone "not guilty" juror (who also served as jury foreman) was a member ofthe Young 
National Party. 
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He never wanted the populist support of country Queensland as did Bjelke-Peterson, 
aiming instead to move both his party, and the state, in a new managerial, technocratic 
direction of conservative, if cautious, reform accorduig to his own agenda. 
The election of Ahem to the leadership ofthe National Party appears to have been a 
pragmatic response to an electorate which belatedly came to value probity and reform. 
Ahem played the part immediately: 
Mr Ahern yesterday served notice on the carpet-baggers, 
wheeler-dealers and high rollers who have infested 
Queensland for years. Cronyism, the scourge ofthe last years 
9A 
ofthe Bjelke- Petersen Government, was out, he said. 
For the public, the high point of Ahem's premiership came when he "committed 
himself publicly [and sight unseen] to implement the recommendations [ofthe 
Fitzgerald Report] 'lock, stock and bartel,'" a commitment that was to be popularly 
adopted over the following months, receiving prominence at street demonstrations 
and on car bumper stickers.^^ This was a game attempt to neutralise cortuption as an 
issue hi the 1989 election, but as the election drew near, it became apparent that a 
sincere commitment by Ahem to implement Fitzgerald was insufficient to save the 
Nationals. Ahem's attempts at consensus politics "became synonymous with 
indecisive Govemmenf'^^ and resulted in criticism from his political opponents 
^^  Courier Mail 27 November 1987 
" Wanna, J. (1991) "The Campaign" m Whip, R. & Hughes, C. (1991) Political Crossroads, UQ 
Press, St Lucia 209-210 
^^  Cribb, M. (1991) "The National Party" in Whip, R. & Hughes, C. (1991) Political Crossroads, UQ 
Press, St Lucia 117 
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outside the party and plotting from similar elements within it, many of whom (for 
example, Russell Cooper) saw no need to do any more than apply minimalist activity 
to the Fitzgerald recommendations. 
As the election drew ever nearer, h became apparent that the Nationals faced defeat, 
hence they engaged in "a last desperate gamble to save [their] traditional country 
seats"^^ by electing, in Russell Cooper, a leader who "bore a passing resemblance to 
Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen"^°. Cooper, elected leader in late September for an early 
December general election, was much more decisive, even backing away from 
Ahem's commitment to implementing Fitzgerald's recommendations. In the 
subsequent general election, the Nationals did in fact save most of their country seats 
but h will be argued below that the nature of Fitzgerald-era politics, rather than 
Cooper's leadership, was responsible. 
Literature about the Fitzgerald Inquiry and its aftermath tends to focus on the far 
reaching effects ofthe Inquiry on Queensland. It often emphasises the level of outrage 
felt by Queenslanders and it would be easy to deduce that the outrage described was 
felt right across Queensland. However, it will be suggested that the impact ofthe 
Fitzgerald Inquiry differed appreciably across Queensland's regions. 
In Brisbane, where the National Party was defending a handful of seats won in 1983, 
outrage was high. Among Labor and, after 1983, for Liberal electors who had 
opposed the Nationals, Fitzgerald confirmed everythmg they had suspected and 
^'Cribb (1991)/^)/(/120 
°^ Cribb (1991)/6!(? 121 
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alleged about the Nationals. The political cuhure of Labor-dominated Brisbane, 
which for reasons already described had often been the target of attacks by Bjelke-
Petersen and the populist ethos he represented, was confirmed in its opposition to his 
populist regime. 
In country Queensland, the Fitzgerald revelations of vice were clearly consistent with 
the already-extant opinions, described more fully above, about Brisbane as an 
immoral, dangerous place to live (as opposed to the virtuous lifestyle self-attributed 
by those in rural areas). Given these cultural antecedents, it appeared only right that 
the streets of Brisbane should be riddled with prostitution and gambling. The 
Fitzgerald outcomes seemed to confirm country expectations of a city devoid ofthe 
'traditional values' upon which country life was built. 
Many country Queenslanders may have maintained a faith in Bjelke-Petersen, and in 
his representation of their moral values, but this faith had to be reconciled with the 
awareness that he had been implicated in the 'city' cortuption. In the end, this 
reconciliation was achieved by tuming away from moral judgments, and focussmg 
instead on the traditional instrumental view of Govemment. Bjelke-Petersen was thus 
forgiven because "sufficient voters were ready to be gulled into discounting the 
dubious aspects of his Govemment and his private affairs on the ground that he had 
done a lot for Queensland."^' According to a doctrine of instmmentalism, whether 
Bjelke-Petersen accepted bribes or not was irtelevant, so long as Queensland in 
general and their district in particular remained prosperous. The ultimate effect on 
political culture, then, ofthe Fhzgerald Inquiry, was much the same m the coimtry as 
'^Whitton (1989) ope//139 
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h was in inner Brisbane: reinforcement ofthe values held prior to Fitzgerald. This 
effect was, however, confined to the truly rural seats hi inland Queensland. In coastal 
electorates, and particularly those which included the larger regional centres, the 
Nationals polled poorly. The resuh was that the Nationals' Parliamentary 
'^ 9 
representation was driven back to its unambiguously rural, 'heartland' seats . 
The Fitzgerald recommendations had their greatest effect in outer Brisbane 
electorates, and in the few metropolitan Brisbane electorates which the Nationals had 
won in 1983 and retained in 1986. These voters were much less subject to the cultural 
values of country Queensland and, living either in Brisbane or on its fringe, they had 
no populist based opposition to the city. Neither did they have any difficulty in 
judging Bjelke-Petersen by the cortuption of his regime. These seats swung heavily 
against the National Party, handing victory in 1989 to Labor: 
After the 1989 election ... the National Party has been driven 
out of Brisbane and the provincial cities entirely, and in the 
south-east outside Brisbane its strength was much diminished 
with only [eight] seats instead of eighteen. But in the two 
'rural' zones it lost merely two seats.^^ 
The events of 1987 -1989 therefore had thefr greatest impact in outer-Brisbane seats 
by teaching their electors that they had the capacity to overthrow Govemments at the 
32 hi 1989 the Nationals lost ten seats along the coast and in regional cities - Maryborough, Cooroora, 
Whitsunday, Townsville, Barron River, Toowoomba North, Broadsound, Mulgrave, Glasshouse and 
Isis. Additionally, the Liberals lost Mt Isa to the ALP. 
Hughes, C. (1991) "The Results" in Whip, R. & Hughes, C. (1991) Political Crossroads, UQ Press 
St. Lucia 179 
33 
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ballot box. They did so m 1989 despite electoral malapportionment and after the 1991 
redistribution were even more capable of so doing (e.g. 1995 and 1998). The 
electorate, as a result, began to swing from being, in Hughes' words, "passive joint 
[receivers] of benefits from Government"^"* towards the situation of an activist 
participant which could receive the style of Govemment they demanded. 
The Fitzgerald Report was submitted to the Govemment in July 1989, a little more 
than two years after "The Moonlight State". Its recommendations would further aher 
the political cuhure of Queensland. Pre-Fitzgerald Queensland, as noted above, had 
scant regard for political institutions. They, up to and including the Parliament, 
existed to fulfil instrumental functions of providing goods and services for the 
regions. Fitzgerald identified the lack of instimtional decision-making processes as a 
significant weakness ofthe Queensland system of Govemment, and set about creating 
two strong, independent institutions as vehicles for his reform process. He called for 
reform ofthe Parliament, including an impartial Speaker and a properly resourced 
Opposition. He also recommended the continued expansion ofthe system of 
Parliamentary Committees^^, stating that: 
There is a need to consider introducing a comprehensive 
system of Parliamentary Committees to enhance the ability of 
Parliament to monitor the efficiency of Government 
...Elsewhere, the effective and efficient operation of 
Parliament has been enhanced by the setting up of all-party 
34 Hughes (1973) o/7c/n 40 
'^ Fitzgerald, A (1989) Report of a Commission of Inquiry Pursuant to Orders in Council 123 
^^  A Public Accounts Committee and a Public Works Committee had been established in 1989 by the 
Ahem Govemment 
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policy and investigatory committees. These committees have 
become a vital and energetic part of giving effect to the 
democratic process particularly in respect of complex issues. 
They serve as Parliament's research arm and as an 
Independent source of information to aid proper 
37 
Parliamentary debate. 
Fhzgerald recognised that administrative procedures (relating, for instance, to 
electoral boundaries) had been conducted outside the tradhional institutional 
framework. He stated that "an enduring process with adequate independence and 
Parliamentary (as distinct from Govemment or bureaucratic) support must be set up to 
review and recommend the necessary laws and guidelines, and to attend to the 
multitude of administrative matters which need improvement." As a vehicle for this 
activity he recommended the establishment ofthe Electoral and Administrative 
Review Commission (EARC) and its Parliamentary supervisor, the Parliamentary 
Committee for Electoral and Administrative Review (PCEAR). 
In relation to his primary concem, probhy in the Queensland Police, Fitzgerald stated 
that "the administration of criminal justice should be independent of Executive 
controls. It is an apohtical, vital public function. Such administration must be 
accountable for hs activities ... and should be open to public review and accountable 
to Pariiament." In order to provide for this independent scrutiny of police activity 
Fitzgerald recommended the creation ofthe Criminal Justice Commission (CJC) 
"Fitzgerald(1989) zZ>zW 124 
^^  Fitzgerald (1989)/6/W 144 
^^  Fitzgerald (1989)/6;V/307 
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which, like EARC, reported to a Parliamentary Committee, the Parliamentary 
Criminal Justice Committee (PCJC). 
Finally, Fhzgerald's general recommendations supportuig reform ofthe Queensland 
Public Service were concordant with the post-1989 Labor Govemment's public sector 
reform agenda. This reform process led directly to the creation of another institution, 
the Public Sector Management Commission (PSMC). The PSMC's "objectives [are] 
to provide the people of Queensland with a more accountable, fair, efficient, effective, 
responsive and open public sector."""^ The net result ofthe Fitzgerald recommended 
reforms was that, for the first time in decades, political histitutions began to matter in 
Queensland politics. 
One of these institutions, EARC, fiirther changed the shape of Queensland by 
conducting a review of electoral boundaries, enacted in 1991 as the Electoral Districts 
Act. The new boundaries eliminated the Zonal System, and installed a set of 
boundaries much closer to the ideal of 'one-vote-one-value', allowing a special 
weighthig only to only five electorates over 100,000 km in size. The electoral system 
no longer discriminated against city dwellers, and all electoral matters were now in 
the hands ofthe independent Electoral Commission Queensland, modelled on its 1984 
federal counterpart. 
"" Coaldrake, P. m Prasser, S., Hede, A et al (1992) Keeping them Honest, UQ Press, St. Lucia 244 
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Recent Queensland Political History 
The final part of this chapter presents a short, nartative overview ofthe most recent 
Queensland elections, those of 1992, 1995, 1998 and 2001, in order to provide context 
for the case studies which will be presented below. The campaigns observed in these 
case studies took place during these four general elections, and an overview now will 
obviate the need for addhional pohtical background later. 
To a large extent, the Goss Govemment's first term of office (1989 -1992) was one of 
stewardship rather than leadership. Its role was to implement the Fitzgerald reforms 
and to make them work. It did so faithfully, even implementing electoral boundaries it 
was not entirely happy with"", and maintaining a sometimes tense relationship with 
the CJC. Goss was rewarded for keeping the faith with an election victory in 1992, 
hardly dramatic in its outcome. Labor was still heady with the notion of Govemment 
after three decades in exile, and was led by an effective and popular leader. Wayne 
Goss was extremely popular in suburban Brisbane, enough so that in the 1992 
campaign, Queensland Labor campaigned state-wide as "Wayne Goss and Labor" (m 
that order), with "Labor" in diminished, lower case letters. 
Labor approached the 1995 general election with a great deal of confidence. One 
election issue, which had been creating headlines since late 1994, touched on the 
transport link between Brisbane (expanding ever-southwards) and the Gold Coast 
(expanding ever-northwards). The Pacific Highway, which links the two chies, then 
41 Goss stated m Parliament that he "would have preferred to be mtroducmg legislation that did not 
contam any departure, however margmal, from one vote, one value" [Queensland Parliamentary 
Debates, 14 March 1991, 6817] 
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continues southwards towards Sydney had long become overcrowded, especially at 
weekends. As the suburbs of each city extended, the highway began to carty higher 
volumes of commuter traffic. Development of a planned rail link between the cities 
was underway and about to open in early 1996, but h was clear that fiirther roads were 
necessary. 
The Goss Govemment established a plan to provide a new highway to link the eastem 
suburbs of Brisbane with the Gold Coast. The new highway, the South Coast 
Motorway, was a $700 million project which would pay for itself through toll 
revenues. Although the concept of a toll was electorally unpopular, the more 
significant drawback ofthe plan was that the proposed road would pass through "core 
parts of South-East Queensland's sensitive Koala habitat.""*^ Residents ofthe areas 
feared for those habitats during and after the development ofthe highway. Initially the 
Goss Govemment misjudged the depth of public feeling on the issue but within weeks 
local residents had begun a sustained and vigorous campaign against the roadway, 
involving "the biggest protest rallies seen in Brisbane since the Vietnam War.""*^  The 
Coalition parties, possibly motivated more by opportunism than by environmentalism, 
joined the cause, eventually announcing an altemative plan which involved widening 
the Pacific Highway to eight lanes. 
The issue might have been a relatively minor setback for Labor but for the fact that 
the four 'Koala seats' were all in the outer southem Brisbane regions which had 
helped sweep them to power hi 1989. The electors at stake were those who had, in 
'^^ Courier Mail 30 June 1995 
^^ Courier MaU 30 June 1995 
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1989, newly discovered that they could overthrow Govemments. One ofthe seats at 
risk (and eventually lost) was Springwood, held by Environment Minister Molly 
Robson. When the protests gained widespread and sympathetic media coverage, h 
became obvious that no amount of reassurance was going to swhig public opinion in 
favour ofthe plan. The Govemment responded with ahematives including "the 
addhion of an expensive tunnel, fencing and various habitat purchases."'*'' These 
altematives were subject to scientific criticism, and were rarely taken seriously. 
By the election, it was apparent that the 'Koala Highway' issue had been a winning 
issue for the Opposition, and a losing one for the Govemment. However, defeat in this 
area was still not widely expected to resuh in a significant change to the electoral 
balance. On election night, it quickly became apparent that Labor had misjudged the 
electorate. Seats in the south of Brisbane, and in outer Brisbane generally, swung 
against Labor and the "Koala seats" of Albert, Mansfield, Redlands and Springwood 
fell to the Coahtion. Regional issues in north Queensland led to the additional loss of 
Barton River and near-loss of Whhsunday. For much ofthe count fr appeared as 
though Labor was going to lose office. In the end Labor held on by one seat, 45-43 
with one Independent. 
The lesson of 1995 was that Queensland polhics had fundamentally changed. Prior to 
1995, h may have been possible to mount a case that the Goss Govemment was a 
fairiy typical Queensland Govemment, and Goss a fairiy typical Queensland premier, 
both tending towards the old notions of state chauvinism and mstrumentalism as much 
as Fitzgerald would let them. The 1995 election made h clear that Govertiments could 
'*'* Courier Mail 30 June 1995 
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no longer govem with assuredness of victory in the followuig election but rather that 
they had to continually demonstrate their suitability to govem to a critical public. 
Following the 1995 resuh, the count in the seat of Mundingburta, in Townsville, was 
appealed by the Liberal Party to the Court of Disputed Returns. The seat, won by 
Labor by just 16 votes, contains a major Army bartacks. At the time ofthe general 
election, a number of soldiers from that barracks were in Rwanda, Africa, as part of a 
UN Peacekeepmg force. An irregularity in the supply and retum of their election 
papers meant their votes had not been counted. There were another seventeen ertors 
or omissions m the conduct ofthe ballot. The Court determined that the Labor 
candidate "may not have been elected if ertors or omissions had not occurred and if 
seven unlawfully cast votes had not been counted."''^ The Court ordered a re-election, 
which took place in February 1996'* .^ 
Defeat for Labor in Mundingburta would have left the Assembly even at 44-44 with 
one Independent, Liz Cuimingham, who was widely expected to favour the Coalition. 
John Wanna, in The Courier Mail, noted that "Goss' premiership and the survival of 
the Labor Govemment hangs in the balance. The ... voters of Mundingburta will 
decide whether Labor hangs on to office. The northem voters will be called upon to 
weigh the interests ofthe whole state."''^ 
Although the outcome ofthe re-election would decide the state's Govemment, the 
Mundingburta campaign was not conducted as a state campaign. The ALP dumped its 
'^^ Judgment of Justice Ambrose, quoted in Courier Mail 9 December 1995 
''* The Mundingburra Case Study in this thesis gives a much more thorough account of this campaign. 
''^  Wanna, J. (1995) "Not So Much A By-Election as a Mini General Election" Courier Mail 9 
December 1995 
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candidate, Ken Davies, in favour of Tony Mooney, who was the popular Townsville 
Mayor. The Coalition supported Liberal candidate Frank Tanti, who campaigned on 
local issues, by simply meetmg and talkhig to as many people as he could. So great 
was his energy that "he won the nickname 'the dry rot tester' because he had 
doorknocked more than 5000 homes.""*^ Tanti won despite his admission that he had 
no knowledge of Liberal policies and therefore did not discuss policy in his campaign. 
Tanti's tactics were highly effective. Mundingbmra elected the Liberal candidate and 
shortly afterwards, in Febmary 1996, Liz Cunningham declared for the Coalition and 
the Borbidge/ Sheldon Govemment was duly installed. Wayne Goss resigned the 
Premiership and moved to the backbenches. Peter Beattie became Labor leader. 
The hung result ofthe 1995 general election (followuig the 1996 re-election) served 
to increase the importance of institutions in Queensland politics. As noted above, the 
Parliaments of 1989-1992 and 1992-1995 had seen reform and the introduction of 
new political institutions. However Parliament itself, given its unicameral nature in 
Queensland, remained very much the Government's chamber. After the 1996 
accession ofthe Borbidge Govemment, Parliament necessarily became an active 
political arena. Cunningham had promised confidence and supply to the Govemment, 
but had not promised to vote with the Govemment in all divisions. She was, therefore, 
open to persuasion by both sides of politics, mside the chamber and out, on most bills. 
For the first time since the development ofthe modem party system, divisions were 
regularly taken hi the Legislative Assembly without the outcomes bemg totally 
predictable. The result was a revitalisation ofthe Parliament hself, and more 
*^  The Sunday Mail 4 Febmary 1996 
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importantly an enhancement ofthe stature of Parliament in the eyes of Queenslanders. 
The new situation represented one more step away from the political cuhure ofthe 
Bjelke-Petersen era, when Parliament was irtelevant to the goveming ofthe State. 
To this point, this chapter has focussed on change rather than stability. The political 
culture of Queensland had undergone a demonstrable change from 1987 to 1996. 
Populist politics had faded, the institutions of Govemment and Parliament had 
regained their importance. Electors had rediscovered their capacity to elect and 
dismiss Govemments, Brisbane had become politically dominant, and a Govemment 
had fallen as a resuh of proposing an instrumental, developmental project, which had 
negative, environmental overtones. Such an outcome would have been unthinkable 
during the Bjelke-Petersen era, and underscored the dramatic change in Queensland's 
political environment. 
However, the changes in Queensland applied unevenly across the state. Above, it was 
suggested that the Fitzgerald Inquiry had different impacts in different areas ofthe 
state, with neither Country Queensland nor Metropolitan Brisbane substantially 
changed in their varied political responses. During the decade of 1987-96, Brisbane 
began to realise some of its political ambitions, and became politically dominant for 
the first time in Queensland history. Rather than Brisbane being substantially 
changed, Queensland politics had substantially changed to become more resonant 
with Brisbane concems which had, owing to demographic development, merged hito 
the wider geopolitical unit of South-East Queensland. 
85 
hi Country Queensland, the effects ofthe decade of change were rather different. So 
long dominant, Country Queensland was effectively in Opposition for the first time in 
decades. The 'enemy,' as defmed by localism and the rhetoric of right-wing populism, 
suddenly had control of Govemment. Brisbane, long regarded (and durmg Fitzgerald, 
recentiy proven) as somehow immoral and not hi touch with the 'true' Queensland, 
had gained political ascendancy. These conditions were just the conditions required to 
reinforce the already dominant (in rural Queensland) attitudes of localism and 
populism. 
In localist terms, this represents siege-from-without, and challenges to country values 
by a Govemment which seemingly opposed them and which, at least, did not owe 
them a debt for its political ascendancy. The mstrumental benefits which naturally 
flow from supporting the party in power began to diminish as resources were 
transferred elsewhere. This threat united coimtry Queensland areas, and where the 
areas had a local populist 'champion' that person created and consolidated his/her 
poshion of authority by representmg the communhy's will in battle against larger, 
antipathetic forces. This dynamic emerges m almost all ofthe curtent case studies. 
The changes to Queensland after Fitzgerald, then, served to remforce in country areas 
their need to unite as communities against the city, and thus served to confirm 
populism and localism, hi this period, the occurrence of this process does not appear 
to have been widely recognised as most pohtical attention focussed on Brisbane. 
Moreover the country ideology, as exemplified in the previous era, had little effect on 
state politics, perhaps partially because, while small communhies began to unite 
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behind community champions, there emerged no state-wide populist leader to replace 
Bjelke-Petersen. 
In 1995, Pauline Hanson was preselected by the Liberal Party for the House of 
Representatives seat of Oxley (based on Ipswich) but was disendorsed just two weeks 
prior to the election for the following remarks: 
What I believe is racism is starting in this country because the 
Government is looking after the Aborigines too much. [They 
get] a tremendous amount of payouts. Uni places have been 
set aside for them and if you are an Aborigine you get into the 
police force automatically whUe anyone else has to study and 
workjor two years. 
Far from recanting, Hanson ran as an Independent, on a platform of 'old-fashioned 
values', opposing immigration, promoting assimilation of both Aborigines and 
immigrants, rejecting as unnecessary programs of targeted assistance to Aborigines, 
and opposing welfare benefits generally. Hanson was elected to the House of 
Representatives in 1996 and, following her widely reported maiden speech, 
continued to make public statements along the same Ifries. She attracted a large body 
of support throughout Australia, especially in her home state of Queensland. Such was 
this level of support that she founded a party, 'Pauline Hanson's One Nation'. 
Hanson's political views stmck a chord with country Queensland and, with 
"*' Hanson, quoted in Courier MaU 15 Febmary 1996 
'" It should be noted that, as nominations closed prior to Hanson's disendorsement, she appeared on the 
ballot paper as representing the Liberal Party. It is likely that about two thirds of her vote was the base 
Liberal vote in Oxley, to which she added her winning margin based on her own campaign. 
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deliberation, she began to pose as the champion of 'nornial people' agamst 
'pohticians'. She rapidly became Queensland's newest populist leader. One Nation 
announced that h would contest nearly all seats in the Queensland general election in 
1998. 
One Nation was not taken seriously by many commentators, and whilst Pauline 
Hanson had strong personal support she would not be a candidate in the state election. 
Queensland politics had become used to frs Brisbane focus, and concentrated on the 
traditional party battle lines. The election result was therefore a major surprise to 
many. One Nation claimed 11 seats in the Legislative Assembly, two more seats than 
the Liberals managed. It achieved a primary vote of 22.68%, more than either the 
Liberals or the Nationals. The politics of populism, which many had believed dead in 
Queensland, had been re-activated with dramatic results^'. One Westem 
Queenslander, interviewed during the state election campaign, described the 
phenomenon: 
1 see a lot of them coming in here. They're scary 
.. .fundamentalists. Why? 1 think it's the Joh thing. It never 
went away around here, it just went underground. Now we're 
seeing a resurgence and the One Nation thing is just an 
excuse. ' 
The 1998 election left Queensland with another hung Pariiament. The ALP, which 
'^ For a discussion of One Nation's populist philosophy see Stokes, G. "One Nation and Australian 
Populism" in Leach, M., Stokes, G. & Ward, I. (eds) (2000) The Rise and Fad of One Nation, UQ 
Press, St Lucia. 
'^  Courier MaU 6 June 1998 
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had again retumed 44 seats, was able to form a Govemment with the support of 
Independent Peter Wellington. In November 1998, the One Nation member for 
Mulgrave, Charies Rappoh, ended his short Parliamentary career, resigning and ching 
his health and the stresses of office as the cause. In the subsequent by-election. Labor 
claimed Mulgrave and thus won the numbers to govem hi their own right. 
In 1999, One Nation's Parliamentary Party split, completely disintegrating during the 
course ofthe year. Rappolt's resignation cost the party a seat, reducing numbers to 
ten. Then, during January 1999, Hanson and her two senior advisers, David Oldfield 
(now a Member of New South Wales' Legislative Council) and David Ettridge, 
sought to confirm themselves as party leaders without facing election at the party's 
Annual General Meeting. One Nation's Queensland MPs revolted, and all signed an 
ultimatum demanding that the three leaders declare their positions vacant for election. 
As a result ofthe ensuing political wrangle, on Febmary 6, three One Nation MPs 
(Pratt in Barambah, Nelson in Tablelands and Tumer in Thuringowa) resigned their 
membership of One Nation in order to sit as Independents. Later in the month, two 
more MPs (Knuth in Burdekin and Kingston in Maryborough) received an ultimatum 
from the party's leaders, calling upon them to publicly express thefr loyalty to the 
party. Neither complied, so both were purged, continumg to sit as Independents. 
In August 1999, the Supreme Court found that One Nation had been improperly 
registered as a party, that fraudulent information had been supplied to the Electoral 
Commission in support of their registration application, and that One Nation, not 
being a party, was ineligible to receive more than $400,000 in electoral fundhig. 
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Fmally, hi late 1999, the five remainmg One Nation MPs also departed "after Ettridge 
and Oldfield treated as mutiny their attempts to register 'One Nation Queensland' as a 
party."^^ 
Deprived of party registration, retaining no MPs, and having manifestly failed to 
deliver on their promise of a brave new political world. One Nation was in a weak 
poshion for the 2001 state election. At that election, their support slumped to 8.69 
percent of primary votes statewide (albeit from just 39 seats contested), retumhig just 
three seats (regaining Lockyer and Tablelands with new candidates, and winning 
Gympie for the first time^^). In January 2002, still facing prosecution over the 
improper registration of One Nation, Hanson resigned from the party. 
During the latter part ofthe Beattie govemment's first term, it was dogged by 
allegations of widespread vote-rigging in Party preselections which resuhed in an 
investigation by the Criminal Justice Commission (CJC), and later a "special inquiry" 
established under the CJC, but possessing the powers of a Royal Commission. This, 
the Shepherdson hiquiry, began hearings in October 2000. Within a month. Deputy 
Premier Jim Elder resigned his Ministry and then resigned from the Labor Party, 
admitting that he had falsely filled out votmg registration forms. Backbencher Grant 
Musgrove admitted the same activity, and was forced to resign from the Labor Party 
m early December. Finally, fonner Labor State Secretary and Member for Woodridge 
Mike Kaiser was forced to admh he had falsely enrolled in the electorate of South 
" Reynolds, P. (2000) "The One Nation Pariiamentary Party" in Leach, M., Stokes, G. & Ward, I. (eds) 
(2000) The Rise and FaU of One Nation, UQ Press, St Lucia. 
The Gympie incumbent has smce resigned to sit as an mdependent. 
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Brisbane hi the mid 1980s, and was also forced to resign from Labor. 
None of these events touched Beattie personally. He was known to be one ofthe rare 
non-factional players as the Labor leader, and was therefore difficult to implicate in 
allegations arising from inter-factional preselection battles. His response to the 
situation was, perhaps, the only sensible one under the circumstances - he supported 
the inquiry, and threw himself into a crusade against vote rorting within the Labor 
Party. 
He publicly supported Shepherdson's inquiry and did not 
attempt to interfere with the course of its investigations. 
Beattie admitted the inquiry was painful but claimed it would 
have beneficial effects in the longer term. He insisted that 
rorting was unacceptable and gave a firm commitment to 
expel anyone found guilty of rorting from the party. 
The Shepherdson Inquiry created a number of other immediate problems for the 
Beattie govemment. Given the loss of three MPs (who had only resigned from Labor, 
not from Parliament) he lacked a majority in the Legislative Assembly. Though it 
was certain that all three would vote with him on confidence motions, Beattie was 
disinclined to continue in govemment while relying on the support of admitted vote 
rorters. "He stated he would risk the survival of his govemment rather than rely on 
the support ofthe fraudsters."^^ Instead, he embarked upon a "listenmg tour" around 
" Wanna, J. (2001) "A Conservative Debacle" Australasian Parliamentary Review 16:1, 37 
^^  Wanna (2001)/6/V/ 
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Queensland, ostensibly to leam from Queenslanders whether they feh he was obliged 
to take his government to the people. Apparently satisfied that this was mdeed the 
view of his state, he called the poll for February 17. 
Beattie ran the most state-chauvinistic campaign seen smce the hey-day of Bjelke-
Petersen. "Beattie had long enjoyed a high opinion poll rating [in the order of 60%] 
among the six Premiers, and h showed no resuh of wanhig prior to the election." 
Perhaps realising that the vote rorts scandals may - despite his best efforts to the 
contrary - have stamed Labor as an organisation, Beattie became larger than the party 
hself, and ran a presidential style of campaign. The campaign's website was found on 
the intemet at address www.Beattie2001.net rather than on the official ALP website. 
The she introduced candidates as members of Beattie's team rather than Labor 
members. From the "listening tour" onwards, Beattie threw himself into a statewide 
campaign with such energy that the "Bulletin" magazine declared that "In Febmary 
2001, the most dangerous place in Brisbane is standhig between Beattie and a 
CO 
television news crew." 
Labor's fmal ploy was a clever use of Queensland's optional preferential vothig 
system. One Nation declared a plague on both Labor and the Coalition's houses, and 
announced during the campaign that they would direct preferences against sitting 
members in every seat. Based on 1998 figures, this policy would have been 
disastrous for the Coalition, who were the major losers of votes to One Nation. Labor 
followed this with its own recommendation, that Labor voters "just vote 1", casting 
" Bennett, S. & Newman, G. (2001) Queensland Election 2001, Commonwealth Parliamentary 
Library, Canberra 
^^  "Queensland's One Man Band" The Bulletin, Febmary 6, 2001 
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their primary vote for the ALP candidate then retiring their ballot. This threatened the 
nine Nationals who had been elected m 1998 on Labor preferences. The Coalition's 
campaign then effectively dissolved into a process of infighting as branches discussed 
whether to seek "preference deals" with One Nation. Coalition leader Borbidge, who 
had publicly committed himself to directing preferences away from One Nation, 
found himself irtelevant, with branches contemplating - or undertaking - rebellion on 
this important issue. 
The result was staggering. The previous benchmark for electoral disaster had been 
Labor's loss in 1974, which left them with a "cricket team" of eleven Members in the 
Assembly. The 2001 result provided a Coalition equivalent. Labor went from being a 
minority govemment to occupying 66 seats in the 89 seat house, a forty-three seat 
majority. The Nationals' representation halved, from 23 to 12. The Liberals lost two 
thirds of their members, falling from nine to three seats, and One Nation gained just 
three. There were five independents. 
Thus an election forced by revelations of electoral fraud within the Labor Party, 
somehow resuhed in a massive Labor victory. Beattie himself was clearly the 
decisive factor, but the major lesson arising for this thesis from the 2001 election was 
that the old forces of Queensland populism and state chauvinism - directed towards a 
leader who seeks to "connect" with the people, attack Canberra at every opportunity, 




This analysis of recent elections and their effects on Queensland pohtical culture has 
been presented in order to indicate the rapid transition Queensland pohtics and society 
has undergone since 1987. While the state's political culture appears to be in 
transition a number of conclusions can be drawn. First, Brisbane and South-East 
Queensland have become ascendant in state pohtics, bringing Queensland into Ime 
with politics in other states. The population ofthe capital is nearing that ofthe rest of 
the state (Brisbane represents 44.8% of Queensland population, and with the Gold 
Coast included the figure reaches 55.8%)^^, and under a near-one-vote-one-value 
system this demographic primacy is broadly reflected in Brisbane's number of seats in 
Parliament (35 seats, representing 39% ofthe Parliament). Second, the perception of 
Queensland as a state where one party or another rules almost hegemonically is no 
longer appropriate. Queensland electors have demonstrated their capacity and 
willingness to overthrow Govemments. Third, the commitment to development at all 
costs is at least substantially reduced. The Koala Highway issue in 1995 demonstrated 
that Queensland voters are capable a more varied focus than simply that of 
development for hs own sake. Fourth, Queensland's pohtical histitutions are much 
more important than they ever have been. Parliament itself, and the cluster of 
institutions surtounding it, have now had several years where they were more than 
simply instmments ofthe will of Cabinet, fr remams to see whether this change will 
last given the magnitude of Beattie's majorhy. Finally, the forces of state chauvinism, 
59 Figures calculated from Australian Bureau of Statistics (2000) Australian Demographic Trends cat 
3101.0 
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and the sense of threat from outsiders which feeds this philosophy, are still clearly 
present and potent within the electorate. 
All of these conclusions lead to one further view with implications for the curtent 
paper. The orthodox view of Queensland political culture prior to 1987 cartied with it 
a suggestion that Queensland was "differenf and that views regarding politics 
elsewhere in Australia should be applied hesitantly, if at all, in Queensland. The 
series of conclusions suggested above: that the capital is becoming politically 
stronger, that electoral hegemony has declined, that development is balanced by other 
considerations, and that institutions matter, all tend to suggest that the factors 
identified as making Queensland "different" have declined. The result is that if 
connectionalism can be shown to exist in Queensland, then it is reasonable to 
speculate that it may exist in communities elsewhere in Australia, and in communities 
with analogous political circumstances overseas. 
60 McQueen (1979), Charlton (1983) and Head (1986b) all provide examples of this view. 
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CHAPTER 4 - COMMUNITY STUDIES 
Factors which influence electoral behaviour appear to act at different demographic 
levels. Judgments of ethics and conscience, for instance, may act at an individual 
level; class identification acts upon self-aware social classes; the hnpact of family 
socialisation is felt amongst kin. Although little has been written about connectional 
politics, h is already clear that connectionalism operates within communities, at the 
community-wide level. To understand connectionalism, and to comprehend the links 
between communities and connectional voting, it is necessary to understand the 
structure and nature ofthe communities in which connectional politics has a place. 
However, this task is far from simple, as even the smallest communities are often so 
layered as to make systematic, scientific observation and analysis extremely complex. 
The discipline of sociology has, over time, buih up a body of studies of, and theories 
about, community. Methodologies of community study have been developed and 
applied, and whilst we are far from a full understanding of communhies, h is possible 
to draw certain conclusions about them. 
The first and seminal work of such community studies, Middletown, occurred almost 
accidentally, fr authors, Robert and Helen Lynd, were employed in the eariy 1920s by 
"a small institute of social and religious research which decided to survey religious 
provision and practices in a typical small American town."' They chose Muncie, 
Bell, C. &. Newby, H. (1971) Community Studies, George Allen & Unwdn 83 
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Indiana, as appropriately typical, and set to work. It soon became apparent to them 
that their findings on religious activhy would only make sense if understood in the 
context ofthe total community. They divided the activities ofthe community into six 
categories^ and provided a narrative for each. Middletown also established what has 
become the customary method of collecting data for community studies: the Lynds 
dwelt in Muncie for 18 months. They and their research assistants "in every way 
possible ... shared the life ofthe city, making friends and assuming ties and 
obligations as would any other residents of Middletown"^ They reinforced their 
observations with documentary material, statistics, interviews and questionnahes. 
Ultimately they presented a report of over 500 pages which describes in great detail 
many aspects of Muncie in the 1920s. 
Since Middletown, a vast array of communities have been studied, primarily in the 
USA and the British Isles (England, Ireland, and Wales). The subject communities 
have ranged in scope from tiny villages of a few hundred people, to the entire city of 
Chicago. Despite these differences of scope, a number of commonalities bind the 
community studies together. All ofthe studies have examined communities which 
existed in the social sense of a group of people who share company, destiny, identity; 
and which also existed in the geographic sense of contiguous location. The studies 
also share a similar methodology of dwelling in the community and supplementing 
observations with targeted data (for instance, surveys and interviews). They also tend 
to be nartative rather than analytical, with no research question beyond "How do 
people live?" 
^ The six were: Getting a living, Making a home, Traming the young, Using leisure, Engagmg in 
religious practices, and Engaging in community activities. 
^ Lynd, R. and Lynd, H. (1929) Middletown, Harcourt Brace & co, New York 506 
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The findings of these studies also share a number of features. The communhies 
studied all seem to have ways of identifying "those who belong" from those who do 
not; ways of allocating status within the group; formal and informal leaders and 
relationships which occur in a number of contexts. These findings will help to form a 
framework for identifying and analysmg the salient features of communities where 
connectional voting occurs. 
Whilst these community studies present the best available basis for understanding 
communities, community studies as a group have faced substantial criticism, 
condemned famously by Glass as "the poor sociologist's substitute for the novel"^ 
The substance ofthe criticism levelled at community studies amounts to three basic 
assertions. The first is that participant observers can only directly observe those 
events which occur immediately around them. The environment for the research is 
not controlled and a great deal of data is not captured - and this may affect the 
interpretation ofthe data which is captured.^ The second argument is that by 
participating in the communities they wish to study, observers may influence the 
behaviour of those around them. The third argument is that if, as many community 
studies mdicate, community members act differentiy around "outsiders", then 
researchers who come to the community as outsiders are prevented from observhig 
the natural behaviour of community members. 
All of these crhicisms have merh, but a number of arguments can be raised in the 
* Glass "Conflict in Cities", 148, m Conflict in Society, Churchill, London, 1966, cited by Bell and 
Newby (1971) op d n 3 
For example, Middletown contains no reference to the lives of African Americans, probably because 
the Lynds could not have gamed access to their circles and groups. Had they managed to do so, then 
given the nature of race relations in the USA in the 1920s, it is possible the Lynds may have thereby 
been ostracised by the rest ofthe community. 
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studies' defence. First, despite any inadequacies community studies may possess, 
they are still the best tool available for leaming about communhies. Second, the 
problems of acthig as a participant observer are well recognised and can be minimised 
by trained research staff. Finally, given that the shortcomings of community studies 
are readily admitted, those shortcomings can be bome in mmd whilst continuing the 
studies. The knowledge of communities provided by community studies can usefully 
inform this thesis, but the three caveats mentioned above must be bome in mind. 
The first major study of an Australian community, entitled Bradstow^, was published 
in 1974, based upon three years of field research between 1967 and 1970. Bradstow 
is a country town south-west of Sydney, but unlike most Australian country towns, 
Bradstow is highly stratified into six distinct status groupings . As such it was perfect 
for Wild's objective, which was "a description of status, class and power, and their 
inter-relationships in the contemporary scene."^ However, Wild's conclusions 
regarding Bradstow have limited applicability for other rural Australian communities 
because "while it would be very difficult to delineate the major features ofthe 'typical' 
Australian country town, h can be said with confidence that Bradstow is not that 
town."'° 
Whilst Bradstow concentrated upon stratification, the next major Australian 
* Wild, R. (1974) Bradstow: A Study of Status, Class and Power in a Small Australian Town, Angus 
& Robertson, Sydney 
' Bradstow is not the subject town's true name. It has become common practice to follow the Lynds' 
lead in assigning subject towns a false name to protect anonymity. 
^ From highest to lowest status: Gentry, Grange-ites, Local Bosses, Tradesmen, Wage Eamers, No 
Hopers. 
^WM (191 A) Bradstow 1 
'° Dempsey, K. (1990) Smalhown, Oxford University Press, Melboume 179. However note comments 
in Reynolds, P. (1991) Political Sociology, Longman Cheshire, Melboume 108, to the effect that some 
country-bred Queensland university students identify Bradstow with then- home towns. 
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community study concentrated upon the opposite concept: egalitarianism. The study, 
Mateship in Local Organisations, examined the New South Wales tovms of Rylstone 
and Kandos m the late 1960s and was published in 1974. Early hi this study Oxley 
points out that the residents ofthe Two Towns" support and believe in an ideology of 
egalharianism desphe aspects of their community organisation being inegalitarian. 
The rest ofthe study is an attempt to reconcile this apparent paradox. Ultimately he 
concludes that these towns have both egalitarian and stratified frames of reference, 
and that these are each applied in their own distmct social contexts. As a resuh of this 
separation, the two sets of values are never in open conflict. Oxley thus provides a 
neat way to operationalise the supposedly-quintessentially-Australian belief in 
egalitarianism. 
The most recently published major Australian community study was Smalltown 
(1990), based upon seventeen years of intermittent fieldwork. Smalltown is a farming 
community in north-westem Victoria, about 250 kilometres from Melboume. 
Dempsey's purpose in Smalltown was the complement of Oxley's in the Two Towns: 
where Oxley sought to understand how egalitarian ideology survived, Dempsey 
sought to leam why class-based inequalities did not threaten the stability and cohesion 
of Smalltown. His conclusions included the effect of an egalitarian ideology; the 
effect of social mixing as equals among classes; and a lack of class compethion for 
leadership positions. 
Oxley's convention of referring to Rylstone and Kandos collectively as "the Two Towns" will be 




A further study. Politics in Place (1991) , examined community power relationships 
in local govemment in Cowra, NSW. While it contains some useful observations for 
this research, hs tight focus on the Council makes it somewhat more restricted as a 
study of community power relationships generally. 
Not all community studies require the seventeen years of fieldwork performed by 
Dempsey for Smalltown, however any community study is a large undertaking. In 
most cases, researchers have lived in their subject communities for periods ranging 
from a few months to a few years, and have gained their data as participant observers. 
This chapter will draw on the literature of community studies, and upon the three 
Australian studies in particular, to examine the nature of communities in Australia in 
order to establish hypotheses about the likely operation of connectionalism. 
Before proceeding with this chapter h should be acknowledged that the Australian 
community studies represent but three ofthe many hundreds of small Australian 
communities, and that none ofthe communities previously studied are in Queensland. 
These studies are not presented as archetypal Australian communities but rather as 
significant points of reference for the examination of Queensland communities below. 
Communities 
Many ofthe communities studied to date have been relatively small and isolated from 
the major population centres. This is probably because such communities offer neatly 
defined boundaries withhi which the community to be studied can be located, and 
'^  Gray, I. (1991) Politics in Place, Cambridge University Press, Sydney 
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because such communities are small enough for participant observers to be able to 
observe a significant portion ofthe community's life. Smalltown and the Two Towns 
were both distant from their state capitals, and from the nearest major regional cenfre. 
They were also small centres - Smalhown was a town of 2700, with an additional 
1050 people in surroundmg fanns; Kandos and Rylstone together had 2900 people, 
plus 300 people in the nearby satellite town of Charbon. 
The small populations and relative isolation of these towns have implications for the 
way inter-personal relationships within each community are structured. Any 
community is, in one sense, composed of members filling roles. Each role has 
specific responsibilities and a specific place in the community structure. There are 
dozens of community roles, from informal ones such as "friend" to very formal ones 
such as "Mayor". Boissevain notes: 
When sociologists speak of role, they mean the norms and 
expectations that apply to the occupant of a particular position. 
Each person plays many different roles: neighbour, husband, 
employee, football club member, and so on. By virtue of each 
[the person] comes in contact with particular sets of people who 
I ^ 
share with [them] a particular activity or interest. 
In isolated communities the number of roles to be filled is much greater than in less 
isolated communities because isolated communities must be self-sufficient. WTiere 
communities are close to one another they can share resources (for instance, one State 
'^  Boissevain, J. (1974) Friends of Friends Basil Blackwell, Oxford 28 
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Emergency Service unit might support three communities) but isolated communities 
must fill all roles themselves. Furthermore, in country towns where volunteer activhy 
provides services which are professionally provided in the city (for example rural 
volunteer firefighters), the filling of community roles has implications for chizens' 
quality of life. A community which, for want of volunteers, cannot maintain a Lions' 
Club, or a Volunteer Playgroup, or Boy Scouts, will be a poorer community as a result 
(and will perceive itself as thus). 
Dempsey demonstrated that in Smalltown the need to fill roles was satisfied in two 
ways. The first involved social sanctions which compelled people to participate in the 
community or else become ostracized. "It is virtuous to join in activities that help to 
ensure the community's survival and the maintenance ofthe lifestyle it offers and it is 
morally reprehensible to choose to live a private life." The second involved role 
redundancy, where multiple roles were filled by one person: 
The development of community based relationships is facilitated 
by there being many parts to play and few players to perform 
them in a community with Smalltown's limited population, 
limited affluence and geographical isolation. So '...people tend 
to place different roles to the same person' (Frankenburg, 
1966:287). Frankenburg calls this phenomenon role 
redundancy. Living in Smalltown is, in some senses, akin to 
being a member of an amateur theatrical group. Because of a 
'" Dempsey (1990) op cit 195. The application of this principle extended to the pomt where 
Smalltown's elderly, who could no longer participate fully m society were, m Dempsey's view, ignored 
and neglected. 
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shortage of performers the man selling tickets also works the 
spotlights and sells drinks at interval. As researchers we found 
ourselves coming across the same people in a variety of 
situations: for instance, the man introduced to you as a town 
councillor at a Saturday public function shakes your hand as you 
enter church on Sunday, then speaks to you again on Tuesday 
night at a Rotary meeting. 
Gray observed role redundancy in Cowra, where the existence of both role 
redundancy and a Council which often lacked strong consensus led to a desire, among 
councillors, to quarantine difficulties within the Council, so that the differences did 
not affect councillors' interaction in other roles: 
All councillors were likely to encounter each other and the 
senior officers on social occasions, but all valued isolation of 
social relations from political life. Some councillors expressed 
concern that the divisions created by contentious issues in the 
councU were being maintained outside. A councillor indicated 
the value placed on isolation of political vendettas inside the 
Council... 
Such a situation, where community members play any number of roles at different 
times, implies the existence of multiplex relationships. "[Relationships] which 
'^ Dempsey (1990)/Z>/c?98 
'* Gray (1991) op cin31 
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contahi only one focus of interaction are called 'Uniplex', or more simply 'single-
stranded' relationships. Those which contain more than one content on the other hand 
... are called muhiplex, or more simply, multi-stranded or many-stranded 
relationships."''' 
The existence of multiplex relationships between two people affects the way they 
handle conflict with each other. Where a relationship exists in several contexts, and a 
dispute arises in one of those contexts, the dispute will be managed in such a way that 
it does not threaten to sever the relationship entirely. Put another way, the strength of 
the ties which are not in dispute ensure that a relationship can survive the dispute, 
because the "many other social relationships of those who are on the losing end [of 
1 Q 
the dispute] may be very supportive." Multiplexity therefore mitigates against 
acrimonious interpersonal conflict. 
In communities where large numbers of multiplex relationships occur, there appears 
to be a link between these relationships and a philosophy of egalitarianism. The 
philosophy of egalitarianism (as opposed to its actual practice) is fundamental to the 
perception Australians have of themselves. In The Australian Legend Ward traces the 
concept back to the convicts, of whom he claimed that "this egalitarian class solidarhy 
was the one human trait which usually remained to all but the most brutalised of 
them."'^ 
'^  Mitchell, J. (1969a) Social Networks in Urban Situations, Manchester University Press, Manchester 
22. At the end of this passage Mitchell cites Gluckman (1955) The Judicial Process among the 
Barotse of Northern Rhodesia, Manchester University Press, Manchester. Gluckman was the fu-st to 
use and defme these terms. 
18 Dempsey (1990) op cU 59 
" Ward, R. (1958) 77?^  Australian Legend, Oxford University Press, Melboume 27 
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Australian egalitarianism has been derided as bemg more cultural myth tiian 
sociological characteristic; opponents ofthe egalitarian myth have been able to cite 
any number of ways m which Australian society and cuhure has been exclusive rather 
than inclusive; hostile rather than welcoming. In fact, Australian egalitarianism as 
described by Ward was never a universal fraternite. He describes how "curtency 
lads"^° ofthe 19* century were egalharian amongst themselves but despised "new-
chums" (recent artivals). The practice of egalitarianism alongside exclusionary 
discrimination is therefore not necessarily mconsistent. 
The links between muhiplex relationships and this form of egalitarianism is as 
follows: the network of strong and multiplex relationships defmes the "hi" group 
amongst whom egalitarian behaviour is practiced. Anyone outside that network is 
denied the privileges of equality and treated as an inferior. This pattem was identified 
in both the Two Towns and in Smalltown: 
Residents of Smalltown have a very positive view of relationships 
in their community. The majority believe that theirs is a friendly 
and caring community where most people can and do feel at 
home. But the account that was offered ofthe social 
marginal ization and, often, exclusion of several categories of 
people who fail to conform to key Smalltown values 
demonstrates that the town does not always live up to the 
Gemeinschaft character it claims to possess. There are many 
other examples of behaviour to show that Smalltown is not quite 
20 Australian bom rather than unmigrants 
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the 'one big happy family' U purports to be.^^ 
Egalitarians, in short, can be arrogantly exclusive ... Mere 
affirmation of interpersonal equality within a group and 
corporate superiority to outsiders does not involve logical 
contradiction. Contradiction appears, however, when pan-
human equality is regularly used as an ideological weapon 
against superordinate groups and as regularly put aside for 
dealings with generally rejected outcasts; and this situation is 
far from uncommon. But belief systems survive by satisfying the 
believers and not by satisfying rules of abstract logic. Such 
inconsistencies should not surprise the sociologist. 
It is also possible that communities which clearly contain objective inequalities may 
still claim to be egalitarian because the egalitarian philosophy forms a strong part of 
their ideological framework (if not their social reality): 
symbolic behaviour is no small thing; it is the smoke which 
indicates the presence of ideological fire. And many ofthe hard 
facts are not really relevant to the point at issue. Proof of 
defects in classlessness, equality of opportunity, radicalism, 
democracy, freedom, tolerance, and so on have nothing to do 
7^ 
with egalitarianism - an entirely different thing. 
'^ Dempsey (1990) op cU 54 
^^  Oxley, H. (1978) Mateship in Local Organisation, UQ Press, St Lucia 52 
^^  Oxley (1978)/6zc? 24 
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Once such an ideology is in place and dominant, believers may begin to simply ignore 
evidence of inequalhy in order to preserve a fa9ade of egalharianism: 
They were alerting us to the social and psychological 
significance of ignoring or denying the importance of such 
inequalities in a community where members of different 
economic classes are neighbours, often are linked by multiple 
personal ties and interact regularly -perhaps daily - in several 
institutional contexts. Denying or ignoring the significance of 
differences that matter while, at the same time emphasizing 
similarities and a certain degree of acceptance among people 
occupying quite different economic class positions helps to 
explain why substantial inequalities do not generate more 
tension and schism, or erode attachment of more disadvantaged 
groups and persons to the community. 
A community such as has been described, containing large numbers of multiplex 
relationships within a bounded network where all group members are considered to be 
equal, is likely to generate a great deal of positive feeling and loyahy within the group 
(i.e. community) members. The studies indicate that one ofthe ways these 
communities maintain their intemal cohesion is by constantly enumerating and 
celebrating what they see as these positive aspects of their town and their way of life: 
•^* Dempsey (1990) op cU 150 
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Whatever their class, they see themselves as resourceful, hard-
working achievers, loyal, hospitable and egalitarian; a people 
who pull together, look after those in trouble, and strive to repel 
threats from outside to their community's survival - especially 
7 ^ 
those from politicians and their bureaucrats. 
Negative events - from unemployment to declining commodity prices to the poor 
performance ofthe local football team - are blamed on extemal factors and outsiders, 
in order to avoid intemal schisms. "Outsiders", who are not part ofthe multiplex web 
of relationships, can safely be attacked by the entfre group. Respondmg to perceived 
attacks and perceived slights also has the effect of increasing the esprit within the 
group, thus further enhancing cohesion and exacerbating the phenomenon. 
Gray, for instance, quoting Cohen, stated that in Cowra "the collective local sense of 
'social self is 'informed by implicit or explicit contrast.' Living hi a town or mral 
area offers an identity in its differentiation of its people against those of other towns 
9 A 
and rural areas." 
The Outsiders who become the focus of blame from the community members need 
not live at a distance. There are some people who live in the town inhabited by the 
community, but who are not included in the web of relationships which sociologically 
consthute the community. Smalltown has two major marginalised groups, whom 
Dempsey calls "no-hopers" and "blockies". "No-hopers" are those who, because of 
^'Dempsey (1990)/WJ 1 
^^  Gray (1991) op cit 164, quoting Cohen, A. (1985) The Symbolic Construction of Community, Ellis 
Horwood/Tavistock, London, 115 
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alcoholism, poverty, or a reputation for either, are unable to fulfil the requirements 
Smalltown has for behaviour and lifestyle. 
"Blockies", on the other hand, are those who have purchased subdivided blocks of 
land for hobby farms but have found that the land could not support them and that 
paid work could not be found locally. Thus driven to idleness in a community which 
values mdustriousness, they are caricatured as "long-hafred, dope-smoking hippy 
types" and accused of "tuming Smalhovm from a community where 'everyone knows 
everyone' into one m which members feel ill-at-ease and their personal identhies are 
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somewhat threatened because there are many strangers walkhig around" 
Another, somewhat less maligned group of outsiders are those whom Watson called 
"Spiralists"^^. Spiralists are "professional and managerial workers in the community 
who ... secure advancement either by moving from one post to another, which may 
well be in a different area, or by promotion within an organisation which has branches 
in several places."^^ Most country towns have "spiralists", professionals such as 
teachers, nurses, bank staff and public servants who have come to the town in order to 
further their careers. Such people are recognised as necessary to the town, but they 
are not necessarily included as part ofthe community. Such newcomers must make 
an active effort to become involved in the community (and therefore to become 
enmeshed in the web of relationships) in order to be accepted. The community is not 
likely to reach out to the newcomers - the newcomers must seek acceptance through 
active involvement. 
" Dempsey (1990) zWc? 46 
^^  Watson (1964) "Social Mobility and Social Class in Industrial Communities", quoted in Bell & 
Newby (1977) o;?c/M77 
^' Bell & Newby (1977) op cit 111 
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Involvement should not be too active, however. Leadership positions should never be 
sought by relative newcomers, and should be accepted only with the most obvious 
reluctance when they are thmst upon the newcomer: 
Newcomers, especially those engaged in upper middle-class 
occupations, are expected by entrenched members of these 
classes to participate enthusiastically in community activities. 
But their enthusiasm must stop short of being 'too pushy' or 
'trying to take over' a local organisation or project, or even 
failing to conform to crucial local expectations of someone in 
their position. In other words it is to stop short of threatening 
the monopolistic rights of'locals' or of certain categories of 
'locals'. It is generally only acceptable for a 'newcomer' to 
aspire to office if he does not seek a position reserved for long-
term residents. Also in seeking office he must observe well 
established protocol by waiting to be asked to stand for office 
and once in office carrying out his duties according to 
established practices. 
Leadership 
If, as described above, communities like Smalltown and the Two Towns profess 
themselves to be egalitarian communities, then the issue of leadership becomes 
°^ Dempsey (1990) op cU 49 
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problematic. If egalharianism admhs of leaders at all, then a way must be found for 
those leaders to be appomted, and for them to actually lead, without the leaders 
appearmg to rise above the level of equality shared by all. 
As noted above, the professed egalharianism in Smalltown and the Two Towns is 
more ideology than reality. The towns do have status systems which provide 
community leaders but a number of observations can be made about the leaders who 
come forward. First and foremost, the leaders must come from within the muhiplex 
network of relations. Leaders must be intrinsically connected to the community and 
•2 1 
in no sense an "outsider" 
Leaders must take every opportunity to emphasise that they are no more than the equal 
of other community members. They must attend the pubs, allow themselves to be 
called "mate," and should claim constantly that they are "just a normal community 
member." Even where their means allow, they should live in no more than the same 
modest comfort available to others. This reinforcement ofthe rhetoric of 
egalitarianism allows leaders to lead without disturbing the central social myths which 
bind the community. 
In the Two Towns, Oxley notes that "an upper-stratum man who comes hito contact 
with workers outside working hours will be treated more or less as an equal whether 
• • ^9 
he likes h or not," and in Smalltown Dempsey describes "medical practhioners, 
Although this seems to be tme for Australian towns, other community studies have found that groups 
may force relative outsiders to act as leaders. By doing so, they create leaders who can easily become 
scapegoats should decisions be unpopular or resuhs unsatisfactory. The most commonly cited example 
of this is contamed in Frankenburg (1957) ViUage on the Border, a study ofthe Welsh village of 
Pentrediwaith. 
32 Oxley (1978) o/?d/97 
112 
lawyers and administrators" who "could afford to spend more of their income on 
housing and on expensive imported cars" but "who resist doing so because they do 
not want to risk being accused of setting themselves apart as superior in a community 
which prides itself on its egalitarian character."" 
Oxley identifies three strands of leadership in Rylstone and Kandos: leaders whose 
leadership derives from their occupancy of a position of "high formal authority"^''; 
those whose leadership derives simply from their ability to lead opinions outside any 
formal structure; and those whose leadership derives from occupancy of senior 
positions in voluntary organisations. Oxley appears to indicate that the most effective 
leaders combine elements ofthe latter two rationales for leadership - high positions in 
voluntary organisations plus an independent capacity to lead opinions: 
These were the general leaders. They outshone the other leaders 
of voluntary activities both in the diversity of their interests and 
in the extent of their infiuence. Each of them has been running 
voluntary projects for some years and had in the process built up 
an extensive network of useful contacts. Each was highly skilled 
in the arts of administration and persuasion. Each had a 
reputation for sound judgment and organising ability which gave 
his words weight. Anyone wishing to start something new would 
be well advised to get one of them to support him. 
" Dempsey (1990) op cit 181 
^'Oxley (1978) op dM37 
"Oxley(1978)/Wc? 140 
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Finally, leaders legitimate their leadership during times of crisis, hi particular, leaders 
defend the communities against "outsiders" whenever the communhy is threatened. 
By takmg up this battle, the position of leaders is remforced even if their efforts to 
hold off larger outside forces is ultimately unsuccessfiil. Dempsey describes the 
phenomenon as follows: 
Where the residents collectively are under threat from extemal 
enemies (or are led to believe they are under threat) sentiments 
of attachment are enhanced. As Simmel has pointed out, the 
degree of amity existing within a group is, in large measure, due 
to the perceptions of enmity arising outside the group (1955: 96-
105). It has already been seen that town leaders, with the co-
operation ofthe newspaper, bring to the community news of any 
possible threat to its quality of life. There appears to be an 
endless series of threats and accounts ofthe battles of 
community leaders with the perpetrators of these threats. These 
almost always make the front page. Bad government decisions, 
the militancy of trade unions, government charges for transport 
and politicians, especially ofthe left, are all blamed for any 
worsening in Smalltown's economy. 
Oxley goes a step further and links this leadership activity to the need for scapegoats: 
Perception of an oppressor provides more than a sense of 
fellowship in misery; it provides a form of scapegoat. 
Superordinate scapegoats cannot serve as objects of open 
^^ Dempsey (1990) op cit 113 
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vengeance but they can serve as objects of blame. Any really or 
supposedly antagonistic out-group can act as focus for feelings 
of aggression otherwise threatening the in-group. 
Bradstow 
To this point the focus has largely been upon Smalltown and the Two Towns. 
Bradstow has not been mentioned because Wild's findings in Bradstow are entfrely 
different from the other two studies. Bradstow is, as noted earlier in this chapter, 
regarded as a completely atypical country town. However, study of Bradstow still 
yields mteresting observations, primarily as a counterpoint to towns such as those 
described above. 
Bradstow differs from the previous towns from the very beginning. Whereas 
Smalltown and the two towns were small and isolated, Bradstow is far from isolated. 
It is a dormitory town for Sydney, and is only a few hours' travel along a good 
highway. A number of Bradstow's residents live and work m Sydney during the week 
and come to Bradstow on the weekends. As such, Bradstow is something of a rural 
playground for wealthy Sydney residents who can afford to maintain a dwelling in 
Sydney and property in Bradstow. 
Bradstow is stratified into a number of observable and self-aware status groups, and 
the social roles within the community are clearly allocated according to status. The 
most respected, but smallest status group Wild calls the Gentry. The Gentry are 
" Oxley (1978) op dM8-49 
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wealthy, and are usually of hidependent means. The families ofthe Gentry have 
dwelt in Bradstow for several generations, being the original European settlers who 
took up land m the district. The next status group, the Grange-ites, are nouveau-riche 
professionals who work in Sydney but maintain properties in Bradstow. They are 
regarded within the town as bemg near the top ofthe social order, but lacking the 
"aristocratic" quahties ofthe Gentry. Third are the Local Bosses. Like the Grange-
ites, the local bosses have achieved prosperhy through business activity, but whilst the 
Grange-ites operate their enterprises in Sydney, the Local Bosses both live and work 
in Bradstow. 
The fourth group are the Tradesmen. These are relatively prosperous local workers 
who have achieved a measure of success in their trade or business but who are still 
less successful than the bosses. They support their families in comfort rather than in 
luxury. The fifth group are the Wage Earners, who are respectably involved in 
regular work, but who have no opportunities nor aspirations of achieving greater 
success. Finally Wild describes the No-Hopers. These are much like the No-Hopers 
in Smalltown. They are wage eamers or unemployed, and are reputed to be morally 
bankrupt and prone to alcoholism. They are an object of disdam and embartassment 
and are usually excluded from full participation in the community's life.^^ 
Class and Status in Bradstow 
When considering these groups, h is important to bear in mmd that Wild regards them 
as status groups rather than class groups, and the central purpose of his work is to 
^^  These descriptions are based on Wild (1974) op cit 36 - 37 
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observe and discuss the relationship between these two concepts of stratification. 
Wild describes four class groups: "These are the leisured owners of property who are 
employers; the working owners who are employers; the working owners who are not 
employers; and the non-owners who are employees."^^ Thus the status groups are 
defmed, as above, in terms of esteem, lifestyle, and some notion of "respectabilhy", 
while class groups are defined strictly in relation to the individual's ownership of 
Capital, and their poshion as a buyer or seller of Labour. 
Wild notes that "the classes overlap to some extent with the status crheria"''^ in that 
those at the top (or bottom) ofthe status system are almost certainly to be found at the 
top (or bottom) ofthe class system. However the relationship between class and 
status is slightly more complex, because adjacent status groups are likely to be linked 
by their class situation: 
If as it seems, adjacent [status] groups share similar economic 
characteristics, and therefore occupy similar class positions, 
then there is a potential for class ties between them. There is a 
possibility that an awareness of these relations may produce a 
class consciousness, that is, an awareness of their general social 
position and the problems and opportunities that surround it. 
Here there is a close link between the class and status systems 
because some cultural elements (that is, some bases of prestige 
evaluation), such as labels of identification, become part ofthe 
Wild (191 A) op cit 1X2 
Wild (1974) op c/n 13 
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class consciousness. In other words, class consciousness and 
styles of social honour can share some elements. 41 
The distinction and relationship between class and status in Bradstow is important for 
this thesis because Wild's description of "class" is a great deal more specific than the 
concept of "class" underlying descriptions of class-based aligned voting m Chapter 2 
above. The use made ofthe term "class" m Chapter 2 implichly included elements 
such as lifestyle, income source, income level, education, material wealth, and 
profession. In Wild's terms, the latter four descriptors are hidicators of status rather 
than indicators of class. Indeed, when discussmg the aligned votmg habhs of 
Bradstow, Wild disaggregates the figures by status group rather than by class, and the 
results obtained for the 1963 and 1966 Federal Elections are compelling: 




























Clearly, Liberal voting decreases and habitual (aligned) voting increases as one moves 
down the status hierarchy. It can be concluded that, electorally at least, "status" in 
Bradstow functions m the same manner as "class" as described in Chapter 2. 
41 Wild (1974) op c//113 
drawn from Wild (1974) op cU 187 (tables 94.; 9.5; 9.6) 
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Relationships in Bradstow 
Relationships in Bradstow are entirely different to those in Smalltown and the Two 
Towns. Wild points out several areas of Bradstow where the different status groups 
live, and notes that a change to a more suitable address is a necessary component of 
any attempt at mobility between status groups. This is in stark contrast to behaviour 
in other towns, where the well-to-do deliberately avoid emphasising their stams 
through their housing or possessions. A segregated housing pattem ensures that 
neighbourly relations tend to be conducted within status groups. This segregation of 
status groups extends into other aspects ofthe community: for instance some 
voluntary associations are very exclusive (based upon status). In other voluntary 
associations the leadership positions are filled by "the most esteemed people 
available." Combined with role redundancy this results in "a marked overlapping of 
officials in different associations.""*^ 
At the lower status levels, Bradstow is more like the other towns studied: 
Much ofthe ordinary life ofthe middle and lower status groups 
is the same as in other towns. The members support such sports 
as rugby league, use the bowling club as an egalitarian centre 
where everyone wears similar clothes, and attend Rotary or 
Lions. 
Wild (1974) op «Y 68 
Wild (1974)/Wc? 34 
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Following Wild's account, h is open to question whether Bradstow is really a 
community at all. The stratified, mutually exclusive groups which constitute 
Bradstow appear almost as a series of smaller communhies who happen to share 
geographical proximhy. Where circumstances force these communhies to interact, 
the status hierarchy govems their behaviour towards one another. Bradstow is, 
therefore, much like the tradhional model of a stratified society and exhibits few of 
the characteristics identified in the other studies. The central difference is that whilst 
Smalltown and the Two Towns were characterised by an ideology of egalharianism, 
Bradstow is characterised by the ready acceptance of a society divided into higher and 
lower status groups. 
Leadership in Bradstow 
As in the other towns, leaders are required in Bradstow. However in the case of a 
stratified town like Bradstow, the leaders must come from the appropriate status 
group. In the case of Bradstow, most formal leadership came from among the Bosses. 
Whd notes: 
The bosses form a solid-core status group. They claim and 
receive a reputation for their interest in social and political 
affairs. They have a particular circle of club memberships and 
share a common lifestyle. There are differences, particularly 
with respect to education and income, but it is the system of 
social relations built around community projects that provides 
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unity. The bosses are known as the ones that can get things 
done, and they control most ofthe projects. '*^ 
One reason for the bosses' continued dominance in leadership roles is the lack of 
interest in filling such positions from the lower status groups. "The tradesmen, 
workers and no-hopers are scarcely concemed about any form of politics, although 
there is more interest in local than in national matters ... With [such] a big section of 
the population apathetic and uninterested it is easy for the upper status groups' 
ideology to dominate and for a small clique to control local political affairs""*^ 
However the Bosses are not the superordinate stams group, and Wild points out''^ that 
the Bosses can govem only with the consent ofthe Grange-ites and the Gentry, the 
two status groups above them. When the Grange-ites and Gentry feel that the 
decisions taken by Boss-leaders are not in their interests, they are capable of 
mobilising and changing the decisions to favour themselves. Thus the Grange-ites 
and Gentry maintain an informal veto over the leadership decisions ofthe Bosses, 
who in tum anticipate the views ofthe higher-status groups when making these 
decisions. As a result, while the Bosses provide the active leadership, the Grange-ites 
and Gentry possess overarching authority. In this sense the leaders' (Bosses') 
positions are legitimated by the acquiescence of those in higher class groups. Should 
that acquiescence be withdrawn, the leaders lose the capacity for effective decision 
making. 
'^Wild (1974)/Wrf 50-51 
"•^  Wild (1974) ibid 184/188 and cf figures above for "habiUial" votmg 
''^  See, for instance, p. 179 
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Gray found that leadership m Cowra was also largely the product of stratification, but 
those who, in Bradstow, would have been Grange-ites or Gentry, took on much more 
active leadership roles in Cowra. Gray states: 
Those at the top ofthe [status] ladder were seen to have a claim 
on rights and responsibilities of leadership ... Their status ... 
gave them a right to a special claim on public office at the same 
time as U laid down their responsibilities to the locality, which 
JO 
some of their ancestors had also served in local government. 
It is also worth nothig that in neither Bradstow nor Cowra did the Tradesmen, 
Workers or No-hopers develop altemative institutions (such as a strong union 
movement or Labor Party branch) through which to mobilise any leadership 
ambitions they may have had.'*^ Thus, the right ofthe Bosses to fill the active 
leadership roles was unchallenged by these subordinate groups, and while this point is 
not openly discussed by Wild, the dormancy of these lower status groups appears to 
result from widespread social acceptance that the Bosses were the natural leadership 
incumbents. 
Conclusions 
This chapter has examined the three major Australian community studies in order to 
''^Gray(1991)o/7c//173 
"*' Gray, however, does describe a "railway community," comprised ofthe diminishing number of 
railway workers, who effectively formed a community withm the commimity rather than endeavouring 
to mfluence the wider community leadership. See Gray (1991) op cU, p. 178 
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provide a base of knowledge about Australian rural communities. The hisights they 
provide are only valid to the extent that Queensland communities are comparable with 
these communities (they are, after all, three New South Wales towns and one 
Victorian). This comparability will be examined below. However certain 
conclusions can be drawn from these studies in order to inform the rest of this thesis. 
The community studies have focussed on two basic models of community -
egalitarian and stratified. Egalitarian communities may arise because, in small and 
isolated communhies, the range of people available to fill social roles is small, so 
people fill a number of roles. This creates multiplex relationships, which have the 
effect of minimizing intemal conflict and maximising intemal cohesion. Multiplex 
relationships also contribute towards an egalitarian ideology, which is not inevitably 
in accord with reality. Difficulties are dealt with by extemalising them and blaming 
"outsiders", who may in fact dwell within the community. The community is 
defended against these outsiders by leaders drawn from within the community, who 
lead but also affirm their equality with the rest ofthe group. Such conflicts have the 
effect of further binding the group together. 
Stratified communities have obvious and self-aware class and/or status groups. Inside 
each such group, relations may be multiplex and the groups may be cohesive, but 
between the groups there are few ties, and those which exist are weak, occurthig only 
between adjacent groups. Because the network of multiplex relationships does not 
cover the entire community, there is no impediment to intemal conflict among such 
groups. There is no philosophy of egalitarianism, and Leaders affirm this situation by 
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deferting to those of a higher stratum while exercising dommance over those from the 
lower strata. 
Community Studies and Queensland Political Culture 
These three studies then provide a number of insightful perspectives conceming 
Australian communities. Yet none was a Queensland communhy and, uhimately, the 
studies can only inform this thesis if they lead to a greater understanding of 
communhies in Queensland. It should be noted, however, that all three communities 
were Australian communhies; and that although Smalhown is in Victoria and the Two 
Towns are in New South Wales, they shared many characteristics. It is worth, then, 
asking how well Smalltown, or the Two Towns, would fit in Queensland. If the 
culture and values of these towns are roughly concomitant with the values of country 
Queensland, it is open to conclude (at least tentatively) that some Queensland 
communities will be similar, to a greater or lesser degree, with Smalltown and the 
Two Towns. 
It should be emphasised at the outset that too much should not be read into similarities 
which emerge from this comparison. There is no intention at this point to argue that 
Smalltown, the Two Towns, or Bradstow represent archetypes which can be found m 
Queensland. Rather, the intention is to use these comparisons to begin to determine 
how much these studies' conclusions might contribute to an understanding of 
communities in country Queensland. 
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The first and possibly simplest issue is that of decentralisation. It was noted in the 
previous chapter that Queensland is characterised by decentralisation, with 
settlements often being both far from one another, and from the capital. Smalltown 
and the Two Towns are, likewise, relatively isolated, and this isolation was the most 
important factor identified in contributing towards role redundancy. Role redundancy 
would be reduced if communities could call on the citizens of other towns to fill local 
roles as the essence of role redundancy is that there are many community roles, yet 
few people to fill them. Bradstow, on the other hand, is less isolated, and has an 
entire status group (the Grange-ites) who typically work in Sydney and live (at least 
part-time) in Bradstow. Role Redundancy was much less of an issue in Bradstow. It 
is possible, then, to suggest that in decentralised Queensland, isolated towns are likely 
to experience role redundancy in the manner of Smalltown and the Two Towns. In 
more densely settled areas, and in areas adjacent to major cities (e.g. Ipswich, 
adjacent to Brisbane), this is less likely to be the case. 
The previous chapter identified the belief held by Country Queensland that the 
country way of life is morally superior to life in the city. Citizens of Smalltown have 
an identical view: 
The descendents [of the pioneers] and those who have come to 
join them from the city, believe in the superiority of their way of 
life. When they talk about it they evoke images direct from the 
Australian legend: they enthuse about the physical appeal ofthe 
bush, they emphasise the vicissitudes of making a living in the 
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bush, and ofthe inability ofthe city-dweller to understand those 
vicissitudes, or to emulate satisfactorily the rural lifestyle.^^ 
Since it has already been established that country Queenslanders feel that thefr 
lifestyle is morally superior to that of the chies, h follows logically that this belief 
must also be present at the local level, fr may be expected, on this basis, that the 
above quotation could be aptiy applied to any number of Queensland tovms. 
Identified above, in Queensland, was the political importance of rejectmg and 
attacking "outsiders" (be they physically outside the state or merely intemal voices of 
dissent); and therefore the tendency to divide the world into "us" and "them". In 
much the same way, the towns studied reject outsiders and use them as scapegoats for 
negative events in their communities. Also, as in Queensland, the "outsiders" of the 
studied communities may well live within the community but are defined (for failing 
to satisfy community norms) as being outside the community proper. These 
similarities tend to suggest that in many Queensland communities, the politics of 
rejecting outsiders may be in force. At the very least, it can be said that such 
community behaviour is consonant with the political culture of country Queensland. 
The fmal set of characteristics to be considered concem leadership. The populist 
leadership described in country Queensland demands that leaders are of the people, 
that is that they emerge from the community; and that they represent the people by 
acting as a state "champion" against threatening outside forces. In the towns studied 
(Bradstow excepted), both of these qualities were important. Leaders were requfred 
to be an active and vital part of the community network, fillhig a leadership role but 
°^ Dempsey (1990) op c /n 
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being essentially no different to any other community member. They legitimated 
their leadership positions by battling larger, hostile outside forces. In short, 
leadership activities in Smalltown and the Two Towns were in these respects identical 
to the populist leadership typified, at a wider level in Queensland, by Bjelke-Petersen. 
The similarities discussed between Queensland and the studied towns are at least 
sufficient to suggest with confidence that the findings of Oxley and Dempsey will be 
useful guides to interpreting the behaviour of Queensland communities. It will be 
noted that no similarities have been reported between Bradstow and the culture of 
country Queensland. As a result, while Bradstow remains as an altemative model for 
regional communities, and may be reflected in more affluent provincial cities such as 
Toowoomba, such communities would not be expected to predominate in Queensland. 
There are also two particular areas of dissimilarity between the community studies 
and country Queensland which merit consideration. The fiirst of these is the issue of 
multiplexity. The existence of multiple overlapping relationships within Smalltown 
and the Two Towns (and among voluntary association leaders in Bradstow) is integral 
to each tovm's organisation. However, multiplexity has not previously been 
mentioned during above discussion of Queensland political culture. One apparent 
reason is that multiplexity operates at the community level - one would not expect to 
fmd multiple overlapping relationships amongst all country communities given their 
isolation - but another possible reason is that multiplex networks simply do not tend 
to occur in country Queensland. Given that multiplexity seems to arise out of role 
redundancy, and that isolated communities produce role redundancy, it may be 
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expected to find multiplex relationships in country Queensland, but their existence 
cannot be more firmly deduced from the evidence presented thus far. 
The second point of difference concems histmmentalism. At the state level, 
instmmentalism is broadly regarded as a raison d'etre for govemment. Govemment, 
according to this perception, exists to provide thmgs for citizens. At the community 
level, instmmentalism seems to take on a related, though subtly different importance, 
hi that it represents a political scorecard; each new development project and each new 
govemment dollar spent locally represents a victory for the local leadership. The sum 
of these achievements allows local leaders to demonstrate that they have had victories 
in wresting advancements from the hostile 'outsiders' in the central govemment. 
It is evident that there are points of similarity and points of difference between the 
towns studied and the pohtical culture of country Queensland. However all of these 
differences and similarities are instructive, and the community studies, although 
carried out interstate, can still usefully inform the development of understanduig 
about Queensland communities. 
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CHAPTER 5 - METHODOLOGY AND INDICATORS 
Indicators for Connectionalism 
Reynolds^ introduces the notion of connectionalism by selecting and analysing eight 
electoral anomalies - seats the Liberals held but which they were unlikely to hold 
based on electoral history. The impact of connectionalism in these (rare) seats is 
fairly stark. However Reynolds remarks that these cases are by no means the only 
examples of connectionalism which, he suggests, ought to occur to some extent in all 
non-metropolitan seats; and may well occur in a diluted fashion in city seats. 
This research seeks to demonstrate the occurtence of connectionalism in a wider 
range of seats and circumstances by assessing a number of case studies of seats where 
connectional politics may have occurred. These assessments will be guided by 
indicators, based on Reynolds' work, to describe connectionalism. From Reynolds' 
paper a total of eighteen indicators of connectional activity were drawn, focussed on 
three areas: the Candidate, the Town, and the Electoral Circumstances. These are 
listed immediately below, and there follows a discussion of each. The indicators in 
normal type are more important conditions for connectionalism, whilst those in italics 
are less critical but still useftil pomters. 
'Reynolds (1991a) ope// 
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Candidate 
1. Candidate must be high profile and well regarded locally. 
2. Candidate must be a "local". 
3. Candidate must identify, and be seen to champion, local 
parochial concems. 
4. Candidate must "identify more as a local polhician than as 
a local representative of a pohtical party". 
5. Candidate must have extensive local networks developed 
through their profession, voluntary organisation activhy, 
local govemment experience, or state govemment 
incumbency. 
6. Candidates may exhibit maverick qualities, even opposing 
their own party in government. 
7. Many candidates have local government experience and 
transfer this political style to the state level. 
Town 
1. The town must have a distinctive ethos and identity, with 
its own social networks and historical tradition. 
2. The town should be the basis for the seat 
3. The town should have a general feeling of neglect and 
local chauvinism. 
4. The town may have locally-oriented print and electronic 
media outlets. 
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5. Towns such as these seem to occur more, the further one 
travels from Brisbane. 
Electoral Circumstances 
1. Connectionalism is only one aspect of electioneering. 
2. Connectionalism will minimise adverse national or 
regional voting trends. 
3. Connectional candidates extend beyond their class-party 
base, regardless of how strong this base may be. 
4. Connectionalism tends not to withstand concerted shifts in 
the forces of party politics. /M 
5, Connectionalism becomes critical in knife-edge situations. 
6. Connectionalism is strongest when married with wider 
political forces. 
Indicators Focussing on the candidate. 
These indicators aim to highlight the features a connectional candidate will exhibit. 
Any candidates who do not exhibit the first five qualities are unlikely to be 
connectional candidates. The final two are quite usual for connectional candidates, 
but by no means necessary. 
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1. Candidate must be high profile and well-regarded locally. 
Fundamentally, connectionalism relies upon electors having a certain level of esteem 
for the candidate, regardless ofthe elector's or the candidate's partisan affiliations. If 
the candidate is well-regarded, people are more likely to vote for him/her. If, 
furthermore, the candidate is high profile, and well regarded, this implies that the 
regard for the candidate is shared by a significant proportion ofthe community. 
Conversely, a candidate who is poorly regarded is obviously not likely to attract 
electoral support, and a candidate who lacks a high profile has addhional work to do 
in order to enable sufficient voters to become aware of her/his meritorious personal 
qualities. 
2. Candidate must be a "local". 
A connectional politician is seen as representing the community on a personal, rather 
than an histitutional level, fr therefore appears vital that the candidate be completely 
accepted as a member of that community. Reynolds describes how, m his case 
studies: 
...all eight actors had local credentials. All were born and 
raised in their towns, or regions, worked, married and raised 
families. While these points may be obvious, they should not be 
underrated in parochial communities. There is sufficient 
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evidence to confirm that there is no political specimen more 
unpopular in provincial and rural seats than the non-local 
candidate 'foisted' on the community ...^ 
At first glance this indicator appears to be the same as the previous one, but they are 
subtly different as it is possible for a person to be high profile, and well regarded in a 
community, without truly being "a local". A well-regarded but transient school 
principal or bank manager might provide an example here. 
3. Candidate must identijy, and be seen to champion, local parochial concerns. 
One ofthe indicators of likely connectional towns is "a general feeling of neglect and 
local chauvinism." This implies that such towns have local parochial concems which 
predominate in the local consciousness. A candidate could benefit from engaging 
these concems and thereby convincing community members that he or she would be a 
suitable champion for those concems in the state Parliament. In effect, the candidate 
promises that if they achieve office, the "constituency service" aspects of their work 
as a parliamentarian will be given substantial priority. 
An incumbent could obtain this benefit by demonstrating that she/he has already 
successfiilly undertaken this constituency service. The incumbent should endeavour 
to show that he or she has identified the local parochial concems, and that during the 
term of office he or she has been active on behalf of those concems, which have 
^ Reynolds (1991a) ibid 35 
^ See Chapter 2 above. 
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moved towards a satisfactory resolution. At the very least, they should show that no 
altemative member could do a better job. This concem was directly addressed by 
Reynolds, who describes how "Mmisters vish[ing the connectional electorate] ... 
praised [the Member] for his activism as a local member."^ Effectively, the Ministers 
were reassurhig electors that the curtent member was doing the best job anybody 
could, and ought not to be replaced. 
4. Candidate must "identify more as a local politician than as a local representative 
of a political party ". 
One mdicator under electoral circumstances notes that connectional candidates extend 
beyond their class-party base, regardless of how strong this base may be. In order for 
candidates to do so, they must wear their partisan label lightly, if at all. A 
connectional Labor candidate, for instance, seeks to maximise the vote by attracting 
National and Liberal Party supporters. For these voters, the Labor Party has 
historically been the "enemy," and if they vote on a connectional basis it will be 
despite, rather than because ofthe candidate's party label. It is easier to encourage 
voters to cross this partisan rubicon if the candidate emphasises local, ahead of party, 
commitment. Thus it appears important for candidates seeking connectional votes 
first and foremost to portray themselves as a local representative. 
5. Candidate must have extensive local netivorks developed through their profession, 
voluntary organisation activity, local government experience, or state government 
incumbency. 
' Reynolds (1991a)/6/^ 14 
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One ofthe central points of Reynolds' argument is that each candidate he studied had 
developed extensive networks through the community during their life before politics. 
A number ofthe candidates had been local Doctors, others had been uivolved in local 
politics (including a Mayor and Deputy Mayor), and one had occupied a key position 
in the electorate's major industry (Mount Isa Mines). Reynolds describes how "All 
[ofthe candidates studied] were in a [professional] position to forge networks in 
business and/or in their public or private capacities, especially reinforced by activity 
in the ubiquitous service clubs, frequently augmented by local govemment 
experience."^ 
6. Candidates may exhibit maverick qualities, even opposing their own party in 
govemment. 
A number ofthe candidates studied by Reynolds were required to adopt maverick 
positions in order to maintain their credibility as connectional candidates. If a 
connectional candidate were elected on the basis that they would be a local activist, 
and on the basis that they were a local representative first and a political party 
representative second, then there may be occasional important local issues where 
communhy opinion is directly opposed to party policy (or more importantly, to the 
govemment's policy where the Member's party is in govemment), and on these 
occasions the connectional Member may feel forced to act as the local champion, 
even though this means criticising his or her own party. Given the tight disciplhie in 
Reynolds (1991a)/i>/J 36 
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Australian pariiamentary pohtical parties, maverick activity carties some political 
risks. Reynolds outlmes these risks in the following quotation. 
To act the maverick is certainly an option for those playing 
connectional politics as, in doing so the maverick becomes the 
personification of local opinion. However when this involves 
attacking one's colleagues, the party system which lies behind 
connectionalism is discredited. Such an aggressive role can only 
be realistically pursued if U yields tangible political benefits.^ 
7. Many candidates have local government experience and transfer this political 
style to the state level. 
Local govemment has an entirely different focus to state govemment. It is 
unambiguously about providing services to local communhies, and competing with 
other local govemment areas for state and federal govemment largesse, tourist dollars, 
industrial development, and so forth. 
A connectional candidate whose political development has hicluded local govemment 
activity may therefore have grown used to this parochial, roads-and-bridges politics. 
If they have spent a reasonable amount of time in local govemment, they may have 
established for themselves a local reputation as a "can do" person, who can be 
counted on to supply these benefits for the local area. It is not difficult to see that 
such a person is ideally placed to develop a connectional vote as a parochial champion 
* Reynolds (1991a)/6/J 11 
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of local interests. Local govemment is one of very few ways a connectional candidate 
can demonstrate a capacity for activism on behalf of the local area before entering 
parliament. 
Furthermore, most local elections in Queensland are not contested by the parties. 
Candidates are actively discouraged from standing on behalf of a political party, even 
when they have well-known political affiliations. Thus local govemment affords 
political partisans an arena in which to demonstrate that they are a local representative 
first and a party representative second (see indicator 4 above). While not vital, an 
apprenticeship in Local Govemment certainly appears useful. 
Indicators Focussing on the Town. 
Connectional politics is most successful where undertaken within appropriate 
communities. These communities may constitute a town, a group of towns, a region, 
an electorate, or any other geopolitical grouping. For convenience they will all be 
referted to as towns. Reynolds' paper yields a number of ideas about the conditions 
most conducive to connectional politics. 
1. The town must have a distinctive ethos and identity, with its own social networks 
and historical tradition. 
If a town holds hself to be an unique entity, requiring distinct representation in order 
to preserve and enrich its own distinctive way of life, then a connectional candidate 
can campaign on the basis of their abihty to provide that representation. Without this 
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distinction, the connectional candidate can hardly champion local mterests as there are 
no specifically local interests to champion. It follows that the stronger the local 
interests, ethos and networks, the more ftilly a connectional candidate can base a 
claim to represent these community values. 
Reynolds provides a strong example ofthe importance of these quahties when 
discussing Ipswich, a city on the fringe of Brisbane and, due to urban sprawl, in 
danger of becoming just another set of Brisbane suburbs, indistinct from any others. 
However, "Ipswich maintains a distinctive ethos and identhy. Intra-Ipswich social 
networks may well be supplemented by wider networks influenced by Brisbane, but 
the local versions are not replaced. The city has an identity and an historical tradition. 
It sustains its own newspaper ... possessing both a distinctive economic base together 
with an associated social infrastmcture... In party and community politics it retained a 
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distinctiveness." The implications of this quotation are that Ipswich is only a prime 
location for connectionalism because it has preserved a separate identity which 
requires distinct representation in state Parliament. 
2. The town should be the basis for the seat. 
A common pattem for non-metropolitan electorates in Queensland is that whereby the 
electorate consists of one (or possibly a few) major towns, and their surtoundmg 
regions. The major town in each electorate can usually be easily identified because h 
becomes the location for the Member's electorate office. This major town is usually 
the largest population centre, and is also usually the economic centre ofthe region. 
'Reynolds (1991a)/Z7/(/16 
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Reynolds noted of his eight examples that "All seats were located around provincial 
or country towns."^ 
It seems likely that a candidate with strong connectional support in the electorate's 
major township may hold an advantage over a candidate whose support comes from a 
smaller centre. This may be particularly so in regions where towns are fiercely 
competitive with one another, and residence in one town may depress support from 
the other. A surge of connectional support in the largest population centre carries 
with it a larger proportion ofthe local electors, and thus maximises the potential for 
connectional voting to be effective. 
It may still be possible for connectionalism to occur in fully decentralised electorates, 
and it may similarly be possible for a candidate from a smaller community to claim 
significant levels of connectional support in the major community. Notwithstanding 
these points, h seems probable that an electorate based around a major township 
would be conducive to connectional electioneering. 
3. The town should have a general feeling of neglect and local chauvinism. 
A town which feels neglected, or which feels it has valid claims to better treatment 
than fr is curtently receiving from the state govemment, seems likely to be suitable for 
connectional activity. The task for the connectional candidate is to identify the nature 
of these feelings of neglect and chauvinism, then to become the champion redressing 
the shuation. A town which feels neglected may already have a groundswell of 
Reynolds (1991 a)/WJ 4 
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outrage, and as a result there may be potential for a connectional candidate to hamess 
this and use h to gather wide electoral support by attacking the state govemment and 
promising to become an activist on behalf of the community's grievances. "Brisbane-
bashing then becomes the stock in trade ofthe provincial connectionalist, as 
Canberta-bashfrig is of all Queensland premiers." 
4. The town may have locally-oriented print and electronic media outlets. 
This indicator is not strictly necessary, as connectional support (and more 
importantly, the local reputation upon which connectionalism is based) could be 
transmitted very effectively by word of mouth. However the presence of local, and 
locally-oriented media makes the task of establishing connectional support easier. 
Local media tend to share the same parochial concems as their audience. Thus, local 
issues which would be of no news value at all to the wider media may well be front 
page headlines for a local audience. Effective identification and promotion of these 
issues by a connectional candidate may provide opportunities to be seen in the local 
newspaper as a potential person-of-action, energetically focusshig upon the local 
concems. Local media also offer an opportunity to have one's name and face known 
right throughout the community, and this further facilhates face-to-face 
electioneering. 
5. Towns such as these seem to occur more, the further one travels from Brisbane. 
'Reynolds (1991a)/Z)/J35 
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This point relies upon somewhat impressionistic observation. It is suggested that the 
further one travels from Brisbane, the more likely one is to find communities where 
connectional politics could be usefully pursued. Without accepting the validity of this 
argument, Reynolds at least considers the possibility that it may be so^°. 
If this point holds, h may be because distance from Brisbane speaks to the first and 
third town-based indicators discussed above. The further towns are from Brisbane 
(and from other major centres), the more likely they are to have a distinctive ethos and 
identity, unadulterated by the cultures of nearby cities, and therefore the more likely 
they are to be conducive to connectionalism. Furthermore, the more distant a 
communhy is from Brisbane, the more likely it may be to feel forgotten or neglected 
by a government based in the far south-east comer ofthe state. As noted above, these 
feelings of neglect can be harnessed by a connectional candidate. 
This indicator of probable connectional activity is the weakest in this group. It 
appears that remote communities would, for the reasons noted above, be more 
conducive to connectionalism than communities in close orbit around the capital, but 
once a community is remote from the capital, it is unclear why being "more remote" 
makes a community more conducive to coimectionalism. However some measure of 
remoteness may be useful in assessing the possibility that connectionalism will 
flourish in a particular town. 
'"Reynolds (1991a)/6/J21 
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Indicators Focussing on Electoral Circumstances 
One ofthe strongest points made by Reynolds is that connectional polhics does not 
just depend on the Candidate, or the Town, but also upon the circumstances of a 
particular election. It may be that an excellent connectional candidate begins 
campaigning in a tovm which is ideally suitable for connectional activhy, but the 
nature ofthe election prevents them from prevailing. Six hidicators can be drawn 
from Reynolds' work in order to determine whether electoral circumstances will 
encourage or hinder connectional campaigning. 
1. Connectionalism is only one aspect of electioneering. 
In the very first paragraph ofthe paper's abstract, Reynolds describes connectionalism 
as "one dimension ofthe role ofthe incumbent, or candidate, in wirming or retaining 
seats."^^ By implication there are other dimensions, such as political partisanship, 
influence of state-wide and federal issues, importance ofthe political leaders, and so 
forth. Chapter 1 ofthe thesis dealt at length with different determinants of electoral 
behaviour within the funnel of causality. 
Connectionalism need not be used in isolation from these other forms of 
electioneering. A Labor candidate may, for instance, receive support from the base 
aligned group of Labor voters, from an additional group who prefer the Labor leader 
to the Nationals leader, from a further group who support Labor environmental 
policies, and fmally from a group whose support has been solicited by connectional 
" Reynolds (1991a) /6/(/Abstract. 
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polhics. Similariy, a voter may be a Labor-aligned voter confirmed in their votmg 
intention by connectional support for the Labor candidate; thus their support is based 
upon more than one aspect of electioneering. 
As a result, in seeking examples of connectional politics in action, it would be 
pointless to seek "pure" connectional candidates, operating on the basis of their local 
connections alone. Successfiil connectional politicians are likely to employ 
connectionalism alongside other forms of electioneering. 
2. Connectionalism will minimise adverse national or regional voting trends. 
This is one ofthe most important clues for identifying connectional activity. A 
successful connectional candidate receives, as one component of their overall vote, 
electoral support which is not dependent upon the party's state-wide performance, and 
this personal support provides a buffer against adverse state-wide trends. 
Analysis might take, for instance, two National Party candidates and assume a 
uniform swing of 8 percent against the Nationals. Assuming that one of those 
candidates has eamed, through their electioneering, connectional support amounting 
to 3% of voters who would otherwise have voted Labor, the result would be that 3% 
ofthe swing against the Nationals would be offset by the 3% connectional support 
from Labor voters, with the effect that the connectionally-supported candidate would 
suffer a swhig of-5 %, while the candidate without connectional support would suffer 
a swmg of-8%. 
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Naturally, there are a plethora of other reasons why an electorate nught hold up 
agamst a state-wide swing. It would not be reasonable to suggest that all such 
instances are the result of connectional voting. However, connectionalism is one 
plausible basis for such an outcome, and seats which do hold up against adverse state-
wide swings are worth examining (using the other indicators discussed here) for 
connectional effects. 
A related electoral phenomenon focuses upon independent candidates. Such 
candidates, lacking a party label, have no access to the support of party alignment. 
They do not have a base "Party" vote upon which to build. Thus any independent 
who achieves greater than usual success has done so hi spite of adverse state-wide 
conditions, and such independents are worth examining, in the same way, in order to 
establish whether connectional politics had any part in their success. Again, not every 
successful independent will be so on the basis of connectionalism, but they are 
certainly worth examining. 
3. Connectional candidates extend beyond their class-party base, regardless of how 
strong this base may be. 
Describmg the campaigning activity of Sfr Gordon Chalk m Lockyer, Reynolds noted 
that "Chalk's class-party base lay on the Range and pluralhies here would have carried 
the electorate for hhn ... but he did not confine himself to this area."^^ Despite the 
securhy afforded Chalk by the magnitude of his class-party base, he still sought to 
extend his support amongst voters who might otherwise have been expected to vote 
'^Reynolds (1991a)/6/J6 
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against him. A connectional candidate may wear a party label and attract the voters 
who customarily vote for that party, but they can add a further layer of support by 
employing connectional pohtics and convincing supporters of other political parties 
that they are still the best candidate to actively represent the local area. 
A candidate may engage in a form of connectionalism by simply confirming class-
party support, overlaying a sheen of cormectional support from the same voters - thus 
they have two reasons to vote for the candidate. However the most effective 
connectional candidates will seek the support of any local voter because, as noted 
above, they aim to present themselves as a local representative first and a political 
party representative second. 
It follows from this indicator that a candidate who suddenly generates favourable 
swings in booths which had customarily voted against his/her party, may have 
engaged those voters through connectional politics. There may be other reasons for 
the swings, but their presence is sufficient to wartant further examination, and may be 
a pointer towards connectional activity. 
4. Connectionalism tends not to withstand concerted shifts in the forces of party 
politics. 
This was one of Reynolds' central arguments. Connectionalism is not an 
overpowering political force. It operates at the marghis, rather than at the centre, of 
electoral politics. Addhionally, in the face of large, uniform statewide swmgs (such 
as the swmg towards Labor hi 1989 and 2001, and possibly the swing towards One 
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Nation in 1998) the connectional vote is prone to collapse. Under these 
circumstances, connectional regard for the candidate is insufficient to overcome their 
party label. The voter's attention is firmly fixed upon state-level issues rather than 
local or parochial issues, and their vote is consequently little influenced by 
connectional factors. Although, as noted above, connectional politics may help 
minimise adverse swings, h may be helpless in the face of concerted and determined 
partisan swings. 
Thus those elections characterised by large swings, and which are fundamentally 
based upon state level issues, will not easily yield examples of connectionalism. 
Connectional polhics will still be employed, but hs effects will probably be 
negligible, or at least almost impossible to quantify. 
5. Connectionalism becomes critical in knife-edge situations. 
As noted above, connectionalism operates at the margins of electoral politics. In 
close elections, margmal advantages become all-important (consider 1995, where less 
than fifty votes - including those not cast - were the difference between Labor and 
office), and under such circumstances the candidate who best utilises the forces of 
connectionalism may well emerge victorious. Reynolds describes how, "With a 
'knife-edge' situation ... the operation of connectional politics assumes dominance. 
Maryborough is a state seat swayed by the operation both of personal-polhical 
networks and of local reputations." 
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In a knife-edge political situation, neither candidate has obtained, by virtue of their 
party label or the electoral circumstances ofthe day, a decisive lead. Connectionalism 
provides a means by which voters aligned to the opposition party can be attracted to 
defect, voting for the candidate's personal qualities as a local, and as a local activist. 
Thus in a close race, and especially one known ahead of time to be close, it is worth 
examining the candidates to see if connectionalism may have been the difference 
between victor and vanquished. 
6. Connectionalism is strongest when married with wider political forces. 
This point retums to the first indicator related to electoral circumstances. 
Connectionalism on its own is often a weak basis for campaigning. It is difficult to 
establish, and prone to collapse under pressure from state-level political forces. 
Connectionalism is much stronger, however, when it provides an additional layer of 
support over and above party-based, issue based, or image based support. A 
candidate who averages 46% primary vote, and therefore faces preference flows 
might, through the agency of connectional politics, obtain the further 4% required for 
victory on primary votes. An incumbent defending a 3% lead and watching the pre-
election polls moving against his/her party may, through connectional activity, reduce 
the -4% statewide swing to a - 2 % swing and thereby retain the seat. 
Connectional politics is therefore at its most powerful as the icing rather than as the 
cake. A candidate in modem elections may well fmd that the bulk of their support is 
based upon state-level politics over which they have little or no influence. However 
" For ease, consider a simple election between two candidates. 
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they can still hifluence their ovm fate by campaigning on a connectional basis to 
provide connectional support in addition to state-wide support. 
IMethodological Approach 
The form of electoral analysis which is most often hi the public eye is based on deft 
statistical analysis. This process takes electoral data from three levels - booth, 
electorate and state - and uses them as a basis for prediction (usually ahead of 
elections or immediately following redistributions) and on-the-spot analysis on 
election night. Antony Green is among the leading Australian exponents of this 
process, and is one of few to have focussed much attention on state level politics. To 
an extent. Green follows the lead of earlier analysts, most notably David Fraser, who 
produced a statistical analysis for each Queensland election from 1977 to 1995 and 
the 1985 redistribution. 
This process of analysis owes much to the discipline of economics, and in particular 
bears a strong resemblance to economic modelling (it seems no co-incidence that 
Green holds degrees in mathematics, computing, economics and politics). Like 
economic modelling, the statistical modelling of elections provides valuable tools to 
understand elections at macro levels. They generate detailed swings which predict, or 
analyse, which seats are going to fall at any given election, and which party will hold 
the numbers to form a govemment. Such models are less powerful after an election. 
They have an outstanding capacity to identify which booths and seats contributed to 
the outcome but little more - that is, a capachy to establish which way voters voted, 
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but limited capacity to explain why. Green himself, introducing a compilation of 
statistics across several elections, notes that: 
WhUe some commentary is provided ... it is not the aim of this 
publication to explain all the trends evident across the four 
elections. Rather ... the aim is to assist in public understanding 
ofthe shift in relative support for the three major parties.''* 
Statistical techniques to overcome this challenge have relied primarily upon 
questionnaire design, with pre-election polling and exit polling regularly asking voters 
to cite the reasons for their vote, often providing a "menu" for respondents to choose 
from. While such techniques provide useful input, they are still an extremely blunt 
instmment when compared to theoretical models such as the funnel of causality. The 
notion ofthe funnel of causality suggests that a wide band of variables, narrowing 
over a long period of time, interact to produce a fmal voting outcome. There is no 
way such complex interactions of influencing factors could be effectively captured by 
a single survey question. At the very best, such questions may record the final 
influential factors which existed at the tunnel's very tip - during the campaign or on 
polling day - but the rest ofthe factors underlying the voter's electoral choice would 
remain a mystery. 
As a result, the present research will proceed on the basis of a series of case studies, 
where five electoral cases will be exammed for connectional factors. The cases will 
'" Green, A. (1996) Queensland Elections 1986 to 1995: A Comparative Analysis Queensland 
Parliamentary Library Research Bulletin (5/96) 1 
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be developed from documentary material and interviews with participants. The 
primary advantage of such an approach is that by limhing the focus of this study to 
just a few cases, those cases can be explored in depth, to obtain contextual 
information about the players, the course, and the outcome of campaigns, which 
would elude the statistical analyst. This approach allows an opportunity for the large 
number of indicators drawn above from Reynolds' work to be tested in the field - and 
allows ample opportunity for them to be found wanting. 
This thesis has already indicated that connectionalism, if it exists, is the result of an 
array of factors relating to the community, the candidate, and the electoral 
circumstances. Piecing together connectional electoral behaviour requires a 
sufficiently detailed frame of reference to allow consideration of these three factors. 
Only a case-based approach can deliver the required level of detail for analysis. 
Furthermore, a case study approach would be concordant with the methods ofthe 
community studies described in Chapter 4. While those studies each represented a 
full work unto themselves, each of them also contained observations regarding single 
events as frames for observing the wider community dynamics. 
Such an approach does, however, carty a number of limitations, and these will 
circumscribe the outcomes this thesis can hope to produce. First, the crhicisms 
leveled at communhy studies generally - that they are the "poor sociologist's 
substitute for the novel" may equally be leveled at the approach proposed for this 
thesis. These case studies might perhaps be attacked as the "poor pohtical scientist's 
substitute for the short story" and in particular may be susceptible to the second ofthe 
previously-cited criticisms of community studies: that the environment for the 
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research is not controlled and a great deal of data is not captured. This will 
particularly be so for cases which took place in elections as far back as 1992, where 
interviewees are asked to cast their recollections back nearly ten years. 
This criticism has some merit in the case of this research. In fact, during the 
interviews, some participants did find it difficult to recollect events in the past, and in 
other cases desirable interviewees could not be located (or were unwilling to 
participate). There is, as a result, no doubt that other information which was (or had 
at some time been) extant was not captured by this research. However, having said 
that, these case studies still represent some ofthe most detailed academic accounts of 
single electorate contests in Queensland which have been undertaken. Similar case 
studies were not to be found during uiitial research. Further, these campaign studies 
clearly provide a level of detail well beyond the bare statistical retums the campaigns 
generated. On balance, the proposed methodology remains worthwhile (particularly 
given that this admitted shortcoming can be bome in mind by critical readers). 
Second, a case study approach based on documentary evidence and interviews does 
not benefit from the advantages of perception obtained by a participant observer. The 
authors ofthe community studies discussed in Chapter 4 actually participated in the 
communities rather than just observing them from afar. This may be so, but the fact 
that no participant observer activity was undertaken for this research also had two 
advantages. First, the proposed methodology avoids suggestions that the researcher 
may have somehow influenced the behaviour ofthe electors. Second, the passage of 
time between campaign and research allowed the participants to be far more candid 
during interviews than they might have been in the "thick ofthe fight." This was 
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particularly so for candidates who were defeated. Havmg said this, an in-depth case 
study of a single connectional campaign, conducted by a participant-observer, would 
be a useful contribution to the development of understanduig of connectionalsm. 
Such an approach was not, however, possible for the present study. 
Finally, five case studies represent a small fraction ofthe number of contests m the 
period 1992-2001. As a resuh, h is difficuh to support any wider application for 
conclusions developed from such a narrow base. This is clearly so, but two factors 
moderate the strength of this criticism. First, as stated in the hitroduction to this 
research, it is not the objective ofthe current study to prove, conclusively and fmally, 
the existence, dynamics and nature of connectionalism. Such understanding is only 
likely to be built incrementally, and this research serves as one increment. At best, 
this research seeks to conclude a series of observations of how connectionslism seems 
to operate, based on this limited number of case studies. As a result, this criticism can 
be admitted without undermining the methodology. Further, the precedmg chapters 
on Electoral Analysis, Community Studies, and particularly Queensland Culture 
provide a wider background against which to consider these five case studies. This 
allows at least some basis for tentative observations as to whether the trends 
observable in these case studies may have wider applicabilhy. 
Overall, then, the proposed methodology - case studies based on documentary 
searches and interviews -is fundamentally strong and valid albeh with some 
acknowledged limitations. Those limitations, however, having been established 
cleariy prior to the case studies, can inform readers' assessment ofthe case study 
material. 
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Connectionalism and Queensland Country Electorates 
To this point a series of indicators for connectionalism have been established from 
Reynolds' paper, and a proposed methodology established for using these indicators 
to study cases m the field. Next, the process used to determine the case electorates, 
where case studies were undertaken, will be outlined. 
Starting Point — Electoral Data 
One could plausibly begin searching for connectionalism with any ofthe three 
categories of indicators (Town, Candidate, and Electoral Circumstances). However to 
begin with the candidate-based indicators would mean prohibitively exhaustive 
assessment of each ofthe hundreds of candidates who have contested recent 
Queensland elections; similarly, because "town" is not fixed at the town, electorate, or 
regional level, to begin with the town-based indicators would mean assessment of 
potentially thousands of geo-political units. For Electoral Circumstances, however, 
data is abundantly available from official retums, and is relatively neat and well-
defined. Thus this process begins with the indicators of electoral circumstances, in 
order to gain a shorter list of towns, which will then be assessed. Following this 
assessment, candidates in those towns which still appear likely prospects for 
connectional activity, will be assessed and studied in detail, in anticipation of 
capturing activity which is clearly connectional m nature. 
The first indicator to be measured suggests that "Connectionalism will minimise 
adverse national or regional voting trends". From this indicator two inferences were 
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derived. The first inference was that in seats where connectionalism operates, the 
vote for independent candidates is likely to be higher than in seats where 
connectionalism is absent or negligible as a factor. The received wisdom of electoral 
behaviour suggests that independents perform poorly because they lack access to 
mass media and to the state-level stage where the mam electoral battle is conducted. 
In seats where connectionalism is powerful, voting behaviour can be expected to be 
govemed less by state-wide factors as promoted through the media, and more by 
personal contact, networks and reputation. Under these circumstances, it is 
reasonable to assume that the disadvantage suffered by independents would be less in 
connectional seats. 
The second inference is that in seats where connectionalism operates, the vote for a 
connectional candidate may diverge from the state-wide swing. This inference takes 
account of connectionalism in favour of candidates who represent major parties. 
These candidates no doubt derive a proportion of their votes from the state-wide 
campaign, but they also derive votes on the basis of their personal, connectional 
following. They are likely, as a result, to perform somewhat better than their party 
does as a whole, either by exacerbating a state-wide swfrig in favour of their party, or 
by holding up against a state-wide swing against their party. 
Based upon these mferences, data from the 1989, 1992, 1995 and 1998 Queensland 
General Elections (hereafter simply "the elections") were tested for evidence of strong 
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performance by hidependents, and of better than usual performance of party 
candidates'^. 
Methodology: Independents 
The first step in this analysis was to defme an "Independenf. Any candidate who did 
not represent the ALP, LPA, NPA, and in 1998, the ONP, was regarded as an 
independent. Candidates representing the Democrats, the Greens, the Shooters Party 
and so forth were regarded as independent because on the whole their campaign 
activity was closer to that ofthe genuine independent than it was to any major party. 
That is, they lacked state leadership with access to the mass media, and campaigned 
locally, often on local issues. 
The second step involved drawing from the official retums the percentage of primary 
votes recorded for each independent. For each election, a mean percentage was then 
established, and standard deviations determined. Finally, the details of candidates 
who had scored at least 1, 2 or 3 standard deviations above the mean were 
determined. 
Methodology: Major Parties 
The analysis to be undertaken here required an analysis of electoral swings m each 
seat. This gave rise to an immediate difficulty, as electoral boundaries were 
'' Case study research was well underway by the time ofthe 2001 state election. It therefore informed 
the studies themselves, but not the selection ofthe cases to be studied. 
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significantly changed between the 1989 and 1992 general elections. In order to 
overcome this problem, the 1989 retums as adjusted for the 1992 boundaries by Kelly 
and Reynolds'^ were used. It must therefore be recognised that the 1992 swings are 
based upon a construct and not upon votes cast in 1989 in existing electorates. 
For 1992, swings were calculated for each of three parties: Nationals, the Liberals, 
and Labor. In 1995 and 1998, however, the Liberal and National parties ran as a 
coalition and by and large did not field candidates against one another. Therefore the 
1992 retums for the Liberals and Nationals were summed to give a 1992 coalition 
retum, which was then used as the basis for the 1995 swings. 
Having taken the official retums (and the Kelly/Reynolds figures) and adjusted them 
as indicated above, a simple assessment ofthe swing for or against each party was 
conducted on the basis ofthe formula: 
[swmg] = [percentage primary votes this election] - [percentage primary 
votes last election] 
The mean swing and standard deviations for each party, for each election, were then 
determined and the seats with swings I, 2, and 3 standard deviations above, and 
below, the mean determined. 
fr became apparent during these calculations that for a large number of seats the 
16 
Kelly, S. & Reynolds, P. (1992) The 1991 Queensland Redistribution, Department of Govemment 
University of Queensland ' 
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apparent swings misrepresented the real outcome. For instance, a seat not contested 
in 1992 but contested for a retum of 20% in 1995 showed a 20% swing in favour of 
the subject party. In reahty the "swing" was simply an abertation caused by a new 
electoral choice, not by a change of electoral fortune. Seats where such explanations 
for the swing existed were disregarded to form a final list. Wherever a seat was 
disregarded an explanation for its removal was recorded. 
Methodology: One Nation Party 
The success of One Nation in 1998 presented a challenge to the analysis, as One 
Nation candidates were not independent, in the sense described above, and neither 
were they from a recognised major party (One Nation held no seats prior to 1998, its 
first general election). As a result One Nation was treated as a separate group, but 
analysed in the same way as the independents (see above) to produce a list of One 
Nation candidates who scored 1, 2 and 3 standard deviations above the One Nation 
mean percentage or primary votes in 1998. These figures can then be used to draw 
observations about One Nation performance compared to the major party swings in 
1998, and compared to the performance of other independents in all elections. 
Results 
Analysis of Independents 
The analysis ofthe performance of independents across this range of elections reports 
four interesting cases, three of which may have connectional potential: 
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hi Gladstone in 1989 (Port Curtis as h then was), Independent Eric Bailey won 13.9% 
of primary votes. Smce then Liz Cunningham recorded 31.58% in 1992, 40.06% in 
1995, 47.05% m 1998, and 50.66% in 2001. 
In Nicklm in 1989, Keith Bartholomew recorded 9.9%, Hermann Schwabe m 1992 
recorded 22.13%, and in 1998 Peter Wellington won the seat principally on ALP 
preferences after recording 25.63%, then retained h in 2001 with 46.31%. 
Lockyer Independents recorded a total of 26.6% in 1989 before h became a safe 
National seat won on primary votes in 1992 and 1995. In 1998, Lockyer was won by 
One Nation but also recorded 14.23% votes for Independents. 
Springwood recorded a 30.29% Independent vote hi 1995, when the seat was the 
focus ofthe "Koala Highway" issue described in Chapter 3. This result is likely to 
have been an aberration rather than an indicator of connectional politics. Labor 
reacquired the seat in 1998 with one candidate and held it in 2001 with another. 
Analysis of Major Parties 
The analysis ofthe major parties also indicated some interesting potential case 
studies. The two starkest were Toowoomba North in 1992, where Kelly and 
Reynolds anticipated a 25.9% National vote but National candidate Graham Healy 
recorded 39.46%; and Caims in 1992, where Kelly and Reynolds projected a Liberal 
resuh of 4.3% and Liberal Kel Ryan recorded 24.25%. 
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Other possible cases included Ipswich West in 1992, where the Nationals recorded 
23.44% against an expected 5.7%, and Mount Coot-tha in 1998, where Labor's 
Wendy Edmonds lifted her vote by 9.3% despite an expanded field against her. 
The analysis ofthe major party results presented something of a challenge to the 
work, because other than Mount Coot-tha (which is in Brisbane and less likely to 
respond to connectional influences) there were no seats where Labor candidates had 
recorded aberrant swings. The proportion of Labor votes tended to rise and fall quite 
evenly across the state, compared to the conservative and independent votes, which 
fluctuated as votes passed from one of these groupings to another. In order to present 
a Labor case for study, the 'candidate' indicators were used across a range of Labor's 
regional campaigns to fmd a suitable case. From this search, the Mundingburta by-
election of 1996 emerged as a strong possibility. Labor candidate Tony Mooney was 
the high-proflle and well regarded Mayor of Townsville, who had made a local 
govemment career of championing Townsville's concems, had on occasions battled 
with a state Labor govemment. Moreover he had had over fifteen years in local 
govemment to establish, and expand or consolidate extensive personal networks. 
Analysis of One Nation 
The problem with assessing One Nation votes is likely to be one of separating 
populist votes (for Paulhie Hanson) from connectional votes (for local candidates) 
However two interesting possibilities were dravm from the One Nation figures. 
159 
Barambah, following decades of incumbency by Bjelke-Petersen, elected an 
Independent (Pertett) in a by-election m 1988, and in 1989 supplied another 
Independent (Isherwood) with 12.4% ofthe vote. In 1998, Pratt (ONP) won the seat 
over Pertett (who had joined the Nationals shortly after his election) with 43.94%. 
Maryborough, which was identified by Reynolds as having a connectional character, 
in 1992 supplied 16.18% ofthe vote to an Independent (Tony Pitt) and was won in 
1998 by John Kingston, who narrowly retained it as an Independent in 2001. 
Lockyer, mentioned above for its tradition of supporting Independents, was won by 
One Nation's Peter Prenzler in 1998 with 39.23% of primary votes. 
Summary 
On the basis of this analysis, there are a number of cases which bear fiirther 
examination as possible connectional contests. This analysis was followed with 
preliminary documentary research hi order to determine which cases could be most 
fully pursued, given that, for some, nearly ten years had elapsed between the election 
and the time of this research. Sufficient resources were established to pursue five 
case studies: Caims (1992); Gladstone (1992 - 2001); Maryborough (1998-2001); 
Mundingburra (1995-1996) and Toowoomba North (1992 - 2001). The next five 
chapters will follow these case studies, guided by the indicators established in this 
paper, in order to allow conclusions about the operation of connectional politics to be 
drawn. 
'^Reynolds (1991a) ope// 
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CHAPTER 6 - CASE STUDY NARRATIVES 
This chapter presents the five cases studies undertaken for this thesis, in nartative 
form. At this stage no attempt will be made to analyse the cases, rather they will be 
presented as a group in order to lay out in a comprehensible fashion the basic material 
acquired during fieldwork. The next two chapters will analyse these cases studies, to 
determine whether connectional politics was a factor in their outcomes, and to 
consider them against the indicators developed in the previous chapter. Finally, the 
following chapter will locate that outcomes in a theoretical context in order to 
establish an understanding of connectional politics in Queensland. 
These studies will be presented in chronological order, begiiming with the election in 
Caims (1992), then proceeding to those for Gladstone (1992 - 2001), Toowoomba 
North (1992 - 2001), Mundingburra (1995 - 1996) and Maryborough (1998 - 2001). 
Cairns 1992: Law, Order, and IMilitary Precision 
Introduction 
The electorate of Caims, based on the chy ofthe same name, lies on the Queensland 
coast approximately 1700 km north of Brisbane. For much of its history, Caims was 
an archetypical Queensland coastal city, providing port facilities and secondary 
industry support to the primary uidustries inland. However, in recent years, tourism 
has become the dominant industry m Caims, with direct hitemational flights between 
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Caims and many South-East Asian destinations, including Japan, Korea, Hong Kong 
and Malaysia. 
Politically, Caims is a Labor stronghold. Labor first took the seat from the 
Ministerialists in 1899, and has held it continually since, but for a short intertegnum, 
1902-1904, when the seat was held by an Independent. The incumbent at the time of 
the 1992 general election, Keith De Lacy, was elected in 1983 and became Treasurer 
upon the ALP's accession to power in 1989. 
An electoral redistribution conducted in 1991 slightly changed the electorate of 
Caims, ceding some land to Barton River in the west, and gaining some new territory 
to the north. However the seat was still fundamentally based on the city, and the 
resultant political implications were not expected to be substantial. Kelly and 
Reynolds* expected the ALP in 1992 to gain 59.5 percent ofthe vote, down slightiy 
on hs 1989 retum as a result ofthe boundary changes. The Nationals were expected 
to gain 36.2 percent, and the Liberals, if they ran, would be a minor distraction, 
gafriing only 4.3 percent. 
The resuhs, however, diverged considerably from these predictions. The ALP still 
won the seat on primary votes, claiming 52.97%, the Liberals won 24.25% and the 
Nationals were beaten into third poshion, claiming just 14.34%. This case study will 
follow the campaign, paying particular attention to the connectional campaign waged 
by Liberal candidate Kel Ryan. 
' Kelly & Reynolds (1992) ope// 17 
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Case 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the city of Caims was changing, as intemal 
migration brought new residents (though census information shows net intemal 
migration into the Far North statistical district of just 7763 or 3.96%, 1991-1994^). 
Dr Dawn May, an academic and Caims political commentator during the 1992 
campaign, noted that "The nature of Caims was actually changing, becoming more 
metropolitan and less provincial, and therefore voters were more attracted to a Liberal 
candidate than a National candidate." 
Incumbent Keith De Lacy noted that "Caims ... was really in a period of transition. It 
was almost as though there were two cultures within Caims, the older more 
established culture and a culture of newcomers who were growing in numbers. These 
newcomers were more attuned to the state-wide culture and less the products of its 
local variant.""* 
One relative newcomer was the Liberal candidate, Kel Ryan. Ryan was bom and 
raised in Melboume, where he lived until he was drafted hito the first National 
Service intake in 1965/66. He subsequently served in Vietnam, then joined the 
regular army as an officer, went back to Vietnam for a second year, and spent time in 
the Special Air Service Regiment. The Army also brought Ryan into contact with Far 
North Queensland, first as an officer in the Pacific Islands Regiment (during the late 
1970s), later m command of an Army Reserve formation in Townsville (1979 - 1983), 
^ Jackson, R. (1996) Adas of the Australian People - 1991 Census. Queensland, AGPS Canberra, 288 
^ May Interview 7 February 2001 
^ De Lacy Interview 20 February 2001 
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and finally as the commanding officer of a battalion ofthe Far North Queensland 
Regiment in Caims (1985 - 1987, until shortly before his retirement from the army in 
1988). 
When he left the army with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, Ryan and his family 
retumed to Caims where Ryan obtained employment as an msurance broker. As a 
senior officer in the Far North Queensland Regiment, Ryan had established 
friendships and networks, and had occupied a poshion of some prominence in Caims. 
Thus he fitted back into Caims society quickly and comfortably, taking on a number 
of prominent roles in voluntary associations. Ryan became the local president of 
Legacy, he became the chairman ofthe St Augustines College Parents and Friends 
(P&F) Organisation and shortly afterwards the chairman of all P&F groups m the 
Caims Catholic diocese. Finally, he became treasurer, and then president, ofthe 
Caims sub-branch ofthe Retumed Services League (RSL). At the time, the RSL was 
dominated by veterans ofthe Second World War, and Vietnam Veterans such as Ryan 
were seldom elected to office. It is therefore apparent that Ryan became highly 
connected into sections ofthe Caims community, and was accepted as a leader even 
by organisations as conservative as the RSL. According to Ryan, "The nature of 
organisations in Caims at that time was that really they were looking out for 
leadership, they were looking out for someone to drive them and obviously I was seen 
as someone who could do that."^ 
In the leadup to the 1991 Queensland local govemment elections, Ryan became 
involved with the Caims Civic Association, a loose association of promhient 
^ Ryan Interview 14 February 2001 
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conservative locals. It is not customary for the major parties in Queensland to contest 
most local govemment elections , thus groups such as the Civic Association become 
de facto parties for the period ofthe election. Ryan was elected chairman ofthe Civic 
Association, and became one of hs slate of candidates, but subsequently withdrew his 
candidacy to focus his efforts as Campaign Manager. Although the Civic Association 
was unsuccessful, campaignfrig appealed to Ryan, and (having brought with him to 
Caims a Liberal political alignment) he subsequentiy joined the Liberal Party. 
The Liberal Party then had only one branch in Caims, and Ryan became its president 
shortly after he jomed the party. The branch, though struggling, had a core of 
enthusiastic members, many of whom (like Ryan) had moved to Caims and carried 
their political affiliation with them. In Ryan's view, this situation was due to the 
indifference ofthe Liberal Party state organisation: 
It was very difficult to motivate members ofthe party from the 
south-east corner to give some support to what was 
considered at that time a growing number of Liberals, or 
Liberal-leaning individuals who had moved up to the north, to 
give them a go to establish the party up there. So it was quite 
a hard slog, frankly. 
Early in 1992, Ryan decided to nominate and was preselected unopposed. He was 
aware that it was unlikely that De Lacy would be defeated, but saw his candidacy as 
Other than in major local govemment areas such as the Brisbane and Townsville City Councils. 
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an attempt "to raise the profile [ofthe Liberals] for the next step, for the next 
election."^ Observations suggest that the near-moribund Caims Liberals needed a 
rallying-point to generate enthusiasm and momentum, and that Ryan's candidacy was 
seen as the appropriate vehicle. 
Ryan's preselection was conducted early, which gave him a great deal of time in 
which to mount a labour-fritensive campaign based on two strategies. The first was to 
leverage Ryan's personal profile into electoral support for himself and the Liberal 
Party, while the second was simply to doorknock as many houses in the electorate as 
he possibly could: 
/ suppose 1 had a reasonable profile in a number of areas 
which were not traditionally Liberal-leaning ... and 1 used 
that, whether consciously or not, to electioneer. And 1 
certainly did do a lot of doorknocking. My aim was to 
doorknock, and 1 did that constantly. I estimate that 1 
doorknocked about seventy percent ofthe electorate. 
These strategies were combined with enlightened use ofthe local media. Ryan was 
aware that, as the Nationals had not yet preselected a candidate, and as De Lacy was 
inevitably distracted by the duties of Govemment, he was virtually unopposed for 
local media attention. As a result, he began a ritual of sending press releases to local 




that the next day's paper would carry his story. Through these means Ryan gradually 
began to build up support until, by the time ofthe campaign proper, he possessed a 
public profile. 
Despite his progress, Ryan continued to experience general indifference within the 
Liberal Party organisation, except for state president Bob Tucker, parliamentary 
leader Joan Sheldon, and North Queensland-based Senator Ian MacDonald, all of 
whom assisted the campaign whenever in Caims. In some cases, the attitude ofthe 
party organisation went beyond indifference, and bordered on hostility, especially 
when it became clear that the Nationals still intended to preselect a candidate, and 
tum the seat into a three-comered contest. Matters deteriorated when Liberal 
candidates emerged to force three-comered contests in three other North Queensland 
seats, namely Barton River, Mulgrave and Cook. In the end, according to Ryan, the 
Liberal state executive "understood that there was a determined bunch of people up 
north who really wanted to force the issue, and they were not strong enough to say no, 
basically, so they tended to buy out of it." 
During this period, between Ryan's preselection and the commencement ofthe 
campaign, two public issues emerged in Caims, both of which cartied racial 
overtones: allegations of "kickbacks" to Japanese tour guides; and a wave of violent 
crime which the public linked to Caims' mdigenous Australians. 
Concem about "kickbacks" is an ongoing issue in Cafrns. Essentially a "kickback" is 
a financial artangement between a retailer, typically a souvenir retailer, and the 
Ryan Interview 
167 
operators of tour groups, particulariy Japanese tour groups, hi retum for a 
commission, the tour guides ensure that the tourists in their groups patronise only 
those shops participating in the "kickback" scheme. This created outcry from those 
retailers who refused to pay the commission to the tour guides. The issue of 
kickbacks, which has still not been fully resolved hi Caims, was, in 1992, addressed 
largely by civic groups, and was not taken up by any ofthe candidates despite its 
prominence in local headlines. According to the incumbent, De Lacy, this was 
because only the Opposition could have made mileage out ofthe issue, and Ryan was 
reluctant to do so as he was a businessman, representing businessmen, and the 
Japanese were a large market for the business community.** 
Ryan's reason for avoiding the issue is illuminating. He said that "It was one of these 
issues [where] the longer-term people in Caims really saw it as a big problem, 
whereas the people who were trying to make their way, and break into the industry in 
a big way, did not see it as a problem, because that was their means of getting the 
market." Ryan had apparently become aware ofthe cleavage, described earlier by 
De Lacy, between the "old" and "new" Caims cultures, and was aware that the 
kickbacks issue was one issue which focussed on that pohtical cleavage. As Ryan's 
mtention was to solicit support from both cultural groups, there was no benefit to him 
in taking up the issue. 
On the second issue, itinerant Aborigines and crime, Ryan was much more vocal. It 
has long been the custom for several groups of Aborigines, when visiting Caims, to 
De Lacy Interview 
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occupy an area of developed foreshore known as "the Esplanade." In late 1991 and 
eariy 1992, a series of assaults took place there. In mid-1992 the situation escalated 
with a marked increase in break-and-entry thefts directed at the Esplanade's 
businesses. Early in 1992 the issue developed a personal dimension for Ryan, when 
his eldest daughter was assaulted in the area. 
A march in Caims in August 1992 by 700 anti-violence protesters, led to suggestions 
that Caims' 1992/93 New Year's Eve celebrations, to be held on the Esplanade, would 
be cancelled for fear of violence. This then prompted the Govemment to respond. 
On August 13 De Lacy announced that Aboriginal Liaison Police would be stationed 
in Caims to deal with dmg and alcohol problems among local Aborigines. This 
announcement had little impact, and on 29 August Premier Goss made the first major 
policy announcement ofthe Caims campaign, announcmg a "Nine Point Plan" of 
largely diversionary measures designed to abate the crime problem. The measures 
were: 
1. Expansion of Aboriginal and Tortes Straits Islander Police Liaison 
programme; 
2. Diversionary holding facility at AUuna hostel (a "dry-ouf centre); 
3. $11 Million for a juvenile crime strategy; 
4. Better use of police on patrol, with bike patrols and more night patrols; 
5. A new police station, courthouse, and watch-house; 
6. A police office in City Place (the Esplanade); 
7. More money for a domestic violence unit; 
13 Cairns Post, 13 August 1992 
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8. More money for the sex offences squad; 
9. More money for a women's safety project 14 
At this time, as the state-level campaigns gained momentum, "law and order" became 
a state level issue, picked up by all parties. As a resuh, Ryan's response to the nme-
pomt plan was based on state Liberal policy, suggesting truth-in-sentencing 
(effectively a policy restricting access to parole or other forms of early release), and 
holding parents responsible for the actions of children under their care. But Ryan 
added his own suggestion, the creation of a "police reserve" similar to the Army 
Reserve, to increase the number of police on the streets. 
This issue became the first overt clash of policy between Ryan and De Lacy, and the 
commencement of that clash marked the begiimmg ofthe Caims campaign proper. 
Although the Govemment's proposals were, according to De Lacy, "practical 
measures rather than populist measures,"*^ Ryan's more populist approach may have 
been better received by the electorate, as suggested by the following incident: 
There were a couple of large demonstrations on the 
Esplanade, where people sought to "recapture " the 
Esplanade, and 1 addressed the meeting there. 1 thought my 
comments were better received than what Keith's were, I think 
he was howled down, and really did not win any votes on the 
softly softly that he was trying to push'^ 
16 
Caims Post, 29 August 1992 
Caims Post, 2 September 1992 
De Lacy Interview 
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With this issue occupying public attention, the National Party finally preselected a 
candidate in the person of Ron Balodis, a milk vendor and cafe operator. Balodis was 
unknown to either Ryan or De Lacy (who had known one another before the 
campaign began), and essentially ran a dead campaign. Virmally his only media 
appearances were a number of small paid advertisements in the "Classified" section of 
the Cairns Post. De Lacy expressed the view that Balodis' candidacy was really a 
sign from the Nationals that they were not prepared simply to concede Conservative 
dominance of Caims to the Liberals, but De Lacy himself took the view that Ryan 
1 R 
was his real opponent. The only other candidate was a Green, John Metcalfe, whose 
share ofthe vote and activity during the campaign was negligible. 
On election day, Ryan was able to recruit workers to staff every booth all day, despite 
the miniscule size ofthe Liberal Party in Caims. The manner in which his booth 
workers were recruited gives one final indication of his operation as a connectional 
candidate: 
A lot of those [booth workers] were not members ofthe 
Liberal Party. They were assembled by net\vorks, friends of 
mine, friends of friends, people I'd contacted through, be it 
P&F or RSL or Legacy, or just other networks who wanted to 
go against Keith De Lacy, wanted to go against the Labor 
18 De Lacy Interview 
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Party. So I was quite satisfied with the whole organisation on 
that day. 
Accorduig to Ryan, by about 8.30 PM on election night he was aware that he had won 
a significant swing, but by 10.30 PM he had contacted De Lacy to concede defeat. 
Following the 1992 election Ryan received no feedback from the Liberal Party on his 
performance, and subsequently resigned. There was no endeavour to capitalise on the 
1992 result in order to increase the Liberal presence in the area, and thus Ryan's 
success was largely wasted. The Liberals contested the seat again in 1995, without 
the distraction of a National Party candidate, and made a slight gain (3.22 %) durmg a 
very poor election for Labor. In 1998 the Liberal vote nearly halved, to 23.47 %, as 
27.54 % of voters supported One Nation, and by 2001 the Liberals had conceded 
Coalition candidacy in the seat to the Nationals. 
Gladstone 1992 - 2001: The Value of an Independent 
Introduction 
The City of Gladstone is a port city located approximately 500 kilometres north of 
Brisbane. The chy itself has a population of approximately 30,000 and the region, 
including the Miriam Vale and Calliope Shires has a total population in the order of 
50,000^°. 
Ryan Interview 
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The port, sheltered by the Great Bartier Reef, is the largest multi-cargo port in 
Australia, and the coal termmal is the 6 largest in the world. As a result, Gladstone 
has attracted major industrial developments, and is known as an industrial city. The 
largest of these developments is Queensland Alumina's aluminium refinery, which is 
the world's largest. The development ofthe refinery in the late 1960s initiated 
Gladstone's industrial expansion, and the area now includes a major power station, 
magnesium plant, ammonium plant, and cement clinker plant. A major aluminium 
smelter is also planned. Gladstone's proximity to the Great Bartier Reef, and a marina 
for sailing vessels, have resulted in the area promoting itself as a tourist destination, 
but it is still primarily known as an industrial city. 
The city has a long political history. The seat of Port Curtis was proclaimed for the 
first state elections in 1860, and remained until renamed Gladstone in 1991. As might 
be expected on the basis of class-party politics, the seat has been a Labor seat for 
much of its history. Labor first took the seat in 1909 and held it for fourteen ofthe 
twenty years between 1909 and the Depression. Labor lost the seat during the 
Depression, regained it in 1932, and then held the seat continuously for more than 60 
years, until 1995. 
In that 1995 election, the Labor incumbent Neil Bennett, who had been the 
representative for just one term, was challenged by independent Liz Cunningham, the 
Mayor of Calliope, who had unsuccessfully contested the seat in 1992. Cunningham 
had initially been a community activist in a Rate and Taxpayers' Association, then a 
maverick local Councillor who found more local acceptance upon taking the Council 
Chairman's position. In 1995 she ran a campaign emphasising her local cormections 
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and independent status, against Bennett, who ran a campaign based upon state 
pohtical factors. Cunningham was the mam opposhion candidate, and a swing against 
Bennett gave her victory in the seat. 
Six months later, when Tanti claimed Mundingburta for the Liberals,^* Cunningham 
held the balance of power in the Legislative Assembly, and used this poshion to deny 
confidence to Labor, forcuig the end ofthe Goss administration (chmg reasons such 
as a leaking hospital roof in Gladstone, and the need for a new High School). Given 
her position holding balance of power, Cuimingham won instrumental benefits for 
Gladstone during the period 1995 - 1998. hi the 1998 election. One Nation declined 
to run against her, and she retained the seat in what amounted to a straight contest 
with Labor. In 2001, Cunningham defied the statewide trend to Labor, gaining a 3 
percent swing and winning the seat on primary votes for the first time. 
Case 
Elizabeth Cunningham was bom in Central Queensland and moved to Calliope, south 
of Gladstone, in the late 1970s where she martied a fitter in the Queensland Alumina 
refinery. During the early to mid 1980s her main activities centred around the Church 
(she has a Diploma in Theology) and raishig her family at home. In the late 1980s, 
however, she became involved in the Calliope Rate and Taxpayers' Association and 
the Concemed Citizens for Industrial Control, a local environmental group. The Rate 
and Taxpayers' Association served a watchdog role on the local council, which was 
antagonistic towards the Association's members: 
'^ c/Mundingburra Case Study below 
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The CouncU at the time had reached a decision not even to 
acknowledge the Rate and Taxpayers' correspondence, let 
alone answer it, or respond to it in a meaningful way. They 
wouldn't even respond with a polite acknowledgment. I found 
that very disappointing, stating it mildly, that a local authority 
would ignore a local body, albeit that they may have been at 
times annoying."' 
As a result of her ongoing disappointment with the attitude ofthe Council, 
Cuimingham stood for a Council seat in 1988, against a long-term incumbent. In that 
first election, she doorknocked extensively, "just to get myself known in the 
Division." This doorknocking effort, combined with the growing profile her 
activism in the Rate and Taxpayers' Association had given her, led to victory. 
The Council in Calliope was very much like that described in Bradstow^"*, in that it 
operated mainly on the basis of consensus, with unwritten mles to avoid open 
conflict. "The Council ... was used to being a group of people who generally agreed 
9 < 
with one another, they went along and agreed with the process." Curmingham, 
however, had run for the Council on the basis of her disappointment with its 
operations, and as a result she dismpted the stable consensus which had previously 
operated. Soon after her election, when the Council proposed a rates increase, she led 
a successful rates revolt, and during Council meetings she found that her endeavours 
^^  Cunningham Interview 8 December 2001 
23 
Cunningham Interview 
^^  Wild (1974) op cit Chapter 1 passim 
'^ Cunningham Interview 
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to hold non-elected Council officials accountable for thefr activities put her further out 
of favour: 
At the time there were a number of elements that I'd query, 
and the officer concerned would verbalise that they saw my 
question as a slight on their integrity. It certainly wasn't 
intended to be, it was intended to question the costings, or the 
manner in which a proposal was going to be approached. 
Often, rather than responding to the particular question they 
would respond on a personal level. So things got quite 
antagonistic at various times 
Again, it is instructive to compare this with Wild's observations of Bradstow, where 
97 
he described an "overwhelming dread of dissension" and where new, zealous 
Councillors such as Cunningham are guided by the town clerk: 
He advises them to listen carefully and follow the experienced 
members, warns them not to bring up controversial issues, ... 
and asks them to bring any problems or difficulties they may 
have to him. In this way he slowly absorbs them into his 
system without friction or controversy.'^^ 
26 Cunnmgham Interview 
"Wild (1974) op c//132 
^^  Wild (1974)/Z)/^ 138-139 
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By the end of her first term on the Council, Cunningham's disappointment with the 
Council process had led her to increase her political aspirations, and she ran for the 
Chairmanship^^, on the basis that she wished to "either try to change that [Council] 
culture or get out." She ran a campaign based on a platform of "openness and 
transparency": 
Mrs Cunningham said she wanted to see improved 
communication between councillors and with the community. 
She said many people felt they could not approach the Council 
on issues and get a straight answer. [She] said there needed 
to be a change in Councillors' attitude to their avaUability. 
"They have to be available, even to the point of the much-
dreaded public meetings, " she said. "Some of the present 
Councillors refuse point blank to go to them. That's not doing 
the job you have been elected to do, which is to be accessible 
and represent the community, acting as a sounding board for 
the community's concerns, " she said.^° 
Cunningham won the Chairmanship comfortably, 2680 votes to 1962, but then 
confronted the challenge of leadmg a Council whose processes she had continually 
attacked in order to win the election. The Gladstone 'Observer' reported that "she 
forecast some initial difficulties working with some fellow Councillors who had not 
2Q 
The Council, and Cunningham herself, universally used the masculine term "Chairman" rather than 
the gender-neutral "Chair" or "Chairperson" until the position became "Mayor." This local usage has 
been retained. 
°^ Gladstone Observer, 1 March 1991 
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"X 1 
seen eye to eye with her perspectives." Soon after her election, though, fortune gave 
Cunningham an opportunity to mend her relationships with the other Councillors. 
During 1991, the state Parliamentary Committee on Electoral and Administrative 
Review (PCEAR) was in the process of reviewing the Electoral and Administrative 
Review Commission's (EARC) Report into Extemal Boundaries of Local Authorhies 
in Queensland. EARC's inhial recommendation was that Calliope and Gladstone be 
amalgamated on the basis that predicted future growth in the area would result in 
Gladstone progressively encroaching upon Calliope Shire. This suggestion was 
supported by the Gladstone City Council, but opposed by all but one ofthe Calliope 
Councillors. Cunningham, as the Chairman, led the Shire's response to the EARC 
report, and she was one ofthe Council's two nominated witnesses at the PCEAR 
review's public hearing, held in the Calliope RSL Hall. 
In the leadup to the hearing, an altemative amalgamation proposal emerged among 
some Gladstone leaders, led by ALP Chairman Leo Zussino, "to expand Gladstone by 
transferring industrial land to it [rather] than amalgamate the two authorities."^^ This 
submission further raised the ire of Cunningham and other Calliope residents: 
Gladstone City CouncU, at the time, was interested in taking 
over the income producing sectors ofthe shire, but U didn't 
really care about the rest. The rural areas ofthe Calliope 
Shire CouncU area, would effectively have been a late 
attachment to Fitzroy, Monto and Miriam Vale Shire 
31 Gladstone Observer, 26 March 1991 
32 
^CEAR (1992) Extemal Boundaries of Local Authorities 125 
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Councils. They would have become the rump of those 
councils. It was, from my perspective, a most inappropriate 
and uncaring way of dealing with people who 'd contributed 
for a lot of years. 
On the day ofthe hearhig, "There was quite a significant communhy tumout. There 
were several hundred. The hall was full and overflowing with community people 
who'd tumed out, cattle trucks with signs on them, clearly expressing the communhy 
feeling."^ "* Cunningham's representation of that community feeling was successful, 
and m its report the PCEAR "concur[red] with the comments of Cr Cunningham that 
any recommendation for amalgamation at this stage is premature, and consideration of 
the issue should be delayed."^^ Cunningham regards the issue as "the tuming point in 
our [the Council's] relationship,"^^ and found herself no longer ostracised by the 
Council. Over her term of office, she continued to improve her relationship with 
other Councillors, to the point where she was retumed to office unopposed in 1994. 
In 1992, the seat of Port Curtis became the seat of Gladstone following the 1991 
redistribution, but the boundaries ofthe seat were essentially unchanged. Also in 
1992, MLA Bill Prest, who had held the seat smce 1976, announced his hitention to 
retire. When he made his intentions known, the local Labor membership pushed for 
Leo Zussino, Cunningham's opponent in the PCEAR review process, to succeed 
Prest. Zussino was bom and grew up in Gladstone before studymg in Brisbane and 






became a senior executive m the automobile company Ford Australia. In 1980, 
Zussino's father-in-law Marty Hanson (who had been Labor MLA for Gladstone from 
1963 until 1976) died and he retumed to Gladstone where he ran the family's busmess 
(the Grand Hotel) and a management consultancy business. 
In 1991 Zussino was appointed as Chairman ofthe Gladstone Port Authority, a 
poshion he still holds, and probably the most high profile professional position in the 
city. As noted above, the port is the central reason for Gladstone's existence and 
commercial success, so Zussino immediately become one ofthe most prominent 
Gladstone chizens. Later, he was also appointed to the Council ofthe Central 
Queensland Univershy and joined the Gladstone Area Promotion and Development 
Board. According to Zussino "there was a widespread assumption that I would stand 
as the natural heir of Bill Presf and if he had done so, "h would have been an easy 
victory."^^ However he declined, on the basis that parliamentary service would be too 
trying upon his family, and that he had more opportunity to achieve things for the 
Gladstone community through his other community roles. Instead, Labor preselected 
Neil Bennett, the Secretary ofthe Gladstone ALP Branch and an electrician who had 
worked at the Gladstone Power Station for 13 years, and Zussino became his 
campaign manager. 
Following her experience with PCEAR, Cunningham also decided to contest the seat 
in 1992. "State government decisions were affecting our communhy. The state 
govemment set up the EARC/PCEAR review, and that had the potential to gut the 
Council and the community. [...] I said 'Well, maybe there needs to be more of a 
" Zussino Interview 19 December 2001 
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local govemment voice in [state polhics].'" She campaigned as an Independent, but 
her campaign was distracted by the ongoing requirements of her poshion as Council 
Chairman: 
Throughout the election, I'd always determined that my 
primary role, my primary responsibility was to continue the 
job as Mayor, and not allow the campaigning to interrupt 
that. Otherwise 1 should have stood aside or whatever. I 
didn't, so the jobs that 1 had to do as Mayor always took 
precedence, and then 1 did the campaigning in the gaps. 
Meanwhile, Bennett ran a strong, locally based campaign. He had been preselected as 
"a worker, a tradesman, a regular person who had the ability to understand issues 
affecting normal people in the electorate" and "in response to the growing perception 
and criticism ofthe Labor Party as being dominated by lawyers and doctors." His 
campaign opened with statements of support from Wayne Goss and outgoing member 
Bill Prest, who claimed that "a vote for any candidate other than ... Neil Bennett is a 
wasted vote. My request to my constituents upon my retirement from State 
Parliament after 16 years of electorate service, is that they exercise their right to vote 
sensibly on September 19.""** Bennett's campaign material emphasised his 
involvement in local industry and the local community, and included a full article m 
Cunningham Interview 
^' Cunningham Interview 
'"' Zussino Interview 
"*' Gladstone Observer 11 August 1992 
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42 the Observer about his family, and his wife's community activhies. 
Bennett's campaign, combhied with the base Labor vote in Gladstone, proved 
sufficient to win the seat, however the success was far from resoundmg. A swing 
against Labor might have been expected given the departure from office of Prest, a 
popular and long term Member, but Bennett suffered a large swing of 16 percent 
against him. Most of these votes went to Cunningham, who took 31.58% ofthe vote, 
polling extremely well in Calliope, but also surprisingly well in Gladstone itself Her 
vote in the key Gladstone booths varied between 26 percent and 31 percent, figures 
quite consistent with her overall result. The only booth where she polled less than a 
quarter ofthe primary vote was tiny Raglan, with only 43 voters'*^. Cunningham 
received more than twice the votes of either the National or Liberal candidates, and 
outpolled their combined total by more than ten percentage points. She then received 
80 percent of National Party preferences, but leakage from conservative preferences 
was sufficient to give Bennett a close victory, with a two-party-preferred vote of 
51.99%. 
Given the strength of Cunningham's resuh in 1992, h is unsurprising that she retumed 
to contest the seat again m 1995. The 1995 campaign was quite different to the 1992 
campaign. Although Cunningham remained the Mayor of Calliope, she gave more 
time to the 1995 campaign, and although her political message - that she was an 
hidependent seeking to represent the local area without party influence - did not 
change, h was delivered more adroitiy: 
" Gladstone Observer 12 September 1992 
This statement excludes the vote m Toowoomba, which with Brisbane City Hall was one of two 
state-wide voting locations in 1992. 19 votes were cast m Toowoomba, of which only two went to 
Cunnkigham. 
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/ am standing as an independent candidate once again 
because I believe this is the best way to represent the local 
community to the government, as opposed to being a political 
party's local representative to the community. Local 
government is an excellent area of work from which to enter 
the State Government as it ensures the representative 
understands the local issues which impact so greatly on the 
community. People continue to ring with concerns about 
policing matters and educational issues and other state 
government responsibilities. As a result I've been able to gain 
an understanding of community concerns.'^^ 
The Labor campaign, on the other hand, was completely different. Labor 
headquarters had realised that Gladstone was now marginal, and Cunningham was 
taken seriously as a threat to Bennett.'*^ As a result, a campaign team was dispatched 
from Brisbane to run the campaign in Gladstone, and the campaign moved from the 
local, community based campaign of 1992 to a focus on the state campaign and the 
persona ofthe Premier, Wayne Goss. Labor's media advertising carried side-by-side 
photographs of Goss and Bennett, with Goss more prominent, and slogans such as 
"Vote in a member ofthe Goss team. Vote for someone who can deliver in 
govemmenf'*^, and "Wayne Goss and Neil Bennett - Make sure you have a voice in 
the next Goss govemment." 
'*'* Cunningham, quoted in the Gladstone Observer 22 June 1995 
Zussino Interview 
"* Gladstone Observer 1 July 1995 
"^  Gladstone Observer 4 July 1995 
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Zussino, who was again nominally the campaign manager, expressed concem at this 
approach because of a growing perception that Goss was "artogant and out of 
touch.""^^ The Grand Hotel, which Zussino still owned, had bumed dovm in 1994 and 
Zussino recalled that when Goss officially opened the re-buih hotel, he "went into the 
bar to have a drink with the workers in the bar, and was shunned and jeered.""*^ This 
was hardly the reception expected in a worker's pub for the Premier whose party had 
held the seat for six decades. 
Most ofthe campaign in 1995 was quite low-key. Cunningham, Bennett, the 
Nationals' Jenny Elliott and Greens' Cedric Williams ran their campaigns, but there 
was little in the way of political conflict until the week ofthe poll, when Treasurer 
Keith DeLacy visited the electorate and gave a speech at the Boyne Smelter, during 
which he emphasised that voting for Cunningham would be pointless because as an 
Independent she would be powerless in govemment. While this is not an uncommon 
argument to be raised against an Independent, in this case it gave Cunningham an 
opportunity to initiate the sort of conflict which had, until then, been lacking during 
the campaign. Zussino feh DeLacy's comments represented poor tactics, and whhe 
driving him back to Gladstone asked "What the bloody hell did you say that for? fr 
just gave a boost to her underdog status !"^° 
Zussino Interview 
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The local media virtually ignored the content of DeLacy's speech, focussing on his 
comments about Cunningham, who responded that: 
It is incredible that a person supposedly representing the 
community (Mr DeLacy) would so publicly acknowledge that 
state government has turned into a private club, and the voice 
ofthe community is of so little value that it would be ignored 
totally if the party machine so decides. As an independent I 
will be free to represent this community on issues facing our 
residents without the constraints party politics places on party 
representatives. Neil Bennett is powerless to act for this area 
if his party makes a decision which is not to this community's 
advantage. Indeed he has less power than an independent. If 
Neil tries to fight against his party's decision, he would be 
soundly rebuked and would be totally powerless to further 
represent the people.^' 
The following day, the issue escalated as the "Gladstone Observer" cartied a front 
page baimer headline reading "Issue Emerges: Bennett Scoms the Role of 
Independents." While Bennett featured heavily in the headline, his comments were 
restricted to one paragraph ofthe article, and appear to fall short of "scom": "An 
independent candidate could never participate in the caucus process, nor have access 
to govemment Ministers to adequately represent Gladstone electors."^^ The balance 
Gladstone Observer 11 July 1995 
52 Gladstone Observer 12 July 1995 
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ofthe article was devoted to Cunnhigham's comments, which escalated the attack on 
Bennett: 
Mr Bennett talks of his influence with caucus, but where was U 
when the police numbers at Tannum Sands were reduced? 
Where is U in regard to the shortage of doctors in Gladstone? 
And what effect did U have in bringing a high school to 
Tannum when U was promised three years ago? 
Bennett responded to the article with a letter to the editor, which the "Observer" 
printed the next day, at the bottom of page 6 (as opposed to the headlhie treatment 
given the initial article). In his letter, he stated his wish "to make h clear that I have 
not instigated a personal attack on our independent candidate." By this stage, 
however, the damage to his campaign was done. Zussino blamed the local media for 
taking the opportunhy to promote Cunningham, and based on the available evidence, 
his objection has some merit. 
The result on election day was that Cunningham took 40.06% ofthe vote to Bennett's 
43.62 percent, and won the seat on National Party preferences. As noted hi Chapter 3, 
the 1995 election produced a remarkably close statewide result, and for some days 
after the 1995 election it appeared that Cunningham would hold the balance of power 
in the Legislative Assembly. The leaders of both Labor and the Coalition approached 
her to sound out her support for them in the event that she was needed to form 
" Gladstone Observer 12 July 1995 
'* Gladstone Observer 13 July 1995 
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govemment. Cunningham, however, claims not to have given the matter too much 
thought: "I'd determhied not to be worried about an issue like holding the balance of 
power until it was an issue."^^ She did, however, travel to Brisbane to meet with both 
leaders and attend the Local Govemment Association Conference (given that she was 
still, at that time. Mayor of Calliope, a position she retained for a short time after her 
election in order to deliver the Shire budget). The visit received widespread press 
coverage which often focussed on Cunningham's perceived personal qualities: 
This was no yokel. This was no wide-eyed innocent 
blundering through her first day in the musty corridors of big-
time power. The diminutive Mrs Cunningham ... walked and 
talked like a political veteran. She moved from meeting to 
meeting with an air of confidence and a clear determination 
not to give anything away. 
Shortly afterwards, Davies claimed Mundingburra and, despite appeals raised against 
the decisions in Greenslopes and Mundingburra, Goss was able to form a govemment. 
During the short-lived third Goss administration, and even during the Mundingburta 
appeal, Cunningham claims that ALP members made no effort to establish a positive 
working relationship with her, probably because Gladstone "had been historically a 
Labor seat, they were still quite aggrieved that Labor had lost it, and were resentful 
that I had won h ."" 
^^  Cunningham Interview. 
*^ Courier Mail 21 July 1995 
Cunningham Interview 
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When Mundingburta was declared vacant on appeal and subsequently won by Tanti, 
the Legislative Assembly was hung, with Labor holdmg 44 seats, the Coahtion 44 
seats, and Cunningham holding the remaining seat. In order to secure stable 
govemment, h was necessary for Cunningham to guarantee confidence and supply to 
one party or the other. She waited more than a week after the Mundfrigburta by-
election, and spoke again with both Goss and coalition leader Borbidge, before 
announcing her decision to support a coalition govemment with Borbidge as Premier. 
Her speech to that effect, which was cartied live by radio and television around the 
state, had a distinctly local focus: 
Projects for the Gladstone area have been stalled. The High 
School at Tannum shows little or no progress. It is reported 
to me that party members are reluctant to progress the issue 
for fear the independent may get some credit for the work. 
Such an obstructive attitude is entirely unacceptable to me 
and 1 believe, to the community. [...] Police numbers continue 
to dwindle in spite of a growing population and demonstrated 
need. The hospital is now receiving some attention however 
critical things like leaking roofs remain unattended to.^^ 
Her decision's local flavour attracted positive media support locally, including the 
"Observer's" statement that "one thing is for sure, Gladstone residents should be 
CO 
Cunningham speech, reported in fiill m Gladstone Observer 13 February 1996 
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pleased with the way their representative has handled herself in recent days „59 
In 1998, Cunningham faced two significant challenges. The first was the growing 
tide of support for One Nation, and the second, the long-delayed candidacy of Leo 
Zussino for Labor. The first of these challenges, however, failed to materialise. 
Gladstone was one of just ten seats in Queensland which One Nation did not contest, 
and was the only such seat outside metropolitan Brisbane. This was a surprise to 
Cunningham. "I was expecting that they would [contest the seat]. [...] I believe had 
they contested it there was a real risk that they would have split the conservative vote 
and I would have lost the seat."^° Zussino claims to have seen the minutes of a One 
Nation meeting where it was decided not to mn in Gladstone for precisely that 
reason^*, but fieldwork for this thesis was unable to obtain additional evidence to 
support this speculation. Given the absence of One Nation, the major pohtical 
dynamic in the 1998 election, the maui contest came down to Cunningham and 
Labor's Zussino. 
Zussino, as noted above, had declined to mn for the seat in 1992, and had managed 
Bennett's campaigns in 1992 and 1995, as well as being Labor's main spokesman 
during Cunningham's decision on supply and confidence in 1996. In 1998, he was 
contacted by Premier Peter Beattie, and asked to stand for the seat because "I was the 
only one who could beat [Cunningham], and if I won Gladstone, Beattie would win 
office. "^ ^ Given his history within the Gladstone community, and his long term 
occupancy of one ofthe community's more significant leadership positions, Zussino 





appears to have had the basis to contest the connectional vote which had given 
Cunningham the seat in 1995. His campaign seems to have bome this out. He 
doorknocked extensively, attended the meetings of local associations and 
organisations, and his media coverage focussed on his local history, posting articles 
with headlines such as "Leo Helps City Grow from Frugal Beginnings."^^ 
Cunningham was concemed that Zussino posed a significant threat. "He had the 
profile in the Labor Party ranks. He had a role in the Port Authority as Chairman. He 
had a public profile because of that role, and he had a business profile as well."^"* She 
ran an extremely low-key campaign. The events of 1996 and media attention on her 
parliamentary performance since, meant that she had an extremely high profile, and 
she eschewed even the basic trappings of a campaign. She did not have a campaign 
launch, did no doorknocking, and her media campaigning was based around a theme 
of "business as usual." 
Although at the end ofthe campaign Zussino feh that the tide of support was tummg 
his way , this was not bome out by the resuh. Both Zussino and Cunningham 
received a positive swing, Zussino claimmg a 3.8% swing for a resuh of 47.42%, and 
Cunningham a 6.99% swmg for a resuh of 47.05%. Cunningham retamed the seat on 
National Party preferences. 
hi 2001, Labor paid great attention to defeating Cunningham, who lacked the balance 
of power she had held between 1996 and 1998. The candidate, Jennifer Ellmgsen, 
Gladstone Observer 10 June 1998 
Cunningham Interview 
^^ Zussino Interview 
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"started her campaign with a flurty of fliers delivered to Gladstone area letterboxes"^^ 
and doorknocked extensively, claiming to have doorknocked 5000 homes hi the 
electorate.^^ Ellingsen was a local physiotherapist who had worked m Gladstone 
Hospital, and who was involved in various community groups including sporting 
groups. Lifeline, and the Chamber of Commerce. She was supported by visits to the 
electorate by several Ministers and by Peter Beattie, who announced a grant of 
$250,000 to be spent upgrading the facilities of local clubs and associations, and 
another grant of $550,000 to assist Gladstone to deal with population increases arising 
from promised industrial development. In all. Labor promised nearly $20 Million to 
Gladstone, though Premier Beattie dulled the pork-bartelling potential of those grants 
by promising that they would be honoured whether Labor won the seat or not. 
Again, Cunningham's campaign was low key and relied on the message of continuing 
business as usual. "I've never promised to get [the electorate] this or that, because as 
an independent I can't but then neither can any backbencher. [...] I think people could 
see that h was possible for an independent to speak out on issues irrespective of who's 
in govemment, and they can speak out positively as well as negatively. I'd had six 
years to show that."^^ Cunningham also believes that the "flurry" of mailouts from 
Labor was counterproductive: "I had comments made to me along the lines that it 
was obscene. There was so much mailout that went from ... Jenny Ellingsen that 
people foimd it an affront." 
As noted elsewhere, the statewide resuh hi 2001 saw a massive swmg to Labor. Had 
** Gladstone Observer 26 January 2001 
*^  Gladstone Observer 15 February 2001 
^^  Cunningham Interview 
*' Cunningham Interview 
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this statewide swing occurted in Gladstone, Cunningham would certamly have been 
defeated, given that the seat was marginal m 1998. In the event, however, Ellmgsen 
suffered a swing against her of 2.28% to claim 45.18% ofthe primary vote. The 
electorate swung towards Cunningham, delivering her an additional 3.61% for a 
primary vote of 50.66% and therefore, for the first time, election on primary votes. 
Toowoomba North 1992 - 2001: Oh! So That's What You Look 
Like! 
Introduction 
Toowoomba is a city of 90,000 people located in the fertile agricultural area west of 
Brisbane known as the Darling Downs. It is now less than 90 minutes by road from 
Brisbane, but maintains a fiercely proud independence from the capital. It was settled 
in 1840 by settlers pushing upwards from the northem rivers of New South Wales, 
and was separated from Brisbane by the Great Dividing Range, which effectively 
meant that commerce travelled between the Downs and major towns of New South 
Wales more readily than between the Downs and Brisbane. In terms of size and 
affluence, early Toowoomba^ rivalled Brisbane, and was a serious contender to 
become the state capital. Toowoomba, therefore, has never owed its economic 
poshion to Brisbane. 
Initially the major settlement was Drayton. For simplicity, I will use "Toowoomba" to refer to 
Toowoomba, Drayton and their satellite communities. 
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Politically, Toowoomba has been somewhat more volatile than might be expected so 
close to National Party heartland. The seat, in close to its curtent form, was 
proclaimed in the 1971 redistribution and briefly held by Labor, which lost it in the 
1974 election to the Liberals' Dr John Lockwood, a local general practitioner who 
won and held the seat on a connectional basis^* until the 1983 election, when the 
Liberals were decimated following the collapse ofthe coalition. In 1989, during the 
landslide election which brought the Goss government to power, the seat of 
Toowoomba North fell from the Nationals to Labor. The seat has therefore been 
relatively stable, but has changed hands at each "disaster" election, 1974 (for Labor), 
1983 (for the Liberals), and 1989 (for the Nationals)^^. Somewhat unusually, the seat 
also changed hands in 1992, an election which was characterised more by stability 
than change. This 1992 campaign is the focus of this case. 
After the 1989 election the seat was in Labor hands but was very marginal (the victor, 
John Flynn, held a two-party-preferred majority of 0.3%). The post-EARC 1991 
electoral redistribution subtly altered the boundaries, adding an extremely 
conservative booth, so that by the 1992 general election the seat was tmly knife-edge, 
nommally rated by Kelly and Reynolds as "marginally National" . As explored in 
more detail below, during Flynn's first term of office his commitment to state Labor 
ahead of local concems was highlighted when, following a spill of senior School 
Principal positions and merh-based selection ofthe resulting vacancies, a popular 
local Principal lost his job. During this period a prominent local radio talkback host, 
Graham Healy, joined the Nationals and was immediately approached to stand for the 
'^ See Reynolds (1991a) op cU 23 
'^  And also later, in 2001, which was a disaster election for the Coalition. 
73 Kelly and Reynolds (1992) op cit 80 
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seat. He did so, and ran a campaign with many connectional features, ushig his local 
popularhy and awareness of local issues to increase his share ofthe votes. The result 
was that during the 1992 poll the seat fell to the Nationals. 
Case 
Dr John Flynn was a General Practitioner who had been a member ofthe Labor Party 
for twenty years at the time of his election to Parliament in 1989. Although he had 
completed his medical training and begun practice in Brisbane, he eventually made 
his way to Wilsonton, outside Toowoomba, where he had a small private practice. 
Reynolds '^* noted the potential for GPs to use their position of trust to build political 
support for a candidacy, and while acknowledging that his election in 1989 was 
primarily a result ofthe electorate's disappointment with the revelations ofthe 
Fitzgerald Inquiry, Flynn still claims that his practice of medicme was politically 
useful. According to Flyim, this personal connection made it easier for some voters to 
depart from their primary political alignment and vote Labor in 1989: "I can think of 
a few patients who told me that... because they knew me and thought that I was a 
pretty reasonable sort of person, it made it easier for them to change their votes." 
Graham Healy, however, discounted any connectional value from Flynn's practice of 
medicine on the basis that he was not a "local": 
People know that the incumbent, John Flynn, was not a local. 
Reynolds (1991a) op cit, passim, but particularly his discussions of Llew Edwards and John 
Lockwood. 
" Flynn Interview 1 November 2001 
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They knew that he 'd come from somewhere else. And that was 
even more evident when within six months ofthe [1992] 
election he 'd left the town again. I think people wanted 
somebody local. 
Flynn won the seat in 1989 and became the sole Labor member west ofthe Great 
Dividing Range (except Mount Isa in the far north). In this position, he became the 
de facto Labor representative for all ofthe seats hi south westem Queensland. 
Anyone wishing to speak to a Labor Party representative, whether they were 
constituents of Toowomba North or not, would contact Flynn. Likewise, Ministers 
who had accepted engagements in southem Queensland then found themselves unable 
77 
to attend, would often delegate the task to Flynn. Whilst it was reasonable for 
Labor to use Flynn's presence as the basis for developing support elsewhere in 
southem Queensland, it distracted Flynn's attention from his electorate, and even 
from Toowoomba as a whole, where he was in a direct contest with Member for 
Toowoomba South, Mike Horan. When asked whether he was effectively Labor 
member for all Toowoomba and Horan the National member for all Toowoomba, 
Flynn replied that "I saw it that way, I think the media saw h that way, I think the 
people saw it that way ... there was quite a bit of vigorous competition between us in 
TO 
terms of representing our parties for Toowoomba" 
Flynn's readiness to extend the geographical reach of his responsibilhies indicated a 





desire to serve the party, but cost him opportunhies at a local level, which culmmated 
in an inability to doorknock more than a modest proportion ofthe electorate prior to 
the 1992 poll. "In retrospect, I thmk h was a mistake ... we never looked at our 
boundaries as the boundaries of our workload ... [and] in terms of representation we 
did our best to represent everybody. In retrospect we probably tried to do too much 
that way."^^ 
This tension between Flynn's desire to support the Labor Party at a state level and his 
responsibilities to his local electorate came to a head at the end of July 1991. 
Following recommendations ofthe Public Sector Management Commission (PSMC), 
the top band of high school principals, representing the 35 biggest high schools in 
Queensland, had their positions declared vacant. All ofthe incumbent principals 
were invited to reapply for their positions, which were to be assessed against merit 
criteria. One of those 35 principals was Mr Bill Gynther, principal of Toowoomba 
State High School. Gynther was a popular administrator, and had the support of local 
stakeholders including the teachers, the students and the Parents and Citizens' (P&C) 
Committee. The P&C Committee had a strong enough interest to request the right to 
act as participants or observers duruig the selection process. This request was not 
granted. Ofthe 35 principals who applied to retain their poshions, only Gynther was 
unsuccessful. Following the announcement, the Toowoomba "Chronicle" carried a 
banner headline on the front page stating "State High boss loses his job - Teachers 
receive the news in shinned silence"^°. Although Gynther did not comment, the 
Queensland Teachers Union and the P&C both provided comments lauding Gnyther 
Flynn Interview 
80 Toowoomba Chronicle 30 July 1991 
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and attacking the decision not to reappoint him. 
Flynn's response, in a smaller, separate story on page 2, expressed his "extreme 
disappointment" both at Gynther's loss of position and at the failure ofthe 
Department of Education to involve the school community in the decision. He went 
on to express his personal support for Gynther, but then followed a line supportive of 
the govemment: 
Dr Flynn emphasised the opinions of politicians were not and 
should not have been a factor in deciding the successful 
applicants for the principals' positions declared vacant 
throughout the state. [...] Dr Flynn said he supported the 
o 1 
restructuring ofthe Department 
The issue then escalated, and was again front page news the following day, with the 
headline "School Demands Gynther Stays". The P&C cancelled major fund-raising 
activities, and teachers voted to strike for a day in support of Gynther's retention. 
Follow-up stories in the same article carried headlines including "Students weep as 
R9 
news about principal spreads." At this point Flynn's competitor, Mike Horan, 
stepped in to attack the Education Minister, Paul Braddy. Flynn, however, was silent 
for several days until he reappeared in the media on August 2, under the headline 
"Flynn concedes his seat could be at risk." Despite this concession, Flynn opted to 
'^ Toowoomba Chronicle 30 July 1991 
^^  Toowoomba Chronicle 31 July 1991 
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support the state Labor poshion rather than the local view: 
But Dr Flynn says the Minister cannot step in personally. "He 
can 'tjust overturn this decision, " he said. "It would set the 
precedent that you can't make any decision without 
consultation with the Parents and Citizens Association. " 
The issue escalated still further when approximately one thousand locals, mcluding 
students, teachers and P&C members, held a protest march in the main street of 
Toowoomba, a protest described by the "Chronicle" as "the first held in Toowoomba 
to protest solely about an issue directly affecting the local community. It is certainly 
QA 
the first march staged to protest an Education Department position." Flynn's 
position was publicly shown to be in stark contrast to the community position. The 
newspaper carried an article (August 2) pointing out the differences of opinion 
between Flynn and the P&C following a meeting with Mhiister Braddy, who then told 
the school communhy (via statewide television) to "settle down."^^ Horan contmued 
to attack the govemment on the issue, presenting petitions to parliament, and making 
an adjournment speech on the issue.^^ 
In retrospect, Flynn considers that he made poor decisions regarding the Gynther 
affair: 
1 stoically took the government line, saying "I'm very 
83 Toowoomba Chronicle 2 August 1991 
84 Toowoomba Chronicle 3 August 1991 
Quoted by Mike Horan MLA, as recorded in Queensland Parliamentary Debates, 24 August 1991 
p.424 
Queensland Parliamentary Debates, 24 August 1991, 424 
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disappointed for Mr Gynther because he's a nice fellow, but 
the processes we 're putting in place to ensure selection on 
merit, they 're good processes and I have to support them. " 
What 1 should have done is lead that march down the street, 
banging the drum, basically saying "This decision sucks, I'm 
with my constitutents, the government's made a big mistake 
here. " [...] With the wisdom of hindsight 1 think a local 
politician should just "do a Katter" and tell his government to 
go jump, publicly. 
The media and community interest in these events found a natural outlet in talk-back 
radio, and the most popular talk-back show in Toowoomba was that hosted by 
Graham Healy. Healy was bom and bred in Toowoomba (his family were hoteliers), 
and had spent virtually his entire life in the city. By the time the events of 1991 
unfolded, he had spent 14 years on Toowoomba radio as a breakfast program and 
talk-back radio host, interviewing local notables and speaking with Toowoomba 
citizens about the issues ofthe day. Talk-back radio follows a format where listeners 
are invited to call in and contribute their views on issues, often political issues. The 
role ofthe host is to draw those views out, challenging them where necessary, and to 
facilitate debate. As a result, Healy had spent his career closely connected to the 
views of Toowoomba's community. 
'^ Flynn Interview. The "Katter" reference is a reference to the Hon Bob Katter MP, a Charters Towers 
based MLA (1974 - 1992) and federal Member ofthe House of Representatives (1993 - present), who 
had a maverick reputation, and left the National Party during 2000, winning his seat as an independent 
in the 2001 federal election. 
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I think the thing with talkback was you got to understand the 
issues, because that's what it was all about. I mean, you were 
listening to people and you were virtually playing politics, even 
though you weren't, you were apart of it, you were apart of 
their political thinking. So 1 think 1 learnt more about the 
issues that were affecting my community than a lot of other 
QO 
people got to do. 
Healy recalls the issues surrounding Bill Gynther's failure to be reappointed as 
dominating the show for a period of some weeks, but indicated that he was not yet a 
on 
member ofthe National Party, and tried to give balanced coverage to the issue. 
Shortly afterwards, however, Healy did become a member ofthe National Party: 
/ was good mates with Mike Horan. I'd been mates with him 
for about 14 years prior to this, and I'd watched his political 
career. 1 wanted to join a political party, that's all 1 wanted to 
do at that stage. So 1 remember in 19911 walked into Mike 
Horan's office just to say g'day one day, and just to discuss 
becoming a member ofthe National Party. That's all U was. 
By the time I walked out of his office he 'd convinced me to 
stand for preselection. ^ ^ 
Desphe the potential for his role as a talk-back host to conflict with his new partisan 
Healy Interview 
Healy, personal communication 
Healy Interview 
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affiliation, Healy continued to broadcast, though he claims to have been even more 
.91 
careful to act neutrally at work (and Flynn acknowledges that he was not concemed 
once he leamed Healy was a member ofthe National Party) 92 
Healy was one of two candidates nominated for National Party preselection in 
Toowoomba North. His opponent was a long term National Party member who had 
held senior offices within the Party, but who had only recently come to Toowoomba. 
Given the choice, the Nationals gave local experience a higher priority than party 
service: "I think people in political parties now understand that you've got to pick a 
local. You've got to pick somebody who knows the areas. Now, obviously they had 
a high-profile local, known to a lot of people, versus a dyed-in-the-wool grass roots 
member who nobody knew. And that probably played a significant factor [in the 
preselection outcome]." 
Once preselected, his party affiliation was public knowledge and Healy stopped 
broadcasting in order to focus on campaigning fiill time. His first priority was 
doorknocking. Healy estimates he doorknocked 5000 homes "*, as opposed to Flynn 
who visited just 1500^^. This doorknocking was critical to Healy's success, because it 
took his local celebrity status and added an interpersonal dimension: 
I'd knock on the door and introduce myself, I'd say "I'm 






'^  Flynn Interview. Accordmg to Flynn, these 1500 focussed on areas known to strongly support 
Labor, and the new areas added to the electorate in 1991. 
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Toowoomba North." And they'd say "Oh! That's what you 
look like!" and U was house after house after house. "Oh! 
That's what you look like!" They 'd heard me, but they hadn't 
seen me. So they put a face to a voice. And so 1 continued that 
on, and 1 found that that was good, and people were warming 
to me, and people were talking to me and discussing issues. ^ 
These factors were also addressed by his advertising in local media. 
Graham Healy has been Toowoomba's best-known radio voice 
for the past fifteen years, and has given people a chance to 
voice their opinion to him on issues that are important. 
Graham Healy is proud to be part ofthe National Party team 
that will bring strong, effective and progressive initiatives back 
to Queensland. 
Born and bred in Toowoomba, Graham Healy has an intimate 
knowledge ofthe area. With this background of local 
knowledge, hard work and professional achievement, Graham 
Healy is your man for Toowoomba North.^^ 
Healy Interview 
Toowoomba Chronicle, 29 August 1992 
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Healy also distributed, to each home in the electorate, a "have your say" leaflet which 
invhed voters to detail the issues of most importance to them. Roughly one thousand 
of those were retumed, and while Healy claims they were most useful following the 
election, when he was coming to terms with his representative role, they also clearly 
contributed to his choice of issues during the campaign: 
From the many responses to my "Have your say " leaflets 
distributed recently throughout the electorate, one ofthe main 
concerns from residents of Toowoomba North is the increasing 
evidence of juvenile crime. Frustration has turned to anger 
when it is seen that no sooner have young offenders been dealt 
with by the Children's Court, than that they are back on the 
street again, and in most cases likely to re-offend. The slap-
QO 
on-the-wrist penalty has not worked. 
In addition, the Toowoomba "Chronicle" ran, nearly every day during the campaign, a 
"candidates forum" column in which candidates from the local electorates (principally 
Toowoomba North, Toowoomba South and Lockyer) were invited to express thefr 
views on the topics of their choice. Healy regarded this as "a free kick ... it is very 
important, because a lot of people read it, and if you say the right thing, and push the 
right button, it will stick in people's minds." Rosalie Lang (Liberal) and Ian Parsons 
(Confederate Action Party) also used this fomm extensively. *°° 
'^  Toowoomba Chronicle, 15 September 1992 
99 
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'"^  There was an additional candidate, Wally McCarthy from the Australian Indigenous People's Party, 
however he ran a dead campaign and avoided the media, possibly as a result of his first media 
interview, which appeared under the unfortunate headline "Time for a bit of colour in State 
Parhament". (4 September 1992) 
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John Flynn, however, was missing entirely from this eariy part ofthe campaign. He 
was still trying to represent the entire of south-westem Queensland, and spent 
addhional time out ofthe electorate in the months before the campaign on personal 
leave and on an overseas trade delegation. His media presence was virtually nil, and 
consisted of state Labor advertising which featured Premier Wayne Goss much more 
prommently than Flynn. Flynn did not utilise the "Candidate's fomm" at all: "I 
probably wouldn't have thought it would be very high profile, or an area that was 
changing people's minds. That's probably something I neglected, rightly or wrongly. 
I didn't think h was very important." 
As noted elsewhere*°^ the 1992 Labor campaign focussed heavily on the persona of 
Wayne Goss. Goss campaigned a number of times in Toowoomba North, including 
one vish to the Toowoomba State High School to try to undo some ofthe damage 
wrought by the Gynther affair. The major Labor policy ofthe campaign, the "Wayne 
Goss Plan for Jobs in Toowoomba North" was released less than a fortnight before the 
poll, but ofthe eleven points in the plan only the first, "Constmction of a new high 
school at Wilsonton commencing in 1994" was directly focussed on Toowoomba. 
The other ten elements referred to Toowoomba having a share of state level policies. 
Healy, however, had already been campaigning hard on the issue ofthe school at 
Wilsonton. "[The new High School] had been promised for the last thirty years by 
successive govemments. I was determined that that was one ofthe things I was really 
going to push hard for. Whether we got into govemment or whether we were still 
'°' Flynn Interview 
'°^ c/"Caims case study above 
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going to be m opposition, this was going to be one of my main priorities."*°^ 
The Liberal Party had challenged the Nationals in 1989, claiming 23.5 percent ofthe 
vote against the Nationals' 25.9 percent. In 1992, however, the Liberals experienced 
great difficulty finding a candidate. Their first two choices withdrew, and eventually 
a local interior designer, Rosalie Lang, was chosen to fill the spot. While she 
contributed some advertising, and participated in the "Candidate's Fomm", her 
campaign was not a serious threat to the other major parties. 
On polling day, the electorate swung back towards the Nationals, and although the 
result was close (199 votes after preferences) Healy was elected. The key feature of 
the result was the crashing ofthe Liberal vote, from 23.5 % down to 9.17 %. Healy 
retained the seat in 1995, and during the Coalition's term of govemment from 1996 -
1998 the promised high school at Wilsonton was built. He survived a strong 
challenge from One Nation in 1998, but lost the seat to Labor in 2001. 
Mundingburra 1995 - 1996: All Doorknock and No Debate 
Introduction 
The electorate of Mundingburra was created during the 1991 redistribution, taking 
tertitory from Townsville, Townsville East, and Thuringowa. It occupies roughly half 
of metropolitan Townsville, and extends mto Townsville's neighbourmg Local 
Govemment Area, Thuringowa. It includes the Laverack Army bartacks and James 
^ Healy Interview 
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Cook University, and so contains a larger number of transient voters than do other 
North Queensland electorates. Ken Davies, Member for Townsville prior to the 
redistribution, won the seat in 1992 when h was created. 
During the period ofthe case study (mid-1995 through to February 1996), 
Mundingburra became the focus of political attention in Queensland, and newsworthy 
around Australia. As noted elsewhere in this thesis, the 1995 general election 
produced a poor resuh for Labor, whose two-party preferred vote suffered an adverse 
swing of 5.84% based on 1992 results, reducing the party's representation in the 
Legislative Assembly from 54 to 45, the minimum required to form a majorhy 
govemment. In Mundingburra, Davies fared worse than those other colleagues who 
retained their seats, suffering a swing of 9.36% against him and whming the seat, after 
a recount, by just 16 votes. The Liberals appealed the result, and in December 1995 
the Court of Disputed Remms declared the seat vacant and ordered a further ballot. 
As a result, without Mundingburra, the 88 remainmg parliamentary seats stood at 44 
Labor, 43 Coalition, and I Independent. If the Liberals were to take Mundingburta, it 
would leave parliament in the hands ofthe Independent (Liz Cunningham, 
Gladstone*°'*), who was regarded as almost certain to support the Coalition. Thus the 
voters of Mundingburta went to the polls in February 1996 to decide the fate ofthe 
Goss Govemment. The subsequent campaign saw the Coahtion candidate, Frank 
Tanti, claim Mundingburta from Labor (now represented by popular local Mayor 
Tony Mooney), allowing the Borbidge Govemment (1996-98) to take office after 
Cunningham pledged her support for the Coahtion on Supply bills and Confidence 
Cythe Gladstone case study above. 
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motions. This case study then is important because there are two potential 
connectional candidates (Tanti and Mooney) who seemed set to contest a 
connectional campaign through December 1995 and January 1996. 
Case 
Frank Tanti was bom and raised hi South Australia. At age 33, in 1982, he moved 
with his wife and children to North Queensland, initially settling in Caims. He had no 
political experience in South Australia, but became involved with the National Party 
soon after artiving in Caims, and began leaming the minutiae of branch-level 
electoral politics. "I leamt a lot about what it was like to be a politician. I leamt how 
to man a booth, display coreflute placards and many other things which made my 
[subsequent] campaigns mn so much smoother because I was aware ofthe 
process."* ^ Outside politics, Tanti's only associational activities were through the 
Uniting Church and the local Highland Dancing Association (of which he was 
treasurer). Thus his opportunities to make social connections through associational 
activity were limited. 
In 1991 Tanti moved from Caims to Townsville (for a job which did not materialise). 
The National Party in Townsville was moribund compared to that in Caims, and Tanti 
was recruited to the Liberal Party by Peter Lindsay (then a Townsville City 
Councillor, later federal Member for Herbert). Again, outside polhics, his 
associational activities remained confined to the Church (Presbyterian) and highland 
dancing. 
'"' Young, M. and Tanti, F. (1999) Mundingburra, the Inside Story, Mansion House Press, Brisbane 30 
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Local govemment elections occurred in Queensland in March 1994, and Tanti was 
encouraged by Lindsay to stand. Tanti agreed, joined Toastmasters to improve his 
public speaking, and campaigned simply by knocking on constituents' doors, "fri 
three days in that electorate I personally letterbox-dropped every house ... and that 
was [just] before Christmas when h was thirty-seven degrees and 90 percent humidhy 
... and 1 went into the Labor areas which were the ones they [i.e. Labor] thought they 
didn't have to visit because they had them in their pocket." 
During this process of doorknocking, Tanti actively acknowledged his devout 
Christian views, and this began to facilitate interpersonal connections with those of 
like mind: 
Doorknocking was an emotionally turbulent experience. So 
often when 1 was beginning to feel discouraged I would knock 
on the door of a Christian who would give me the 
encouragement 1 needed. It was refreshing to have somebody 
open the door, know instantly who I was and what 1 was trying 
to achieve, sit me down and give me a drink.^^^ 
Tanti was defeated in this attempt by 162 votes after leading at the close of counting 
on election night. His efforts had, however, been noted by Lindsay and other local 
Liberals, who began to encourage Tanti to consider running for Mundmgburta at the 
'°^ Tanti Interview 18 July 2001 
'°^ Young and Tanti (1999) op cit 38 
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1995 poll. Tanti needed little encouragement: "The Party and I decided to move me 
on to state politics, because of how well I performed in the Council Election."* ^ ^ 
At this time, Tanti began building a local profile, trying to engage local issues by 
writing a series of letters to the editor, which were printed in the Townsville Bulletin. 
The impact of such missives is usually minimal, but Tanti's efforts were enough to 
bring him to the attention ofthe Labor Party, who had "earmarked him as someone 
who was going to have a run. He'd tried the standard Liberal Party tactic of writing 
letters to the editor on particular issues, in the six months before the campaign period, 
so we'd tagged him as someone who would do something in the fiiture."* °^  
Tanti was preselected early in 1995, and shortly afterwards was dismissed from his 
job as a tile salesman, because the employer did not wish to be associated with a 
Liberal candidate (Tanti lodged, but later withdrew, an unfair dismissal claim against 
the employer). Whilst the loss of his job led to financial hardship, unemployment 
allowed Tanti to devote his energies full-time to campaigning. He acquired a bus-
driver's license and a second-hand bus from a Townsville transport company, decked 
it out with advertising material, launched it from the steps of Davies' electorate office, 
and began campaigning in eamest, suburb by suburb, knocking on doors and speaking 
to local voters. 
Tanti lacked any clear appreciation of Liberal policy, and campaigned by focussing 
on micro-issues (his signature issue was off-school parking for one ofthe local 
'°^ Young &. Tanti (1999) ibid 31 
'"^  Mooney/«/erv/ew 26 July 2001 
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primary schools) and by criticishig Davies' representation ofthe electorate. Referting 
to Davies, he constantly repeated his determhiation to be "Mundhigburta's man in 
Brisbane, not Brisbane's man in Mundingburta."**° His campaigning style appeared 
to make his lack of policy knowledge irtelevant - support came from locals simply 
because he had taken the time to doorknock so widely: 
WhUe doorknocking U became apparent to me that people 
wanted someone who could represent them and it was not 
important that 1 didn't know everything [about policy]. They 
wanted grassroots representation, and with me they got it. 
Tanti's discussions regarding the performance of Davies appeared to anger the sittmg 
member. Davies took the unusual step of filing a wrh agamst Tanti for defamation, 
which "related to remarks allegedly made by Mr Tanti while doorknocking the 
electorate."**^ 
On election day, Tanti's campaign bus again came to the fore. Tanti was only lightly 
supported by booth workers - in several cases relying on a single representative to 
staff a booth all day - but he used the bus to travel from booth to booth throughout the 
electorate. "We used the bus to so much advantage on polling day, stopping out the 




see, for example, Townsville Bulletin 21 June 1995, 11 July 1996 
Young and Tanti (1999) op cit 47 
"^ Townsville Bulletin 30 June 1995 
"^ Tanti Interview 
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Tanti's campaigning efforts, combined with the statewide swing against Labor, bh 
heavily into Davies' vote, and by the close of counting on election night, Tanti had 
gamed a 10 percent swing, and was 148 votes ahead, with 3500 postal votes to be 
counted. Postal votes in the electorate had previously favoured the Coalition, and 
Tanti was expected to win the seat, albeit closely. In the end, Davies retained his seat, 
holding Tanti off by a mere 16 votes. 
Tanti was extremely disappointed at losing an election by a fraction of a percent for 
the second time in eighteen months, and had come to the view that his loss was the 
result of electoral fraud, or at least of voting irregularities. To prove this, he wrote a 
"thank-you letter" to every voter in the electorate, thanking those who had supported 
him. In reality, the point of this exercise was to attempt to track down voters who 
were on the roll without living in the electorate, or voters who claimed to have been 
tumed away from booths without voting. Tanti states that "We got 500 [letters] back 
[marked "retum to sender"] and from that myself, my wife and a few friends, we 
doorknocked all 500 places, and proved to our own people that these people don't 
exist and these [other] people didn't get a vote."**"* During this time it also emerged 
that a number of soldiers, based at Laverack bartacks but on active duty overseas, had 
been unable to obtain ballot forms. 
Given the nartOw result, the Liberal Party began proceedings to challenge the result in 
the Court of Disputed Retums, and on 8 December 1995 Justice Brian Ambrose 
declared Davies' election to have been invalid, thus requirmg a by-election to be held 
Tanti Interview 
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in Mundingburta* *^  Tanti emerged from hearing the news to face a large media 
contingent, claiming that he "feh ten foot tall"**^. Labor, however, was caught 
completely by surprise. Tony Mooney, who would contest the by-election for Labor, 
stated that "I didn't give [the challenge] any chance of success and I don't thhik too 
many objective people did. [I was] stunned and amazed, fr was a travesty of justice 
and should never have happened. It was one ofthe most inexplicable decisions by 
any member of the judiciary in the history of Queensland." 
Shortly afterwards. Premier Wayne Goss called the by-election for 3 February 1996, 
and the local Labor organisation formally re-endorsed Ken Davies. Following normal 
Labor procedure, Davies' preselection was sent to the Queensland Labor 
Administrative Committee for endorsement. The committee, however, declined to re-
endorse Davies, citing concems that Davies had been unable to settle outstanding 
legal action with the Commonwealth Bank (had Davies been unsuccessful in his case, 
he may have been bankrupted, and undischarged bankrupts cannot serve in 
Parliament). Instead, the committee called for fresh nominations, and took the 
unusual step of requesting Townsville Mayor Tony Mooney to nominate. 
Davies' disendorsement led to concerted and open in-fightmg within Townsville 
Labor, much of h reported in depth in the local media. The moming after the 
disendorsement, the front page ofthe Townsville BuUetin^'^ bore the headlme 
"DAVIES DUMPED", with Davies claiming to be "shocked, dismayed and angry ... 
"^ Judgment TanU vs Davies (No 3 of 1996). This "by-election" might be more precisely called a "re-
election" as no valid general election result had been recorded. However it was generally referred to as 
a by-election, so that term will be used. 
"'' Townsville Bulletin 9 December 1995 
''^ Mooney Interview 
Townsville Bulletin 16 December 1995 
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1 have plenty to say, and I mean plenty!" Tanti was quoted in the headline, stating 
"Changing horses at the last minute is not a smart move. Wayne Goss is trying every 
desperate move he can think of" Perhaps more damaging was a sidebar article 
enthled "Action Seen as Labor At Its Worst", in which North Queensland-based ALP 
Senator Margaret Reynolds stated that "the Party should think twice before endorsing 
Mr Mooney. 'Tony won't get the Green Party preferences, the Women's Party 
preferences, or the indigenous vote', she said. 'Frankly that's all a bh of a concem ... 
this by-election is too important just to put the favourite son of Brisbane in.' " 
As a prospective candidate, Mooney had been concemed about the impact this 
infighting might have: "I had expressed concems that if I was to put my name 
forward, I would want to see unified party support behind me. So, to obviously allay 
any fears that I had, the executive was able to pass that resolution, which 1 think 
delivered that support at the time."**^ The resolution calling on Mooney to nominate 
for preselection was endorsed across all major factional groups (to deliver the 
necessary unity) but it was still inevitably seen as Brisbane interference in 
Townsville's affairs. Davies added to this feeling by nominating as an Independent 
(thus being expelled from the Labor Party) and spending the rest ofthe campaign 
doing everything he could to undermine Labor: "Davies did little else hi the election 
campaign than cut Goss to shreds." Through all of this, Tanti kept campaigning on 
the ground, taking full advantage of Labor's disartay: 
What you've got to understand then is once the thing 
' '^  Mooney Interview 
^^° Young & Tanti (1999) op cit 44 
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[disendorsement] happened to Davies, U split their support 
base, because the people who were backing Davies didn't like 
what happened to him. So on the ground, they were splintered 
17] 
all over the place. 
Notwithstanding the circumstances of his preselection, it was difficuh to fault Labor's 
choice of candidate for the by-election. Tony Mooney was a lifetime North 
Queensland resident, and a graduate of James Cook University. He had been on the 
Townsville City Council for nearly twenty years (first elected 1977) and had been the 
Mayor since 1989. He was an extremely popular Mayor, who had leamed to navigate 
the political culture of Townsville, and had particularly leamed the importance of 
close involvement with constituents: 
Governments are often thrown out of office because, 1 think, 
they become detached from the real world ofthe constituency, 
and we've always had a very close ear to the ground on what 
the community is saying. And we don't try to push our agenda 
beyond what the community is prepared to tolerate. So we've 
been able to harness that community support and work to it. 
And that then ensures that you don't get the tag of 
"arrogance", which is another killer for elected governments. 
You don't get the tag of being out of touch. And in local 
government, provided you're doing the basics correct and 
keeping that local support by listening to people and doing the 
121 Tanti Interview 
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research on views and opinions, that's the most important 
122 
issue. 
Most importantly from a connectional perspective, Mooney had had years in which to 
become the champion of local concems, attacking the state govemment on his 
consthuents' behalf, and campaigning against other cities for a fair share of available 
resources: 
/ think that has been born out of many years of neglect, by 
various state governments, of regional Queensland. It think 
there's plenty of evidence to back that up. No-one denies the 
state capital needs to have a full range offacilities, but in 
regional Queensland, we suffer the tyranny of distance and all 
that that means in terms of resourcing for the North. That's 
why I've been rather passionate about a new state for North 
Queensland. But in terms of answering the question, I don't 
believe the Mayor has to be the prime Brisbane-basher, in fact 
I've always tried to have a co-operative relationship, because 
I've found that that generally delivers better outcomes in terms 
of resources or funding. But if a particular issue comes up 
and we've got to take on Brisbane, the state capital, or we've 
got to take on the state capital because of what they're giving 
122 Mooney Interview 
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to Cairns and not here, or Gladstone and not here, or 
7 9? 
anywhere else and not here, well we'll take U on. 
As a potential candidate for the Mundingburta by-election, to save the electorate from 
an assauh by a challenger who had campaigned entirely on local issues, Mooney was 
perfectly credentialled. However Labor's campaign had begun poorly with the 
disendorsement of Davies, and took time to regain momentum. During this early 
period. Labor wavered between campaigning either on local issues or on the by-
election's implications for who would govem Queensland. 
Mooney's firm view was that "the strategy was a simple one: keep it simple, keep it 
local, and put the best issues forward that will get support from the local 
community."* He certainly began in this vein, following his local govemment 
practice of acting as the local champion and fighting the capital: 
Mr Mooney said he hoped that the state's political leaders 
would respect the voters of Mundingburra, and allow them to 
control the election. "The reality is people in Mundingburra 
want local people with local issues, " he said. "1 think 
political leaders should take heed of that, and butt out a little 
bit" 
123 Mooney Interview. It should be noted that the term "Brisbane Basher" did not emerge 
spontaneously from Mooney. He was responding to an interview question which included the phrase 
"Brisbane-bashing is vutually a cultural touchstone..." 
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Mr Mooney, who has had a number of disagreements with the 
Labor state government, said he would continue to be critical 
when it was necessary, and had mentioned this to Mr Goss. 
He said he would always put Townsville first. "I'm sorry if 
that doesn't agree with Wayne Goss and the Cabinet. I am a 
parochial North Queenslander, and that is all there is about 
7 9 ? 
//, " Mr Mooney said. ' 
However at the same time Labor had not downplayed its early approach to the by-
election, during which it had focussed attention at the state level: 
// is important for the people of Mundingburra to realise that 
a Liberal win in this by-election would mean a hung 
Parliament. It would mean 44 Labor members and 44 
Coalition members, and an independent holding the balance 
of power. That would make Parliament unworkable, it would 
make government unworkable. The choice is between giving 
Labor an opportunity to get on with the job of governing, as 1 
believe people want us to, or for there to be a hung 
Parliament, and to have the Parliament and government 
1 9/i 
unworkable, which would cripple the state. 
This wavering also showed itself clearly in Premier Goss' involvement in the 
'^ ^ Townsvihe Bulletin 22 December 1995 
126 Mike Kaiser, Labor State Secretary, quoted in the Townsville Bulletin 9 December 1995 
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campaign. Eariy in 1996 Mooney publicly discouraged Goss from campaigning, 
stating that "I don't want outsiders butting in ... I have told the Premier if anyone 
attempts to make this a mini state election it will backfire on them. The Premier is 
welcome to come to Townsville but there is a great deal of cynicism about pohticians 
among the voters."*^^ However neither National leader Rob Borbidge nor Liberal 
Leader Joan Sheldon appeared in Mundingburra nearly as often as did Goss, and 
desphe Mooney's public poshion, he has since conceded that "Wayne Goss was then, 
and would still be, one ofthe most formidable campaigners ... ever in the history of 
Queensland. So it wasn't a matter of keeping him out ofthe campaign, h was really as 
19R 
to how we would handle the intmsive issues that weren't really local issues." 
Those "intrusive issues" had arrived with the plethora of single-issue candidates who 
had flocked to Mundingburra to push their causes. By the time ofthe poll there were 
twelve candidates, including single issue candidates focussed on nude beaches, 
building subcontractors, and right-to-life. Labor's campaign strategy was to allow the 
state-level party personnel (principally Goss and Kaiser) to handle these issues, 
leaving Mooney free to concentrate entirely on local issues. However Mooney was 
unable to completely disengage himself, and instead used them as bah to force Tanti 
into debate: "He [Tanti] was protected throughout the campaign. He was a genuhie 
cotton-wool candidate ... I don't know that h [challenging Tanti to debate] was about 
showmg up Frank's lack of knowledge about Liberal Policy, h was about showing up 
Frank's lack of knowledge on issues generally."*^^ 
127 Townsville Bulletin 3 January 1996 
128 
Mooney Interview 
'^ ^ Mooney Interview 
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Unfortunately for Mooney this tactic backfired as Tanti not only declined to debate, 
but freely conceded his "lack of knowledge on issues generally": 
Tony Mooney continually tried to involve me in a public 
debate. To me it would have proved nothing other than who 
was the best debater. 1 have never tried to hide or been 
ashamed of the fact that I lacked experience in this area, so I 
continually declined. I preferred to doorknock to 
communicate my message to the electorate. [...] One wonders 
whether politicians are actually expected to prattle on about 
things they know little about - a public perception of 
politicians that may have some substance, given the pressure 
on me to comment on things 1 openly admitted 1 knew little 
7 ^0 
about. 
Goss' riposte that Tanti was "all doorknock and no debate"*^* was entirely Tanti's 
point. 
Mooney's efforts to continue his Mayoral image of championing Townsville and 
winning resources for Townsville was assisted by concerted pork-barrelling from the 
Goss govemment, hicludmg a promise of $75 Million (over 30 years) for a new Zinc 
refinery, and 21 additional police. Mooney was never able to fiilly capitalise on these. 
He was neatly outmanoeuvred by Tanti, who claimed credit for the new govemment 
'^ ° Young & Tanti (1999) op cit 47,52 
' Townsville Bulletin 9 January 1996 
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projects on the basis that his assauh on Labor had forced the Govemment to 
132 
reconsider these projects . 
When taken to task for this position, Tanti appeared to blunder, acknowledgmg that 
Mooney had been a good Mayor and had achieved thmgs for Tovmsville*". However 
this "blunder" may have actually gahied Tanti support, because h increased the 
perception that he was not a professional polhician: 
When 1 commented in the press that Mooney's record in 
TownsvdIe was good, it created quite an uproar. 1 responded 
by saying "1 call U as 1 see it. " It was seemingly a foreign 
phenomenon for a candidate to speak the truth, and give 
credit where credit was due.^^^ My campaign people were 
saying "Well what did you bloody say that for? " And I said 
well because it's the truth. And of course then it backfired on 
Labor and worked for me because people realised they [had] 
a good mayor, so why should they lose him? 
While these media activhies took up an increasing amount of Tanti's time, his simple 
tactic of continuous, exhaustive doorknocking, allowed him to avoid in-depth 
discussions on the public stage, and won him support - and even admiration - for his 
doggedness. A feature ofthe Townsville Bulletin durhig the campaign was a front 
See, for instance, Townsville Bulletin 9 January 1996. Tanti also made this claim during the 
interview. 
' " Townsville BuUetin 17 January 1996 
'^ ^ Young and Tanti (1999) op cit 48 
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page column called the "Mundingburta Mole", which provided thumbnail snippets 
and views on the campaign's progress. On 8 January 1996, the Mole asked: 
Does Frank Tanti never sleep? 
Mole asks this after learning that he and a colleague have 
twice this week been out from 3 AM putting up campaign 
posters. 
One can only assume he's running on Duracell batteries . 
Although whether he will be the rabbit still hitting its little 
punch-bag on February 4 when the others have fallen remains 
7 ?7 
to be seen. 
Mooney, on the other hand, did not use the campaign tool of doorknocking nearly as 
1 OO 
effectively as Tanti. Although the Townsville Bulletin ran an article on 10 January 
about his doorknocking activities, he relied mainly on a team of volunteers to 
doorknock on his behalf, and focussed his efforts on particular voters. In retrospect, 
Mooney identifies this efficient approach to doorknocking as a weakness: 
Doorknocking's very important. At that time we had a lot of 
people in the field doorknocking. I try to do as much as 1 can. 
'^ ^ At this time the Duracell company used television advertisements featuring a children's toy rabbit 
which operated longest using their product. The advertisement carried the punch line "He's still 
going!" 
' " Townsville Bulletin 8 January 1996 
'^ ^ Headline "Mooney Hits the Streets in Quest for Votes" 
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Ultimately, though, the way in which U was handled because 
there was such a short timeframe over the Christmas period -
we didn't want to do too much over that holiday period -1 
tended only to go and doorknock those people who were 
swinging voters, who hadn't made up their mind. So there 
was a whole team of people out there determining basic 
affiliation, and then I'd go back and talk to the swingers as 
much as 1 could. 1 didn't get around to see anywhere near as 
many as 1 should have. 
One week before the election, Labor's campaign strategy was further disturbed as 
Prime Minister Paul Keating called a federal general election for March 2. 
[We] pleaded with Keating to hold off for another week so 
that we could run our race here in Queensland, but that wasn't 
to happen ... once the federal campaign was announced, all of 
the media attention [was] leading off with the federal 
campaign ... It was pointless even doorknocking in that final 
week. Igave it up ...And Paul Keating apologised to me 
afterwards, when he was up there in his own campaign, for 
having to call it when he did.^'*^ 
By-election day in 1996 was a much larger affair than had been that for the general 
139 
Mooney Interview 
Mooney Interview. During the interview Mooney cited this as the most important reason for the 
loss of Mundingburra. 
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election. Members ofthe Labor movement had travelled from all around Queensland 
to support Mooney (despite the concurtent federal campaign), and Tanti had now 
marshalled a team of 400 volunteers: 
We had everybody in Liberal T-shirts, we had them from the 
gate back to the six metres, we had four or five people in that 
short distance handing out for the party. And come two 
o'clock on that day the Labor Party signs were falling down 
off the fence, they weren't being replaced. And all the nasty 
boys who had played their games, all the people who'd come 
up from Brisbane, you could tell by their faces that they were 
beaten.'"" 
They were indeed beaten. Tanti received a further swing of 2% based on 1995 and 
claimed the seat. Tanti's election, and Liz Cunningham's expression of confidence in 
Borbidge as Premier, led to the fall ofthe Goss Govemment. Tanti, like the Borbidge 
govemment itself, was a "oncer", seeing out one term of office before bemg defeated. 
In 1998, Tanti failed to win a single booth hi Mundingburra, and only managed to 
outpoll One Nation by 4.5 percent. Labor's Lindy Nelson-Cart won every booth, m 
all but one case claiming a primary vote in excess of 40 percent. 
''" Tanti Interview 
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Maryborough 1998 - 2001: What Did You Do That For? 
Introduction 
Maryborough is a small chy of 25,000 people, approximately three hours' drive north 
of Brisbane. It was founded in 1843 as a port city and is one natural termmus ofthe 
east-west road and rail network from the fertile Brisbane Valley region. It also 
provided port services to the Gympie goldfields, and was an early immigration port. 
For much of its history Maryborough was also a logging town, with forestry industries 
supplying native timber. In the past two decades, Maryborough has undergone 
something of an economic decline. Better land transportation systems have decreased 
the need for coastal shipping, and Maryborough has been left behind as the other 
towns along the coast north of Brisbane have developed their tourism industries. 
Areas such as Maroochydore and Noosa have attracted tourists to their beaches; 
Hervey Bay, Maryborough's nearest neighbour, is the access point for Fraser Island, a 
nature reserve used extensively by four-wheel-drive vehicle enthusiasts; is the base 
for famous whale watching expedhions; and has become a Mecca for retfrees; 
Bundaberg to the north attracts tourists to its famous distillery and to the 
southernmost end ofthe Great Barrier Reef Maryborough is blessed with none of 
these features, and attempts to promote hself to tourists as the "heritage city", with a 
precinct of heritage-listed buildings in the heart ofthe chy. 
Politically, Maryborough has been quite volatile. For a long period the seat was a 
safe Labor seat, held by Labor almost continuously from 1915 until 1971 (except for 
1929-32, when the seat briefly changed hands during the depression). Since 1971 
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however, the seat has changed hands five times, from the Liberals, back to Labor, to 
the Nationals, back to Labor, and then to Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party in the 
1998 election, which is the subject of this case. During this post-1971 period, no 
party has held the seat for ten years, and only once has it been retained beyond six 
years. A significant caveat here relates to Gilbert Alison, who held the seat for a total 
of twelve years, from 1971 until 1977 as a Liberal, and then from 1983 unth 1989 as a 
National. Alison was a successftil connectional politician whose connectional support 
contributed to his re-election despite a change of party label. Connectional aspects of 
his career have been canvassed elsewhere.*"*^ 
In 1998, Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party (hereafter "One Nation") was the 
prominent far-right party, taking on the mantle previously wom by parties such as the 
Citizens' Electoral Council and the Confederate Action Party. One Nation was much 
more successful than its predecessors, however, because of Hanson herself, who 
provided a populist figurehead (something the previous parties had lacked). The 1998 
election was perfectly timed for One Nation, then at the height of its relatively brief 
political popularity. Although it had not been expected to make a significant impact 
on the election. One Nation performed extremely strongly, takhig 22.68% ofthe 
statewide primary vote (or nearly half a million voters) and outpolling both the 
Liberal and National Parties*'* .^ As a result eleven One Nation Members were 
elected. 
In Maryborough, Dr John Kingston, a veterinarian and agricultural economist, was 
'"^  Reynolds (1991a) op cit 
'''^  Electoral Commission of Queensland (1998) Statistical Retums 
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one of those eleven. Although he had spent a great deal of time overseas, Kingston 
was Maryborough bom and bred, his family's pharmacies were widely known 
throughout the town, and he was on Maryborough City Council*"*"*. He won 42.56% 
ofthe primary vote, significantiy more than the state One Nation vote, and more than 
in two ofthe three surrounding seats *'*^ . The purpose of this case is to determine 
whether any of that vote was connectional in nature. 
Case 
John Kingston was bom in Childers, near Maryborough, and moved to Maryborough 
itself in his infancy, when his parents opened the first of several "Kingson's 
Pharmacies" in the town. He undertook his primary schooling in Maryborough, then 
boarded at The Southport School for his secondary schooling, before training as a 
veterinarian and pharmacist at the University of Queensland. Following his training, 
he retumed to Maryborough and began undertaking what he has described as a "fruit 
salad career," often undertaking several pursuits at once. Over the course of twenty 
years he ovmed and operated the family pharmacies, practiced as a veterinarian, 
administered a rural management and consulting firm, undertook several different 
farming projects, and lectured at Univershy. He also began to work extensively 
overseas, particularly hi Laos and Thailand, on rural development projects funded by 
intemational aid agencies. In the early 1990s he also founded a private school, the 
Vientiane Academy, in Laos. In short, Kingston became a model "agri-business" 
As an independent - like most other Queensland local govemments, Maryborough eschews party 
politics in its council chamber. 
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Hervey Bay and Callide. In the third, Barambah, Pratt obtamed 43.54% (ECQ 1998) 
Maryborough Chronicle, 10 June 1998 
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operator, managing a diversified portfolio of agricultural and pastoral activhies, and 
selling skilled services as much as agricultural commodities. 
In 1997 Kingston was "conned, pressured to run" for a seat on the Maryborough 
City Council, which was heavily controlled by Labor stalwarts. His campaign was 
extremely low-key: "Very little campaign. A letterbox drop. No doorknocking. Few 
adverts. I really was not very concemed if [I was] elected or not."*'*^ Despite this 
apathetic, almost fatalistic approach to campaigning, Kingston was elected to the 
Council, and served a short term of approximately one year (before his election to the 
Legislative Assembly). During this term he was prominent in a campaign to save the 
local hospital from potential closure, and was the main architect of a submission to 
the state govemment for a new prison to be sited in the area. The prison proposal, in 
particular, brought him into the public eye because "I was the only person that went 
out [to public meetings] and spoke to the people who were against [the prison]. I 
copped a fair bit of flak at those meetings but the meetings usually ended up quite 
successful, with people in agreement."*"*^ 
During 1998, Kingston was courted by the Nationals as a potential candidate for 
Maryborough, and actually nominated for preselection, but withdrew when the state 
headquarters ofthe Nationals nominated an additional preselection candidate after the 
close of nommations. "That breaks the National Party's mles, it upset the executive of 
the party here very badly, and as far as I was concemed it was a vote of no 
confidence."*^° After the election, when he had won the seat, the Nationals appeared 
"*^  Correspondence, 19 December 2001 
'''^  Correspondence, 19 December 2001 
'"^  Kingston Interview 20 December 2001 
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to me his loss. Kingston cites a National Party official, who "rang me up after the 
election and said 'Oh, what did you do that for? You were going to be our bright 
young man ofthe future.'" 
Also during 1998, Kingston was encouraged by friends to attend a One Nation rally 
held ui Maryborough, at which Hanson delivered an address. This meeting was a 
catalyst for Kingston to become pohtically active hi state polhics: 
By chance, one of my grazier friends saw me working and said 
"Pauline Hanson is speaking in town. Come and listen. " 
Covered in dust and dirt 1 went All my grazier friends, with 
whom 1 was sitting, and 1 were ... nodding in agreement. 1 
went home and thought about it and decided "If you agree with 
the majority of what she said, you should have the guts to stand 
,,152 
up. 
Kingston subsequently stood for preselection for One Nation, and was successful. 
When the election was called, four candidates nominated: Bob Dollin (Labor 
incumbent); Kev Mahoney (Nationals), Kingston, and Sue Russell (Greens) . The 
early campaign virtually ignored Kingston, as Dollin and Mahoney squared off against 
one another and began to fight a fairly traditional development-based campaign, each 
promising new development for the area: refurbishment to the railway station, 
contracts for local steelworks, community facilities, an upgrade ofthe hospital, a 
' ' ' Kingston Interview 
'^ ^ Correspondence, 19 December 2001 
'^ ^ Russell ran an almost-invisible campaign and gained only 3 percent ofthe vote. She is basically 
disregarded for the rest of this case. 
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"tourism trail" between Maryborough and Hervey Bay, and the prison tender. These 
projects, and the resources to be allocated to them, became the basis for a biddfrig war, 
and senior members of both parties (for instance, Russell Cooper for the Nationals and 
Jim Elder for Labor) travelled to the electorate to add weight to the promises. Although 
Kingston had already been publicly associated with two of these projects (the hospital 
and the prison) he was marginalised from the debate. 
Kingston had continued the low-key approach to campaigning which he had developed 
during his Council campaign. He avoided the media, and did not doorknock. "I have 
never doorknocked and won't ever ... dreadful process."*^"* He did, however, lease a 
booth at the Maryborough Show, which was held several weeks prior to the election, 
and made himself available to electors for the two days ofthe show. 
Kingston's relationship with One Nation also bears consideration. While he was 
endorsed by One Nation, his main reason for this affiliation was Pauline Hanson 
herself "Pauline said the things people wanted to hear. Like her or not, she is a 
charismatic speaker."*^^ He had more difficulties, however, with the One Nation 
organisation. The first of these was that One Nation was disorganised and amateurish 
in its approach to state-wide campaigning. "[I campaigned] mainly as an individual. 
The One Nation Party machine was a hindrance. Hopeless organisation."*^^ The 
second issue centred around race. As noted above, Kingston had spent a great deal of 
time in South East Asia. He had martied a Laotian national, had adopted three children 
from Asia, and had an Aboriginal secretary. Hanson, however, had made race one of 
'"* Correspondence, 19 December 2001 
"^  Correspondence, 19 December 2001 
'^ ^ Correspondence, 19 December 2001 
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the core elements of her platform, and as a result, "she did attract some zealots whom I 
found embartassing."*^^ Kmgston does not, however, regard Hanson herself as 
racist*^^ 
Labor and the Nationals continued the contest against one another until the local 
newspaper ran a front page story enthled "Hanson's Support Ignored", cithig AC 
Nielsen polling which indicated One Nation was likely to take about 30 percent ofthe 
vote in the seats of Hervey Bay and Maryborough. Both parties responded (in the 
article) to the news with disbelief Dollin "said that support for One Nation was 
running higher than he expected and might be overstated,"*^^ and Mahoney said "One 
Nation is a new party which has gained some support, but I can't see them winning any 
seats."* However the following day Labor directed its first attack on One Nation, and 
used the issue of race as a focus for the attack: 
77?^  election of a One Nation candidate in Maryborough would 
have major adverse ramifications for business and industry in 
the city, Deputy Opposition Leader Jim Elder said yesterday. 
He said it would also be dangerous for the economies of 
Maryborough and Queensland if the coalition formed a 
government with One Nation support Walkers Ltd'^' and a lot 
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Correspondence, 19 December 2001 
In correspondence (19 December 2001) he offers as evidence for this view, a private dinner for 
Hanson, himself, his wife, and his daughter Tmg, during which Hanson emphasised to Ting that "she 
could achieve whatever she wanted, if she wanted it enough." 
1 cn *^ 59 Maryborough Chronicle, 25 May 1998 
160 . . . 7 
wid 
161 A large Maryborough steel manufacturing and heavy engineering plant, which had recently been 
forced to lay off staff after missing out on government contracts. 
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of other industries throughout Queensland rely heavily on 
exporting their products to South-East Asia, and if the One 
Nation Party with its anti-Asian rhetoric became involved with 
the govemment, it would have major adverse ramifications.'^^ 
Kingston was able to deflect this attack relatively easily, by pointing out that he 
regularly did business in South-East Asia, with people who knew he was standing as a 
candidate on behalf of One Nation, and his business had not diminished. 
By election day, Kingston was quietly confident. He had sufficient volunteer workers 
to staff all polling booths, and he travelled from one to the next throughout the day. 
During the count, he virtually ignored his own results, and instead passed the time 
watching an intemational rugby union football game with joumalists. The results ofthe 
election, however, were remarkable. Kingston obtained 42.56 % ofthe vote, well 
ahead of Labor's Dollin (35.70%) and the Nationals' Mahoney (just 18.87%). 
Kingston was a clear winner on distribution of Mahoney's preferences, with a two 
party preferted vote of 58.32%. 
In February 1999, One Nation m Queensland imploded when Hanson and other senior 
party officials attempted to retain their positions without facfrig election by party 
members. *^ ^ Khigston refused an ultimatum demanding that he make a public 
statement of his support for the party leadership, and was "sacked."* '^* He contuiued as 
an independent, and stood for office again in 2001. Again, his campaign style 
^^^ Maryborough Chronicle, 25 May 1998 
'*^  c/"Chapter 3 above for more details 
'*^  Correspondence, 19 December 2001 
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demonstrated his utter distaste for campaigning. "Peter Beattie ... ran a very clever 
campaign. I won only on preferences. I did not campaign much. Just promised more 
hard work. I hate campaigning." Despite an 11 percentage point swing against him 
on primary votes, Kingston still won the seat on preferences, from a 34.39% primary 
vote base. 
'^ ^ Correspondence, 19 December 2001 
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CHAPTER 7 - ANALYSIS O F NON-CONNECTIONAL 
FACTORS 
As noted in Chapter 5, the case studies presented in the previous chapter were 
selected because they produced a swing which was more pronounced than might have 
been expected given the parties' performance on a state wide basis. It is readily 
apparent, from a simple reading ofthe case studies, that each of them present some 
coimectional factors, and that each result is likely to have been influenced by 
connectional politics. There is, then, a temptation for the researcher to leap 
enthusiastically, but ertoneously, to the conclusion that the unexpected swings were 
produced solely by connectional factors. 
The theoretical models which underpin this thesis, particularly the funnel of causality, 
provide a counterweight to this temptation. The funnel of causality would suggest 
that, in each case study, a series of influential factors and variables had an impact on 
the final outcome. Therefore, before considering the presence and strength of 
connectionalism, it is necessary to consider other influential factors, to determine the 
extent to which they can explain the extent ofthe unexpected swing. Connectional 
politics can then be considered in concert with the other influential factors in the 
funnel. 
This chapter will, therefore, take each case study by tum and examine the factors 
which emerged from the cases studies, which may account for some or all ofthe 
unexpected swing. The focus of this chapter will be on explanations other than 
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connectionalism, in order to determine whether there remains an unexplained portion 
ofthe vote which might be explained by connectional factors. The next chapter will 
then provide an analysis of connectional factors, in an effort to ascertain the 
contribution of those factors to the outcome. 
It is important to note that the emphasis of this chapter, and Chapter 8 which follows, 
is on the analysis ofthe swing in each case. The chapters do not pay particular 
attention to the "base" vote, which is consistent from election to election. In many 
cases these votes are likely to be the result of factors discussed in Chapter 2, such as 
class-based party alignment. It may therefore appear that factors such as class and 
image are neglected in this analysis. They are not in fact neglected, - but they are not 
mentioned unless they are pertinent to the explanation ofthe swing evident in the 
election result. 
Cairns 
A number of plausible reasons for the swing towards the Liberals can be drawn from 
the case study. They are a fundamental demographic shift as a result of intemal 
migration into Caims, especially from southem chies; the impact of state-level 
polhics, and in particular the law and order issue, which ran both at a state and local 
level; the impact ofthe Nationals' "dead" candidacy; and fmally connectional politics. 
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Fundamental Demographic Shift 
May, De Lacy, and Ryan all mention the effect hitemal migration had on the Caims 
region. May and De Lacy cite this as a possible reason for Ryan's success, while 
Ryan saw the influx of Liberal-leaning residents as one base for his efforts to develop 
the Caims branch ofthe Liberal Party. An influx of Liberal supporters could certainly 
produce a swing towards the Liberal Party, and therefore away from both the National 
Party and Labor Party. 
However, net intemal migration of 3.96 % in the census period 1986-1991 would not 
seem to offer a full account of a swing in the order of 20%. Furthermore, it is 
implausible to assume that new Caims residents were uniformly pro-Liberal in their 
political orientation, leaving the other parties also to derive some benefit. As a result, 
it is probable that demographic shifts had some impact, but the magnitude of this 
would have been small, and the direction ofthe shift cannot be demonstrated. 
The Impact of State Level Policy 
As noted in the case study, the law-and-order issue which characterised the 1992 
election in Caims, was also an issue at the state level. As a result, it is reasonable to 
consider that voters may have been responding to state-level political stimuli which 
(because of local attention to the issue) had a stronger impact in Caims than in other 
comparable provincial and Far North Queensland electorates, thus resulting in a swing 
towards the Liberals. 
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Certainly h is plausible that the state's mass media, and coverage of both Liberal 
leader Sheldon, and National leader Borbidge, when campaigning m Caims, may have 
influenced some voters. From Ryan's perspective, however, his main engagement 
with the state level campaign was the largely unsuccessful attempt to encourage the 
state Liberal Party to support his local endeavours. This indifference tends at least to 
suggest that there was no state-level attempt to capitalise locally on the law and order 
campaign. Any impact ofthe state campaign therefore seems to have occurred as a 
result of "spillover" from the state level media where this was broadcast (or 
circulated) into Caims. On balance it is more feasible that the state-level activity 
reinforced the dominant local version ofthe law and order issue, than vice versa. 
The Nationals' Dead Candidacy 
The case study notes that Balodis ran dead, and may have been largely a pretence by 
the Nationals to demonstrate that they had not (formally) ceded conservative 
dominance of Caims to the Liberals. That being the case, it may be plausible to 
consider that, in the absence of a strong National Party campaign, many conservative 
voters simply opted for the stronger non-Labor candidate. 
There is little doubt that this hypothesis accounts for a substantial portion (and 
probably most) ofthe swing from the Nationals to the Liberals in 1992. Clearly, 
Ryan was (and was seen to be) the main opposhion candidate. DeLacy's efforts were 
oriented against Ryan rather than Balodis, and the general direction of media 
coverage was to report what amounted to a contest between Ryan and Delacy. 
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Two questions, however, remain despite the strength of this argument. Balodis 
retained 14.34% ofthe vote despite his dead candidacy. This indicates that there was 
still a core aligned National Party vote in Caims, and suggests that simply being the 
prime non-Labor candidate was not enough to make inevitable a large swing towards 
Ryan. It is open to consider what factors may have encouraged the aligned National 
supporters who swoing towards the Liberals to do so. It is possible, for instance, for 
connectional factors to have reinforced the impact ofthe Nationals' dead candidacy, 
by making it easier for aligned National voters to forsake their usual political 
alignment. 
Most importantly, the impact of Balodis' campaign cannot account for the 6.5 percent 
swing against Labor, based on Kelly and Reynolds' reworking ofthe 1989 results 
according to the 1992 boundaries. In a stable election such as 1992, this swing would 
have been signiflcant in itself, without the additional swing from the Nationals. 
Connectionalism 
All three ofthe hypotheses presented above appear plausible to account for some of 
the swing towards the Liberals, but they cannot, either separately or together, account 
for the magnitude ofthe swing obtained by Ryan. It is left, then, to consider whether 
cormectional politics may account for the remainder. This analysis will be undertaken 
in the next chapter. 
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Gladstone 
It is difficuh to find factors outside connectional, or at least personal, polhics to 
explain the resuhs Liz Cunningham achieved in Gladstone in 1992 and 1995. 
However, her resuh in 1998 was supported by One Nation's decision not to mn in 
Gladstone, and twice in her political career she has been the beneficiary of pohtical 
circumstances, without which her career may not have progressed. 
Political Circumstances 
The first of these circumstances came in 1992 when, shortly after her election as 
Calliope Chairman, Cunningham was called upon to defend the Shire's existence 
before PCEAR hearings. Prior to that, she had been a maverick on the council, 
ostracised by other councillors and unpopular among the council members as a result 
of her recent electoral campaign, which was strongly critical ofthe Council. However 
her leadership and effort as the community "champion" changed her relationships on 
the council dramatically: 
One councillor at the time said it was no secret that Liz faced 
hostility and opposition from fellow councillors because of her 
earlier activities. "But within months, her brilliant advocacy 
against amalgamation recommendations won her the full 
respect ofcouncU, " he said. "We could not believe how well 
she handled herself."' 
Gladstone Observer 11 June 1998 
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Had the beginning of her tenure as Chairman not coincided with the PCEAR hearings, 
it is probable that Cunningham would have remained an outsider on the council, and 
that she would have left public life, based on her assertion that she was either going to 
"change that [Council] culture or get out."'^  
The second political circumstance which assisted Cunningham was the outcome of 
the 1995 election, particularly after the Mundingburra election in 1996. While the 
statements of Bennett and DeLacy, decrying the utility of Independents, may have 
lent additional support to Cuimingham because of their ad hominem nature (or, at 
least, because they were presented in the media as having that nature), they were 
nonetheless correct according to Queensland political history. The Legislative 
Assembly has been dominated by party politics since the rise ofthe party system, and 
the party numbers ofthe floor ofthe Assembly have decided the course of state 
politics. Labor's claims that an independent would be ineffective in Parliament 
because they lacked access to the resources of Govemment were, based on all 
previous experience, entirely accurate, and based on that experience, all Cunningham 
could offer was vocal, and local, advocacy. In her response, Cunningham stated 
somewhat prophetically that "an independent could provide the balance of power in a 
govemment even without being in Caucus" but realistically, the odds of her doing so 
were extremely slim. In the event, she did in fact hold the balance of power in the 
Legislative Assembly and, as a result, was able to maintain a central role in state 
politics 1996 - 1998, which in tum probably increased her support in the 1998 
Gladstone Observer 11 June 1998 
^ Gladstone Observer 12 July 1995 
239 
election. It was almost unfathomably lucky for Cunningham that she took her seat as 
an Independent when, for the first time since the rise ofthe Party system. Parliament 
was hung (but for her vote). 
Although h is possible that, whhout these two events occurting as and when they did, 
Cunningham may still have had a successful pohtical career, h is much more likely 
that these two instances of political fortune had a dramatic effect on her pohtical 
success. While they do not, in themselves, explain any particular portion of 
Cunnigham's vote, any assessment of her success would be hicomplete without 
considering these factors, and any attribution of her electoral support to 
connectionalism, must be moderated by consideration ofthe impact of these 
circumstances. 
One Nation in 1998 
As noted above, Gladstone, in 1998, was the only regional seat not contested by One 
Nation. In that campaign, the first contested by One Nation, the party claimed 
22.68% ofthe vote, and in the seats surrounding Gladstone, between 21.35% (Keppel) 
and 37.50% (Callide). In the nearest regional cities. One Nation claimed 29.34% 
(Bundaberg) and 25.85% (Rockhampton). It is reasonable to consider that, had One 
Nation run m Gladstone, it would have claimed between twenty and thirty percent of 
the vote, and that much of this vote would have come from Cunningham. As a result, 
Cunningham's view that had One Nation stood, this could have cost her the seat, 
appears valid. 
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One Nation was running in 1998 as an altemative to the traditional major parties. 
"The future fate of Australia need no longer be left to the cortidors of Parliament 
dominated by the major Liberal, Labor and National parties.""* Given this basic 
platform, there appeared to be little rationale in One Nation challenging Cunningham 
to risk presenting the seat to one of those major parties. This would support Zussino's 
assertion (noted in the case study) that One Nation passed over the seat in order to 
defend Cunningham. 
It therefore appears that Cunningham's 1998 cause was clearly assisted by the One 
Nation decision not to run. Of course, this factor does not explain her results in 1992, 
1995 or 2001, and her retum of 47.05% in 1998 was higher than the primary vote won 
by any One Nation candidate. 
Connectional Politics 
Connectionalism has a great capacity to explain Cunningham's success in Gladstone. 
Her political career is a textbook example of connectional politics played first at the 
local, then at the state level. The connectional analysis which will be undertaken in 
the next chapter clearly has great potential to explain a significant portion of her vote. 
Toowoomba North 
A number of plausible reasons for the large swing against the Liberals, and the 
resultant retum ofthe seat to the Nationals can be drawn from the case study. They 
"* Internet site www.onenation.com.au/about, accessed 12 January 2002 
241 
are changes to the electorate's boundaries, which introduced a new, conservative 
booth to the seat; state level issues; "celebrity" voting as a resuh of Healy's prominent 
position hi the local media, and connectional factors. 
Changes to the electoral boundaries 
The 1991 electoral redistribution, the result of a process undertaken by the Electoral 
and Administrative Review Commission (EARC), effectively ended the electoral 
malamander which had characterised Queensland for decades. Although the changes 
to Toowoomba North were minor, they were still sufficient for Kelly and Reynolds^ 
to assume that, based on 1989 results, the seat was likely to retum to the Nationals. 
Flynn certainly took the view that the new booths (an in particular the booth of 
Toowoomba Preparatory School) had cost him victory^. On an initial assessment, 
Flynn's claims seem to have some merit. Healy won by 199 votes, a net gain of 564 
votes from the 1989 loss. The Toowoomba Preparatory School booth recorded 422 
votes for Healy, a further 164 for Lang, and just 246 for Flynn. This indicates a gain 
to Healy, after preferences, of 340 votes, less any Liberal leakage. Clearly, m such a 
tight election, these 340 votes were critical to Healy's success. However, voters hi 
this booth were also subject to all ofthe other factors discussed in this analysis, so h 
may not be valid to assume that the full 340 vote gain occurred as a resuh ofthe 
changed boundary. Had it not been for the other factors discussed below, the National 
vote m this seat may have been lower. Despite this caveat, the addhion ofthe 
Toowoomba Preparatory School booth was clearly an advantage for Healy. 
' Kelly and Reynolds (1992) op cit 80 
Flynn interview 
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The Liberal Party candidacy 
As noted during the case, the most obvious characteristic ofthe outcome was the 
defection of 14.3% ofthe electorate from the Liberals to the Nationals. Given that an 
18% leakage of Liberal preferences to Labor had given Flynn victory in 1989, this 
swing of primary coalition votes towards the Nationals may have won Healy the 
election. The Liberal candidate, Lang, made virtually no impact on the campaign, and 
was preselected late, but in the last two weeks ofthe campaign she made sufficient 
effort in the local media to indicate that the campaign was more likely poorly 
managed than deliberately "dead". While a proportion ofthe voters switching from 
the Liberals back to the Nationals in 1992 were deterted by a poor Liberal campaign, 
and a proportion were possibly "retuming" Nationals who had voted Liberal in 1989 
in reprisal for the cortuption revealed in the Fhzgerald Report, there is still room to 
consider that Healy's connectional factors maximised or increased this swing. 
Celebrity voting factors 
It is possible to suggest that support for Healy may have come as "celebrhy" voting 
for a popular local radio personality. While such voting is certainly personal, h is not 
connectional, in that it does not involve a relationship between the candidate and the 
voter; the "relationship" is unidirectional. The voter may feel that they know or 
respect the candidate, but the candidate knows nothing ofthe voter. Notwithstanding 
this, the difference between connectional and "celebrity" voting is marginal, and 
probably semantic. One could suggest that every connectional candidate is a local 
celebrity to a greater or lesser degree. However, they will be treated separately at this 
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point so as to ensure that this study does not attribute, to connectionalism, results 
which emerged from another political dynamic. 
A number of factors suggest that support arising from Healy's radio career may have 
been connectional rather than (or at least, in addhion to) celebrity-based. First, the 
nature of his celebrhy must be taken mto account. Talk-back radio, by its namre, 
fosters direct interaction between the host and the listeners. Listeners who held strong 
views regarding Healy's statements, or the statements of other callers, had an 
opportunity to express those views on air, during what amounted to a conversation 
with Healy. The skills which brought him celebrity were therefore skills of involving 
and connecting with the local community. 
Second, talk-back radio also features interviews with community and state leaders, 
which often become the basis for subsequent debate among callers. When leaders (for 
example, State Ministers) appeared on the program, Healy was able to play the role of 
"local champion", arguing in favour of local community perspectives. Again, this 
form of activity is more typical of connectional politics than of "celebrity politics". 
Finally, the case reveals that Healy spent a great deal of effort during the campaign 
building up the support which existed for him within the commimity. The quotation 
used in the case is a clear example: as former listeners met him at the door and 
exclaimed "Oh! So that's what you look like!" they were personalising, through 
direct contact, the celebrity relationship. As a result, although there was a celebrhy 




Changes to the electoral boundaries and Healy's celebrhy status both appear to be 
contributors to an explanation of Healy's success. However they do not ftilly explain 
Healy's success: the boundary changes cannot explain Healy's attraction of Liberal 
votes, and Healy's celebrity status is unusually bound up with connectional activity. 
The poorly managed Liberal campaign, combined with the retum of some voters who 
sought to punish the Nationals in 1989, explain a fiirther portion ofthe vote, but room 
remains within the analysis to examine Healy's campaign for connectional influences. 
IMundingburra 
Analysis of this case is more complex than for other cases studied in this research 
because two candidates may plausibly have attracted connectional votes, and 
represent, between them, a total of three candidacies. Thus, this analysis will first 
discuss plausible explanations for the 1995 general election result, then plausible 
explanations for the 1996 by-election result. 
The 1995 General Election 
There are a number of reasons which help explain the larger-than-expected 1995 
swing against Labor. These include the impact of state level campaigning (and in 
particular the state-wide swing against Labor); the performance ofthe Goss 
Govemment; impact of Townsville-wide issues; concems over the continuing 
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viability of Davies as a member, given the pending legal action which threatened to 
bankrupt him and disqualify him from Parliamentary service; personal but non-
connectional votes obtained by Tanti; and connectional votes obtained by him. 
Impact of State Level Campaigning 
Obviously the state campaign, in totality, contributed to the outcome in 
Mundingburta, as a large proportion ofthe swing against Davies is likely to have 
reflected the overall statewide swing against Labor. However one important 
campaign difference which arose was that the Coalition had re-formed between 1992 
and 1995, so the Liberals and Nationals were not running against one another in 
Mundingburra. In 1992, distribution of National Party preferences had cost the 
Liberal candidate 843 votes (179 spillage to Davies and 664 exhausted). This equated 
to nearly 4 percent ofthe vote, and therefore obviously represents a significant 
advantage to Tanti. 
From a comparative perspective, however, this factor is less important. Three-
comered contests were avoided hi 1995 in every seat other than Barron River. As a 
result, the avoidance of leakage and exhaustion cannot explain why the swing against 
Labor in Mundingburta was higher than the swhig against Labor elsewhere. The 
formation ofthe Coalition helps explain the base swing against Labor, but not 
Mundingburta's exacerbation of that swing. 
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Performance ofthe Goss Government 
An additional global factor, intrinsically tied to the state-level campaign, was the 
performance ofthe Govemment, which had itself become the focus ofthe Coalition's 
attacks. While the Goss Govemment had continued its success in opinion polling 
throughout hs second term, Mooney noted that 
There had been, [during the previous] couple of years, a 
series of warning signs that people in local government and in 
the local community had been picking up, and this was 
exacerbated a bit by a hostile media, and smart politicking by 
Rob Borbidge, who kept painting the government as out of 
touch and aloof, or not listening. The government were seen to 
be a very good administrative unit, and it was; very good 
financial managers, and they were, but ...there were a whole 
lot of community issues here ranging from facilities for people 
with disabilities, services for those people provided by the 
state, a whole lot of health services, education services, those 
sorts of things were seen to be suffering. 
These "community issues" are different from the state-wide issues discussed above 
because they do not play out evenly across the state. Different electorates will 
respond to these concems according to their need or otherwise for these additional 
services. For some favoured electorates, service levels may have risen, while for 
Mooney Interview 
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others, they may have declined. In Townsville, Davies appeared to have few 
successes to carty into the campaign. A proposed Zmc smeher in the area had not yet 
been announced (but would later be announced during the by-election campaign and 
credit "claimed" by Mooney, Tanti and Davies), and Davies took heavy criticism for 
water charges imposed on Townsville residents for pipelme access to the Burdekin 
Dam. As a result it is plausible (but impossible to assess in the absence of exit 
polling) that service-related issues may have counted against Davies in 1995. 
Impact of Townsville-wide issues 
Townsville is divided into electorates for administrative purposes, but in reality the 
electorates of Mundingburta and Townsville combine to form the one community. 
Thus, if there were factors at play across the city, these may have been reflected in the 
outcome in Mundingburra. This observation is important because Tanti was only 
doorknocking and campaigning in Mundingburra. He did not conduct a high-profile 
campaign, and did not engage Townsville-wide issues. Tanti's Liberal colleague in 
the electorate of Townsville, Chris Mills, had run a much more low-key campaign, 
with little doorknocking (at least by comparison with Tanti) and no media presence. 
In the event, the two-party preferted swing away from Labor in Townsville was 
9.39%, within 0.03% ofthe Mundingburta swing. So h is certainly plausible to 
suggest that factors which applied across Townsville, and which had nothmg to do 
with Tanti, accounted for a substantial part ofthe swing agahist Labor. 
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Concerns about Davies 
The legal and financial concems which ultimately led the ALP to disendorse Davies 
had been public knowledge well before the campaign began, and these had certainly 
been discussed by Tanti durmg the campaign (leading to Davies issuing of a 
defamation writ, as noted during the case). Furthermore, according to Mooney, 
"there'd been some concems about his [Davies'] performance" within the Labor 
Party. While this issue exists, there is little to suggest that it became a dominant 
campaign issue. There was virtually no media coverage of Davies' financial affairs 
until he lodged his writ against Tanti, and even then media speculation was muted 
because the matter was subjudice. The issue did not properly emerge until Labor 
cited it as the reason for Davies' disendorsement. 
Personal but non-connectional votes obtained by Tanti 
The discussion as to whether Tanti was a connectional candidate will be conducted m 
the next chapter, but at this point it is worth considering whether Tanti's extensive 
doorknocking activities were connectional in nature, or simply personal. A 
connectional candidate would have, through associational activity, local govemment 
experience, social or professional prominence, a profile within the community prior to 
such a candidacy. Doorknocking, for these candidates, is an opportunity to penetrate 
further than the close, more intimate parts of their networks of influence, in order to 
supplement the connectional activity being conducted by those networks. In Tanti's 
case, however, doorknocking appears to have been a tool unto itself, and through 
' Mooney Interview 
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sheer stamina Tanti may have been able to build up personal support house by house, 
and vote by vote. These votes, which are obtained by personal contact, and which do 
not in any sense arise as a result of community connectedness, are personal without 
being connectional. In this case, given Tanti's shallow penetration of Townsville 
networks (further discussed below), h is likely that a substantial number ofthe votes 
he attracted during his doorknockmg fit the category of personal but not connectional. 
Tanti's Christianity now needs further exploration. Churches are noted as strong loci 
for associational activity which can be leveraged into connectional support. Often, 
beyond the main congregation. Churches host a series of subsidiary groups - men's 
groups, ladies' auxiliaries, study groups, youth groups and so on. Churches are also, 
by their very nature, bodies which promote a set of shared values and beliefs. 
Church-based associational connections are only valid (for the purpose of 
connectionalism) where they occur within a single congregation; that is, within a 
single voluntary association. Christian voters who welcomed and supported Tanti but 
were not of his congregation, were responding to shared values and beliefs rather than 
any associational connection. As a result, any votes obtained from these voters were 
personal (voting for another Christian) or perhaps even issue-based (given that the 
voter shared the value-orientation ofthe candidate) without being connectional. 
Summaiy 
Although received wisdom attributes much ofthe resuh m 1995 (and therefore, 
uhimately, the fall ofthe Goss Govemment) to hard work by Tanti and a dismissal by 
the electorate of traditional politics in favour of grassroots representation, in reality 
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the state-wide swing, and the performance ofthe Goss govemment m regional areas, 
was enough to account for the swing in Tanti's favour. It is extraordmary that Tanti is 
regarded as having won a significant personal vote with a two-party preferted swing 
of+9.36% while Mills, campaigning next door m Townsville, received no such 
recognition for his swing of+9.39%. In this case, there is simply no aberrant swing to 
try to analyse in connectional terms. Whilst the swing to Tanti was greater than the 
state average, it was remarkably consistent with the swing across greater Townsville. 
The 1996 By-Election 
A number of factors emerge from the case study which account both for Labor's 
failure to regain ground, and its ftirther loss of votes (2%) at the by-election. These 
include the circumstances under which Davies was disendorsed; infighting withhi 
Labor which followed dissatisfaction both with Davies' dismissal and the manner of 
Mooney's preselection; "spoiling" by independent candidates, in particular Davies; 
the opportunity for the local electorate to change the govemment; "election fatigue" 
given the number of recent and potentially forthcoming polls; the timing ofthe 
Federal election, which may have diverted attention from Mooney during the fmal 
week ofthe campaign; and the failure of Mooney to fully activate his connectional 
networks. These will be discussed in tum below, with the exception ofthe final 
explanator, which will be discussed more fully when Mooney's connectional 
credentials are discussed in the next chapter. 
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Davies' disendorsement 
There is little doubt that the disendorsement of Ken Davies was a setback for Labor's 
campaign. Whilst Tanti had been campaigning from the start of 1995 (with a 
relatively short hiatus whilst the Court of Disputed Retums heard his appeal), the new 
candidate could not begin until the very end of 1995, with little more than a month to 
campaign. Furthermore, the decision to refuse Davies' endorsement was made in 
Brisbane by state level administrators, overtuming the decision ofthe local Labor 
branches, perhaps causing resentment among Labor voters. However it is difficult to 
see any resentment being translated into a major loss of votes (Davies, running as an 
independent, attracted less than 1000 votes). The reduced campaigning tfrne for 
Mooney may have been a more important factor, as he blamed his inability to 
doorknock extensively on the fact that "there was such a short time frame over the 
Christmas period."^ Additionally, Davies' disendorsement played itself out in terms 
of infighting within Labor, and "spoiling" by Davies as an independent, both of which 
are discussed below. 
Infighting within Labor 
It is difficult to assess the impact Labor infighting may have had on Mooney's 
performance. Whilst Tanti claims that infighting occurted (noted in the case) his 
views are obviously partisan and were not cortoborated by other evidence. It is also 
clear that Queensland Labor was well aware that govemment was at stake in the by-
election and that Labor volunteers came from all around the state to participate in the 
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campaign. Mooney was short neither on volunteers to assist his door-to-door 
campaigning, nor on volunteers to hand out how-to-vote cards. Additionally, the 
media made no further reference to any Labor in-fighting once the initial drama of 
Davies' disendorsement had passed. As a result this factor is at best a marginal 
explanator, if indeed it is one at all. 
"Spoiling" by Independent Candidates 
Ahhough there were a large number of independent candidates (ten) contesting the 
election, most of them had no impact at all upon the campaign, other than to raise 
diversionary issues which severely disrupted Mooney's campaign. This did have an 
impact, which is discussed in more detail in the next chapter. Two independents 
stood out: Davies, for one, "cropped up and stayed up."*° He had no expectation of 
winning the seat, but every intention of ensuring that Labor did not. Another 
candidate, Sandy Warten (whom Mooney cites as a Liberal "planf **), provided no 
more than nuisance value until the official Labor launch, when he "snuck in through 
the toilets and verbally attacked Premier Wayne Goss for betraying the building 
industry. He was quickly removed." However even these two "spoilers" were no 
more than a distraction from the main contest between Tanti and Mooney. 
The Opportunity for the Electorate to Change the Government 
'° Young and Tanti (1999) op cit 48 
Mooney Interview 
'^  Townsville Bulletin 15 January 1996 
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Although both major candidates professed a desire to run a "local" campaign, the 
Mundingburta by-election was clearly never going to be such a contest. Every person 
in Mundingburta knew that the outcome ofthe by-election would decide the fate of 
the Govemment, and for a time, Mundingburra was the focus of all pohtical attention 
in Queensland*^ Given that Townsville residents had suffered "many years of 
neglect, by various state governments"*'*, the pohtical focus and attendant pork-
bartellfrig was welcomed by the locals. As a resuh, h is possible that Mundingburra 
electors, faced with the opportunhy to demonstrate their pohtical authorhy by 
dismisshig a Govemment, simply could not help doing so. Immediately fohowing the 
general election, the Townsville Bulletin had carried the headlhie "CLIFFHANGER -
Mundingburra Holds the Key!" with the first line "About 3500 postal votes in the seat 
of Mundingburra could hold the key to the outcome of Saturday's State Election." 
It is clear that being within the electorate which "holds the key" to the formation of 
govemment was valued by Mundingburra electors. 
Although this reason initially appears quite flippant, voters are capable of voting 
flippantly, so this explanator cannot be disregarded. In interviews, neither Mooney 
nor Tanti conceded that this may have been a factor. In the absence of direct data, h 
is not possible to draw any conclusions regarding the impact of this opportunity, but it 
remains a possibility. 
Young and Tanti (1999, op cit) cite the amusing example of a prominently-positioned car dealership 
which displayed the sign "Welcome to Mundingburra, the political capital of Australia!" durmg the 
campaign, (p. 11) 
''' Mooney interview. C/Chapter 3 above. 
'^  Townsville Bulletin 17 July 1995 
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'Election Fatigue " 
In January 1996, Mundingburra residents had recently voted in a state general 
election, and were faced with a formal state by-election and an informal federal 
election campaign. Labor initially tried to utilise potential "election fatigue" in order 
to influence the vote. Kaiser said that "It is important for the people of Mundingburta 
to realise that a Liberal win in this by-election would mean a hung Parliament ... 
[which] would make Parliament unworkable [and] make the govemment 
unworkable."*^ The media took this as a threat to hold a new general election, and 
initially the electorate's disinclination to face yet another poll may have given Labor 
an advantage. However, by preselecting Mooney, Labor allowed Tanti to counter 
with the argument that if Mooney won, there would be a Mayoral by-election. As a 
result these two potential elections balanced one another, leaving neither side with the 
advantage. It is difficult to maintain that "election fatigue", or the desire to avoid 
ftiture polls, was significant. 
Timing ofthe Federal Election 
As noted in the case, Mooney considered the timing of Prime Minister Keating's 
election announcement to have been a prime factor in the loss of Mundingburta, citing 
as evidence intemal Labor polling. Given that the Keating Labor govemment was 
defeated in the 1996 federal election, pro-Liberal federal sentiment may have 
reinforced the Liberal vote in Mundingburra. However for the by-election, Mooney's 
point does not seem valid. Although there was some national and state media 
'* Townsville Bulletin 9 December 1995 
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diversion from Mundingburta (something of a tendency to use Mundhigburta as a 
"barometer" of sentiment prior to the federal election), the local media remained 
firmly focussed on Mundmgburra, with Townsville being served by two local 
television news services, several local radio stations and a daily newspaper. Further, 
Mooney claims that he "gave up" doorknocking hi the final week before the election 
because voters were focussed elsewhere. However such doorknocking activhy does 
not rely upon media attention. It is interesting that, having adroitiy kept separate his 
local govemment experience and state govemment ambitions, Mooney was unable to 
separate the concurtent state and federal campaigns. It is difficult to concur with 
Mooney's view that the timing ofthe federal election was a decisive factor. 
Summary 
It is more difficult to identify likely non-connectional explanators for 1996 than for 
1995, but this is principally because the swing to be explained is just 2%. Infighting 
within Labor, "spoiling" by independent candidates other than Davies, "election 
fatigue" and the timing ofthe federal election, do not appear to be useful arguments to 
explain this additional swing. Residual anger at the handling of Davies' 
disendorsement, and Davies himself during the campaign, may have contributed to 
the outcome, but the most likely explanator to have influenced the resuh h the sudden 
capacity of Mundingburra residents to topple the govemment. However, h is difficuh 
(from the quantitative perspective of these case studies) to endeavour to explain 




Aside from connectionalism, there is only one political driver which can plausibly 
account for Kingston's success in 1998 - the general tide of votes for Hanson and her 
party which delivered One Nation a quarter of all votes cast in 1998. This analysis 
will seek to determine whether Kingston was simply the local beneficiary ofthe 
"Hanson Phenomenon" or whether he also obtained connectional support. 
Support for Hanson 
There can be no doubt that a substantial portion of Kingston's vote in 1998 was 
actually a vote for Pauline Hanson. As noted during the case, Kingston's introduction 
to One Nation came during a rally addressed by Hanson, and well attended by 
Maryborough locals. One Nation had a strong and enthusiastic branch in 
Maryborough, and Kingston was preselected ahead of four other nominees. It is clear, 
then, that the groundswell of activism and support which emerged widely in regional 
Queensland for One Nation in 1998 was reflected in Maryborough. It follows that 
much ofthe support Kingston received in 1998 was in fact support for One Nation, or 
more directly, support for Pauline Hanson. Regional support for Hanson and One 
Nation stood at 33.79% in Hervey Bay and 37.5% in Callide. It is likely, therefore, 
that the vote for One Nation accounted for between 30 and 35% of Kingston's 
42.56% primary vote. This still leaves a substantial portion ofthe vote unaccounted 
for, and potentially open to explanation as a connectional vote. 
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Connectionalism 
As with the other case studies undertaken for this thesis, the series of criteria outlined 
in Chapter FV give some guide as to whether the unaccounted-for portion of 
Kfrigston's vote might have been obtained as a result of connectional politics. These 
factors are considered in the next chapter. 
Summary 
The most striking outcome ofthe series of analyses presented in this chapter is that 
election resuhs are the compound outcome of a range of mfluential factors, which 
interact with one another and compete for influence over the voter. None ofthe case 
studies present a "pure" case of connectional politics. Gladstone came close, but even 
the outcome in Gladstone was subject to electoral circumstances which were beyond 
Cunningham's control. 
The approach taken in this chapter was to identify and consider a number of 
influential factors which had an impact on the cases studied in the previous chapter. 
These factors were considered discretely, to determine whether they were, in fact, 
present, and to try to gauge some general appreciation ofthe size of their impact. 
There was no attempt to effectively measure the relative strength of their influence. 
In order to do so (and hence, in order to gain a complete picture ofthe reasons for the 
election outcome) a theoretical device such as the Funnel of Causality is vital. The 
basic premise underpinning the Funnel, that election outcomes are the result of a 
congeries of factors influencing the voter over an extended period of time, appears 
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bome out by this research. The result is that some form of compound model - the 
Funnel of Causahty, the Lifetime Leaming Model, or some other - is necessary in 
order to fully understand the voting outcome. Further analysis m Chapter 9 will 
therefore be guided by the use ofthe Funnel of Causality as a theoretical model. 
This discussion ofthe various influences on voting also underscores the importance of 
maintaining a realistic perspective regarding the potential for connectional politics to 
explain electoral outcomes. However this discussion also indicates that, in each case, 
there remain unexplained electoral dynamics which may be attributed to connectional 
factors. The purpose ofthe next two chapters is to undertake that analysis. The next 
chapter will use the indicators developed in Chapter 5 as a framework for analysing 
connectional factors in the case studies, and the following chapter will draw out the 
most important findings from the case study approach. 
259 
CHAPTER 8 - ANALYSIS O F CONNECTIONAL 
FACTORS 
In Chapter 5, a series of connectional indicators were drawn from Reynolds' paper. 
Those eighteen indicators encompass three broad categories: mdicators relating to the 
candidate; to the town or electorate and to the electoral circumstances for each 
relevant election. These indicators were then discussed in some detail, and were 
proposed as a framework to guide the analysis ofthe selected case studies. In this 
chapter, the framework of indicators will be applied to the case studies to determine 
whether connectional politics was a factor in them, and in order to ascertain more 
about the nature and operation of connectional campaigning. 
The previous two chapters have set the scene for this analysis. Chapter 6 provided the 
cases themselves, in nartative form, presenting the data obtained from the studies. 
Analysis featured in the last chapter, concentrating on influential factors other than 
connectionalism. This analysis demonstrated that all ofthe campaigns were, to 
varying degrees, affected by electoral hifluences other than connectionalism. As a 
result, the capachy of connectionalism to explain the outcomes is constrained to being 
among many influential factors. However the last chapter also indicated that the 
various cases (with the possible exception of Tanti in the general election of 1995) 
were not fully explained by such non-connectional factors, fr is therefore possible 
that connectional polhics may explain some or all ofthe margin between a curtent and 
a complete understanduig of those electoral outcomes. 
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This chapter will deal sequentially with each ofthe indicators, applyhig them to the 
group of cases and drawing illustrative examples from each as appropriate. Thus, in 
the final chapter, the results of this research can be discussed with the theoretical 
perspectives, to build a picture of connectionalism in recent Queensland politics. 
Indicators Focussing on the Candidate 
1. The candidate must be high profile and well regarded locally 
Chapter 5 suggested that this indicator is absolutely fundamental to connectional 
politics, and this appears to have been bome out by the cases. In each case studied, 
there was at least one candidate who was both well known and highly regarded within 
the local community, and in each case that candidate used their profile and high 
regard as the basis of their campaign. It is very difficult to imagine that a candidate 
lacking either a high profile or positive regard could find ways to rally community 
support in the manner observed in the case studies. 
However the means by which the candidates established their profile and high regard 
varied widely. Ryan, in Caims, developed something of a profile as a senior army 
officer, particularly during his service in 51 RQR, the Far North Queensland 
Regiment. As an Army Reserve unit, the personnel under Ryan's command were not 
professional soldiers, but came from many walks of life, thus his profile as a senior 
officer was not confined to the defence communhy, but fihered through the general 
commimity. Upon retuming to Caims approximately one year later, Ryan's 
involvement in both communhy associations and in the Caims Civic Association 
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(including a brief candidacy) gave him addhional opportunities to raise this profile. 
Finally, as an insurance broker, Ryan was regularly involved with the Caims business 
community, further enhancing his profile. During interviews, both May and De Lacy 
recognised that Ryan had an established profile prior to his candidacy. 
In Toowoomba, Healy's position as a talk-back radio host made him extremely high-
profile within the communhy, and the fact that his radio program was consistently the 
top-rating program (in its time-slot) for Toowoomba further indicates that he was 
well-regarded. 
Cunningham, Mooney and Kingston all obtained their profile and esteem through 
local govemment. By the time of Cunningham's first two state campaigns in 1992 and 
1995, she had held public office in Calliope for four and seven years respectively, and 
had previously been actively involved in a vocal community group. She had also 
been the Council Chairman/Mayor since 1991. All of these factors accounted for her 
high profile. Prior to 1992 she had a rising profile, but was not necessarily well 
regarded locally. She was a fmstrated maverick during her three years as a Calliope 
Councillor, and faced hostility from other councillors as she assumed the role of 
Chairman. However, as noted, she became very well regarded during the process of 
defending, before PCEAR, Calliope's right to exist independently of Gladstone. This 
good regard was demonstrated in 1994 when she was re-elected unopposed as Mayor. 
As a resuh, by the 1995 election, Cunningham was certainly high profile and weh-
regarded locally. 
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It is difficuh to imagine a connectional candidate satisfying this indicator more fiilly 
than Mooney. Mayor for nearly a decade, and Councillor for nearly two, he had been 
a prominent figure in public life in Townsville for a long period, and, as Mayor, 
ensured that he engaged personally with a wide range of groups. He met everyone 
from business groups to neighbourhood groups, and pioneered concepts such as "civic 
cabinet" meetings (where council sat in suburbs rather than city hall). 
Kingston's family pharmacies were well known in Maryborough, having been 
established by his father. Kingston was also a veterinarian in a mral community, had 
farms in the local area, and had just completed twelve months on the local council.: 
I'd have been a lot better known than David' before the 
election, so there 'd be a lot of work that David would have to 
do to get himself known that 1 wouldn't have to do. 1 guess 1 
had the profile, maybe not the profile as a parliamentarian, but 
the profile just as a person. I'm well known to all the rural 
producers because I'm a rural producer, and I've got some 
expertise in those areas, but I'm also known to the business 
community because I ran retail businesses here.' 
The only case study candidate who did not appear to have a high profile or high local 
regard was Tanti. He had a very limited range of contacts through his church and 
dancing association membership, had held a range of transient jobs (usually in sales). 
' David Dalgleish, successful One Nation candidate for Hervey Bay in 1998. 
Kingston Interview 
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and had no involvement in public life other than his unsuccessful local govemment 
candidacy in 1994. 
2. The candidate must be a "local" 
Chapter 5 drew a distinction between this indicator and the previous one on the basis 
that while the three characteristics (high profile, high regard and community 
membership) are often likely to be found together, they are not always so. The 
example of a high-profile, well regarded but ultimately transient school principal was 
offered. 
In the cases, Mooney and Healy best satisfy this indicator. They are both life-long 
residents of their respective towns. Profiling Mooney, the Townsville Bulletin 
reported that "Mr Mooney has had plenty of time to get to know the people of 
Townsville, having been on the Council since 1977. What he has leamed in his years 
of public life is that h is issues and achievements, not gossip and mud-slinging, which 
people consider important when they visit the ballot box."^ 
Cunningham is very nearly as well-credentialled in terms of this mdicator. She was 
not bom and bred m Calliope, but had been there for fifteen years m 1992, and was 
married to a long-time local who was involved in local industry. 
Kingston's case is interestmg, because although he grew up in Maryborough, he 
finished school in Southport and then attended university m Brisbane, and has spent 
Townsvihe BuUetin 26 January 1996 
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considerable periods of time working overseas. However Maryborough "has always 
been a base""* and he had always owned farms there, then was elected to local 
govemment. It appears that Kingston's local credentials were in fact strong enough 
that they endured, desphe periods of absence from the electorate. 
Imtially, Ryan appears to struggle to meet the requirements of this indicator. He was 
brought up in Melboume, and spent periods of his working life in Vietnam, Papua 
New Guinea, Perth and Canberra, besides several periods in Townsville and Caims. 
On this basis he came to Caims as a spiralist^, moving to the city to take a promotion 
again, and moving on a few years later. Upon release from the army, he retumed to 
Caims in 1988, and conducted this campaign just four years later. Furthermore, he 
was facing an incumbent who was a genuine, long-term "local." Ryan noted that "he 
was a long-time resident, 1 was relatively new, and 1 know that counted against me in 
the eyes of many ofthe locals, the fact that I was seen as a bit of a Johnny-come-
lately."^ 
Such negative results are mitigated by three factors. First, Ryan demonstrated 
obvious commitment to Caims by retuming to the city voluntarily once his military 
service ended. Second, he quickly became highly involved in a number of 
community associations which would have brought him into contact with many 
"locals". In addition, the "local" element of Caims represented just one side ofthe 
local/newcomer social cleavage observed above. For the other newcomers, the notion 
of a "local" may have related less to the length of time spent hi the city, and more to 
'' Correspondence, 19 December 2001 
' See Chapter 4 for an explanation of this term. 
Ryan Interview 
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the commitment demonstrated to the community. 
On balance, De Lacy is much more likely to have benefited from any "local" 
preference, but Ryan had sufficient local credibility to prevent any serious 
consequences from the fact that he was, as he put h, "Johnny-come-lately." 
Finally, Tanti struggles with this indicator. He was neither bom nor raised in North 
Queensland, and though by 1996 he had spent 14 years in North Queensland, only 
five had been in Townsville. 
3. The candidate must identify, and be seen to champion, local parochial concerns 
This criterion also emerged very strongly through the case studies. All ofthe 
successful connectional candidates identified and championed local concems prior to 
and during their campaigns. 
In Toowoomba, Healy's position as a radio announcer gave him excellent 
opportunities to do this for several years leading up to his formal candidacy. When he 
began campaigning in 1992, he continued this approach. His signature issue, the need 
for a high school at Wilsonton, was the perfect issue for a local "champion". It was a 
strong concem locally, had been promised for many years, and could be held up as an 
example of Brisbane's (and, by extension, the Labor govemment's) lack of concem 
for Toowoomba. Although Labor also publicly supported the new high school less 
than a fortnight from the polling day, this issue was never the focus ofthe Labor 
campaign, as h was for Healy. 
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Cunningham's defence of Calliope before PCEAR is extremely strong evidence of her 
satisfaction of this indicator. This cause attracted several hundred people to protest at 
the hearmgs, yet h was Cunningham who stood before the committee to lead the 
defence ofthe town. In this case she clearly championed local parochial concems. 
Later hi her career, however, this continued, and was particularly evident when she 
cited her reasons for denying parliamentary confidence to Goss and offering it instead 
to Borbidge. Her list of local concems - police, schools, a leaking hospital roof- as 
sufficiently strong reasons to topple a govemment can clearly be seen as Cunningham 
championing those local issues at the highest level. 
The best example of this in Maryborough relates to the issue ofthe proposed prison. 
Although, as noted in the case, there was sporadic resistance to the project from some 
areas ofthe community, the consensus view in the community was that the location of 
the prison near Maryborough would bring significant development investment and 
ongoing employment opportunities. When the prison arose as an issue in the 1998 
state election, it was supported by all candidates. Debate focussed on whether 
Maryborough's bid for the prison would be successftil, and how much each major 
party would invest in the region, rather than whether the prison should be located near 
Maryborough or not . Kingston had been in the public eye as a driver of 
Maryborough's prison submission and therefore as a proponent of this widely-
accepted public issue. 
The prison submission was successful, and a 500 bed, $97 Million prison is due to open near 
Maryborough in 2002 [Qld Department of Correctional Services Annual Report 1999-2000 7] 
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In Mundingburta, both candidates respond well to this indicator. As noted in the case, 
Tanti identified and utilised "micro-issues" during his campaign whilst explichly 
withdrawing from consideration of larger issues. His tactic of claiming some credh 
for the new projects which Labor announced during the campaigns was higenious and 
may have contributed to the perception that he could champion local issues. 
As Mayor durhig the entire tenure ofthe Labor govemment, Mooney (often alongside 
Davies) had been seen to be fighting, and wfrming, for Townsville: 
[Mooney] hopes that his role in Townsville's growing 
prosperity will translate into votes. The Entertainment 
Centre, Stockland Stadium, the Oncology Unit at Townsville 
General Hospital, the Korea Zinc Refinery - Mr Mooney has 
played a part in all. Even his Liberal opponent Frank Tanti 
Q 
has admitted that these are good for Townsville. 
Mooney's early campaign rhetoric appeared to claim defiantly the right to speak his 
mind to Premier Goss on issues affecting the North. This was an obvious attempt to 
portray him as a local champion. 
Finally, hi Caims, Ryan certainly identified and became the champion ofthe local 
law-and-order issue, bringing this state-wide focus to local prominence by proposing 
populist responses. For instance, the suggestion of a police reserve was clearly 
predicated upon his experiences a leader of reserve formations in the army, adapted to 
Townsville Bulletin 26 January 1996 
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provide a unique proposal for a solution to Caims' perceived crime problem. This 
proposed solution had several advantages, all of which speak to a populist response to 
the issue of crime. First, the proposed solution was distinctly community-based. 
Recmits to the Police Reserve would be drawn from the local community, allowing 
the community as a whole to respond actively to confront a problem which the State 
govemment, accordmg to the populist rhetoric Ryan employed, had been unwilling to 
address sufficiently. This dynamic emphasised the "us versus them" political 
dynamic characteristic of populist - and connectional - leaders, and did so in a way 
which appeared to be a direct, short term, tangible response. 
Furthermore, the ALP may have made a tactical ertor in having Goss announce the 
nine-point-plan which, as a long-term preventative plan, appeared weak next to 
Ryan's short-term, active plan in the eyes of voters who were angry over current 
events including criminal activity. This gave Ryan the opportunity to further present 
himself as an opponent of state-level "softly softly^" policies which were in his view 
unsuitable for Caims. His newspaper advertisements emphasised this dynamic, 
headlmed "Kel Ryan - An Ordinary Bloke Who's Had a Gutfull."*° 
More interesting was Ryan's recognition that the issue of "kickbacks," was not 
suitable for his campaign. As the issue split the Caims business community, it would 
have been near-impossible for him to use it as a vehicle to present himself as a 
champion of local concems. Rather, he would have been cast as the champion of one 
group of Caims residents, set against others. In this case, therefore, the issue Ryan 
Ryan Interview 
"* Cairns Post 18 September 1992 
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avoided is as important as the issue he espoused. 
4. The candidate must identify more as a local politician than as a local 
representative of a political party. 
This indicator emerged as quhe important during the cases. While most ofthe 
candidates cartied a party label, and campaigned withhi the general bounds ofthe 
relevant party's state level campaign, the local flavour of their campaigns was almost 
entirely based upon the candidate's personal character. 
This indicator was most fully satisfied, of course, by Cuimingham, who campaigned 
as an Independent and employed anti-party rhetoric duruig the campaign. Clearly, she 
was not the local representative of a political party, and her history in local 
govemment goes some way towards demonstrating her identification as a local 
politician. The reasons she cites for contesting a state seat - that there needed to be a 
local govemment voice in state politics - provide additional evidence in support of 
this indicator. 
Kingston satisfies this criterion in a rather different manner. His initial partisan 
commhment was to the National Party. He then stood for One Nation, and has shice 
won as an Independent. This partisan mobility hi itself suggests a party label lightly 
wom. During the 1998 general election he obviously benefited from One Nation's 
electoral support, but the case reveals that he campaigned on his own, rather than 
It is interesting at this point to recall that Gilbert Alison, the former Member for Maryborough, was 
elected for both the Liberals and the Nationals. 
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simply adopting the One Nation strategies. His narrow victory as an Independent in 
2001, despite the strength ofthe swing towards Labor across the state, emphasises 
that the electorate saw Khigston as a local polhician. 
While Healy campaigned as a National, his satisfaction of this crherion can most 
clearly been seen hi that he jouied the Nationals just one year before the poll; and that 
at preselection he won a contest which was clearly between a local without party 
history (Healy), and a local newcomer who was a party stalwart. Had party service 
been, in 1992, the critical factor for the Nationals in Toowoomba North, Healy would 
not have been preselected. As noted above, Healy stated in interview that "I wanted 
1 -^  
to join a political party, that's all I wanted to do at that stage." During the 
conversation he clarified that, at the time of his conversation with Mike Horan, 
(discussed above) about joining the Nationals, he had still not decided which party to 
join. The actual party was less important that this stage than his desire to become 
politically active in and for Toowoomba North. 
Ryan's first political mvolvement after moving to Caims was with the Caims Civic 
Association, which was loosely Liberal in character, but not a party formation. 
Following the 1991 council elections, Ryan seems to have joined the Liberal Party 
more through a motivation for political involvement than from a pervasive 
commitment to Liberal ideology or political values. Furthermore, the Liberal Party's 
apparent ignorance ofthe details ofthe Caims campaign may have helped Ryan. If he 
had been constantly "shadowed" by senior party players, his reliance on the party 




campaign, with the objective of being elected and, consequentially, of raising the 
profile ofthe Liberals. The party tag was not then fully utilised as an electioneermg 
device. 
In Mundingburra, this indicator delivers Tanti his first real advantage against 
Mooney. Tanti's entire approach, including the use of doorknocking as his basic tool, 
reinforced his intention to be a "grassroots" candidate. His lack of knowledge about 
Liberal policy, and his switch from the National Party (of which he was a Life 
Member), both contributed to a perception that, while Tanti stood for the Liberals, he 
was not bound by party politics. 
Mooney satisfied this indicator less clearly. Whilst he was clearly identified as a 
Labor member, he had (in his role as Mayor) attacked the Goss govemment in the 
past, and as noted above, claimed the right to do so as a state member. The manner of 
Mooney's preselection may, however, have somewhat tamished this perception, as 
did the comments of Senator Reynolds, identifying him as the "favourite son of 
Brisbane."*^ 
5. The candidate must have extensive local networks developed through their 
profession, voluntary organisation activity, local government experience, or state 
government incumbency. 
As noted m chapter 5, this indicator was central to Reynolds' mhial discussion of 
connectional polhics, and this centrality was supported by the case studies. In every 
Townsville Bulletin, 16 December 1995, op cit 
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case, the candidate was supported by a pre-established network of relationships within 
the community. During the case studies, these networks emerged as important for 
two reasons: they provided practical assistance (for instance a supply of booth 
workers for election day) and a more intangible development of support by word of 
mouth. 
This was Ryan's strongest indicator. Professionally, his profile as an army officer 
was high because the soldiers under his command were reservists, and were therefore 
placed throughout the communhy and not confined to a particular military sub-
communhy. As an insurance broker he came into contact with elements ofthe Caims 
business community. Ryan was clearly active in voluntary organisations such as the 
RSL, Legacy, and the P&F, and quickly assumed leadership positions in all. 
Importantly, Ryan did not press for leadership positions, but was invited by more 
longstanding members to take such leadership roles. In fact, Ryan was not even a 
member ofthe RSL when he was approached by the sub-branch President to stand as 
sub-branch treasurer.*'* 
Healy in Toowoomba North satisfies this indicator, primarily as a result of his 
professional activities. "Over a five year period of doing talkback, you got to leam a 
lot about what was happening around the traps. [...] I probably got to know a 
significant part ofthe city ... it was useful, and I had a lot of good contacts from [my 
radio career]."*^ In addition, Healy was involved in a number of community groups, 




of support, particularly people to work for me on election day, from a lot of those 
»16 
groups. 
Cunningham, through her involvement in the Rate and Taxpayers Association, and 
then her involvement in local govemment, had fairly extensive networks in Calliope 
Shire. These networks were substantially in place by 1992 and were strengthened in 
1995. "That's the only way independents get to be known, because of what they do 
either through organisations or on their own, working with and for people." 
However, prior to her taking the seat in 1995, it is not clear that she had well-
developed networks in Gladstone. Therefore this indicator is strongly present for the 
Callide component ofthe electorate, but somewhat weaker for the Gladstone 
component, as an analysis of her support in the Gladstone and non-Gladstone booths 
indicates. 
Kingston's local networks certainly exist, but are not as clear as in some ofthe other 
cases undertaken in this thesis. As he has had a "fruh salad" career, undertaking a 
number of activhies, often concurrently, his total network includes contacts developed 
through his retail business, his membership ofthe farming community and his 
involvement in local govemment. This may however also have had advantages, as 
Kingston's networks extended into various areas ofthe Maryborough communhy. As 
a resuh, he meets this indicator. 
Tanti's failure to respond to this indicator is crhical. As noted m the Mundingburta 
Ryan Interview 
17 Cunningham Interview 
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case, he did not have well-developed community networks, and as a result he was 
unable to use these to establish support for his candidacy. While dawn-to-dusk 
doorknocking may impress the party hierarchy and promote comment hi the media, in 
reality it is a highly inefficient way to campaign. However, in the absence of personal 
networks to carty his message, or fundhig for media campaigns, Tanti had few 
options. As a result (and as noted above) votes he obtained by doorknocking may 
have been personal, that is, votes cast for the candidate qua candidate rather than as a 
proxy for his party. The low base level of Liberal support in Mundingburra was 
reflected by Tanti's comprehensive loss in the 1998 election, and by the failure ofthe 
Liberals to mount a serious challenge in 2001. Mooney, on the other hand, had 
substantial networks in place coming into the campaign, and clearly demonstrates this 
indicator. 
6. Candidates may exhibit maverick qualities, even opposing their own party when in 
govemment. 
For a non-connectional candidate, the practical reasons for maintaining party 
discipline are simple - most voters voted for them because of their party label. Those 
votes are an expression of support for the party rather than the individual; so the 
Member can only be secure while holding party endorsement. The price for party 
endorsement m Queensland as elsewhere in Australia is, inevitably, adherence to 
party discipline. 
For the connectional candidate, however, this argument is less strong. Most 
connectional candidates have benefited to a substantial extent from their party's base 
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vote, but they also obtain votes which a non-connectional candidate may be unable to 
deliver, fr may be that, m order to protect (or, in fact, to gain) those votes, they must 
abandon, usually on certain critical issues, some elements of party disciplhie. 
While the theory behind this indicator is sound, it was not demonstrated to any 
significant extent by any ofthe cases undertaken for the present research, principally 
because this indicator was developed primarily for sittmg (usually Govemment) 
members rather than candidates. Such incumbents feature more heavily in Reynolds' 
cases than in the case studies presented above. 
Healy, in Toowoomba North, was not, either during the 1992 campaign or during his 
nine years in office, a noted maverick in the public eye. However, he claims that 
when the Coalition made proposals likely to be detrimental to Toowoomba, he was 
able to influence outcomes without doing so publicly. 
Iwas able to successfully use my lobbying powers and the 
Party Room ...to convince my colleagues that what they were 
doing was not good for my electorate. You 've got to 
remember, too, 1 had a bit of pull in 92. 1 had a marginal seat, 
the second most marginal seat in the state. When you 've got a 
marginal seat, and the party doesn't want to lose that seat, 1 
think that there's always the chance that they 're going to look 
after the sitting member.'^ 
18 Healy Interview 
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Having said that, he was able to finally oversee the building ofthe high school at 
Wilsonton because of an implied threat of maverick activhy. "1 dragged the 
Opposition Leader and then-Shadow Treasurer to Toowoomba before that 95 election, 
and 1 said "this is where I want the school built." There was so much opposition to h 
because the bureaucrats didn't want it built, and we fought and fought and fought, but 
in the end Borbidge as Premier knew that he'd made a commitment to me in front of a 
lot of people, so we got that built."*^ 
7. Many candidates have local government experience and transfer this political 
style to the state level. 
This indicator was extremely well demonstrated during the cases: only Graham Healy 
lacked experience in local govemment. The others had, at the very least, experience 
of local govemment campaigns. 
Tony Mooney in Mundingburra had an extensive history of local govemment 
involvement, and was undoubtedly preselected to bring this style to the state 
campaign. He was both popular and experienced in local govemment. However he 
failed to convert this support to the state arena, and became diverted by state-level 
issues and relatively inconsequential matters raised by independent candidates. 
Cunningham clearly satisfies this criterion, having progressively moved from a lobby 
group, into local govemment as a councillor, then to the Mayoral position, then finally 
into parliament. By the time of her election to state parliament in 1995 she had been 
Healy Interview 
111 
in the Calliope shire council for seven years, four of those as Mayor. When she 
moved into state parliament, she largely retained the pohtical style she had developed 
in local govemment - she was still nominally the Mayor of Calliope when she won the 
seat of Gladstone, and campaigned in both 1992 and 1995 while performmg the duties 
of Mayor. Once she had taken up parliamentary duties she retained a focus on local 
amenities and services, developed during her local govemment activity. 
Kingston had some involvement in the local council, though only for one year prior to 
his election to Parliament. Although this period was brief, he appears to have 
transferred some elements of his pohtical style to the state arena - he campaigned in a 
low-key, almost fatalistic manner both for the local council and the state Parliament, 
relying on his local profile to wm him support. His approach to local council 
membership appears to have been instrumental - pursuing prisons and defending 
hospitals - and again, this approach was transferted to the state arena. 
Tanti had run for local office in 1994, and developed the campaigning style he was to 
use in 1995 and 1996 - exhaustive doorknocking and a focus on micro-issues. In a 
sense, Tanti's campaigns in 1995 and 1996 might be analysed as local govemment 
campaigns on a wider scale, as he rarely engaged state level issues at all. 
Ryan's local govemment experience was limited to organising the Caims Civic 
Association campaign in 1991, but this experience inspired his foray into state 
politics, and provided a basis of experience for the state campaign. During the 1992 
state campaign, Ryan conducted a campaign which drew upon the experiences and 
personnel of 1991, endeavouring to translate them into state politics. 
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Indicators Focussing on the Town 
1. The town must have a distinctive ethos and identity, with its own social networks 
and historical tradition. 
Duruig the cases this indicator emerged as important, but was not as clear-cut as 
initially expected. First, it is difficult to gauge whether a town would meet this 
criterion; most towns would probably claim to do so, and it is difficult to proceed 
beyond the most subjective levels of analysis. However even at this level, all the 
towns studied demonstrated, at a community level, a sense of "self which had the 
potential to be politicised. 
Toowoomba certainly has a disthictive ethos and identhy. As noted in Chapter 3, 
Toowoomba and the Darling Downs generally, are excellent examples ofthe 
decentralisation which characterises Queensland political culture. Brisbane, where 
relevant at all to the early development of Toowoomba, was a competitor rather than a 
capital. Although modem transport has nartOwed the physical gap between 
Toowoomba and Brisbane, the Toowoomba City Council website still clahns the title 
of the regional capital for the Darling Downs"^* .^ Healy states that: 
It's a very prosperous city, mainly because we 're surrounded by 
some pretty good rural land, and the economy in the city's 
always been good, plus we 've now got a university which is 
20 Internet site http://www.toowoomba.qld.gov.au/ accessed 16 November 2001 
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going extremely well, and two fairly large defence force 
establishments just on the outskirts ofthe city. So, U's a 
prosperous community and there is community spirit there - if 
there is a tragedy the city just rallies around. 
Gladstone is a well-defined communhy based around the port, and supported by the 
range of heavy industry attracted by nearby sources of inexpensive power, and 
transport systems into and out of Gladstone, by land or sea. The level of industrial 
activity in Gladstone is unusual for a Queensland regional city, and has helped to 
define the town's wider and self-image. It has a long history, given that it was 
established as one ofthe string of ports on the Queensland coast, supporting 
development of inland Queensland by providing a terminus for transportation 
networks. It has had its own seat in parliament since the commencement of self-
government. This indicator appears quite strong for Gladstone. It is complicated, 
though, by the separate existence of Calliope within the electorate. As demonstrated 
by the locals' reaction to the proposal to amalgamate Calliope and Gladstone, 
Calliope Shire residents have a separate identity and a distinct (but overlapping) set of 
social networks to those existuig in Gladstone. In its report, EARC noted that "the 
rural sector of Calliope Shire forms a distinct community which identified the 
township of Calliope."^^ So Calhope, as separate from Gladstone, also demonstrates 
this indicator. 
Healy Interview 
^^ quoted m PCEAR (1992) op cit 127 
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In Caims, May, De Lacy and Ryan all pointed to the existence of an old and a new 
culture, so h is possible that some elements ofthe traditional ethos and identity ofthe 
town were under threat. However De Lacy took the view that newcomers tended to 
support, rather than challenge, the prevailing ethos ofthe town, suggesting that they 
had a "fondness" which was similar to, but not the same as, the identification felt by a 
long-term resident. May was clear that Caims had "groupings around particular 
identities''^^ which approximated leadership networks, and De Lacy indicated that in 
1992 he knew "anybody who was anybody" in Caims. Additionally, the emergence 
of groups such as the Cairns Civic Association points to other networks which 
coalesce into voluntary organisations during local govemment elections. On balance, 
h appears that Caims is likely to demonstrate this indicator, though some ambiguities, 
impossible to resolve after the elapse of a decade, remain. 
Maryborough, now styling itself as "the Heritage City," is nearly 160 years old and is 
small, and relatively self contained. In terms of this indicator, the fact that 
Maryborough has largely been passed over by the intemal immigrants who have 
swelled the populations of Hervey Bay and Bundaberg may have contributed to the 
retention of a strong local culture, if not of local chauvinism. 
Townsville regards itself as the capital of North Queensland (though Caims patriots 
would dispute this claim) and Mooney is one among many North Queensland figures 
to favour the foundation of a new state in the north. As one ofthe string of ports 
which developed as Queensland grew, Townsville has produced its own ethos. 
23 
De Lacy Interview 
May Interview 
De Lacy Interview 
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identity and culture. However hi Mundingburra, the presence of large numbers of 
transient soldiers and students may somewhat dilute this characteristic, as they may be 
seen as spiralists. 
2. The town should be the basis for the seat 
This indicator begets a practical consideration. While connectional polhics of a sort 
may well occur in even the smallest communhies, to win a Legislative Assembly seat 
requires at least ten thousand votes. When the electorate and the community are 
contiguous, such candidates have the best chance of claiming community-based votes. 
This indicator held true for all of these electorates. Maryborough, Caims and 
Gladstone all provide the basis for the seats ofthe same name, and have done so for 
many years. Toowoomba has, since at least 1949, been divided into two seats, and 
overflows into the surtounding electoral districts. The Toowoomba North electorate 
therefore provides half of the community's two-member representation in the 
Legislative Assembly, and for all practical purposes, the views of both city and 
electorate are identical. Mundingburra has a similar dynamic - it is not based on a 
particular community, but is ftilly contained within Townsville, shared with one 
(Townsville) and a half (Thuringowa) other seats. 
3. The town should have a general feeling of neglect and local chauvinism. 
This is an extremely important indicator. During the cases, it became apparent that 
the successful connectional candidates established their support by becoming the 
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community's "champion" in an effort to win outcomes - often physical infrastructure 
- from the state govemment, which was inevitably presented as neglecthig the local 
community. 
This aspect of Toowoomba's character strongly emerged on both occasions related to 
education. First, the Gynther affair highlighted the community's anger at a local 
community worthy (Gynther) being dismissed by a Brisbane-based selection panel 
who had rejected local participation in this process. As the issue developed, local 
participation became the central point of debate, particular after the PSMC revealed 
that the panel had in fact included a consultant from outside the PSMC (reported in 
the "Chronicle" under the headline "Outsider on principals' selection panel") . 
Second, the main issue ofthe campaign in 1992 became the school at Wilsonton. 
State Govemments are crucial providers of infrastructure, of which education is 
arguably the most important. The delays in establishing a new high school at 
Wilsonton were held up as examples of how the Brisbane-based bureaucrats in the 
Education Department did not understand the needs ofthe Toowoomba community. 
As noted in the case, Maryborough has not attained the levels of economic growth 
achieved by some of hs neighbours. Its economy is still largely dependent on 
(declining) industrial activity rather than tourism and service industries, yet it aspires 
to levels of affluence obtained in adjacent centres to which it would most readily 
compare itself During the 1998 campaign, Maryborough's poor economic 
performance was accepted by all candidates, who then differed in their allocation of 
^^  Toowoomba Chronicle, 1 August 1991. The article title has been included because ofthe inadvertent 
but interesting use ofthe term "outsider" c/" Chapter 4 above. 
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blame. The following statement, taken from a single page ofthe Maryborough 
Chronicle in the campaign, illustrates the common rhetoric: 
Dollin [Labor]: Maryborough's vital economy has been sadly 
depleted over the past two years. Small business has been hit 
hard by public service job losses, 300 Walkers jobs lost, and 
local builders not getting the chance to tender on major 
government building contracts. But as 1 said in 1989 when first 
elected to a Labor Government, Maryborough has the strength to 
bounce back from hard times, and it will do so again. 
Mahoney [National]: Maryborough has lost much from its 
representation by Labor, as the negativity has pulled the town 
into the doldrums. "Maryborough needs positive leadership to 
guide economic prosperity. 
Kingston [One Nation]: The major issue in this election is 
employment. We have the raw material, a multi-skilled 
population. However ... currently private enterprise sags under 
an increasing load of bureaucratic licensing and tax collection 
duties. 
Without assessing the accuracy of any of these statements, it is clear that the orthodox 
position for candidates was that Maryborough was neglected by outside, larger 
Maryborough Chronicle, 10 June 1998 
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political forces, and that this neglect had caused the local economic downtum and 
heightened local chauvinism. 
In Caims, this indicator was highlighted m the media as the law-and-order issue ran 
hs course during the 1992 campaign. Until Ryan and De Lacy took up the issue, the 
main focus of media attention had been the lack of police numbers in the Caims 
9 o 
region, and the Brisbane-based state Govemment was blamed. Furthermore, 
"outsiders" were blamed for the problem. A local police detective commented that 
"With increasing numbers of transients travelling to the far north, more innocent store 
owners were being targeted ... drug dependent criminals, thrill-seekers, and the 
human fallout from the recession made up the bulk of armed robbers in the region." 
The entire debate was characterised by the sense of Caims as an outpost, battling a 
crime wave despite indifference from Brisbane. 
The Gladstone region's feelings of neglect and local chauvinism are best exemplified 
by Cunningham's reaction, in her "decision" speech in 1992, to delays in service 
provision to Gladstone, which she blamed on the state govemment, and its 
bureaucrats in particular: 
It is difficult to work for the community where elected and 
non-elected people with contacts to Government continue to 
28 Caims Post, August and September 1992 passim. 26 August is an example. 
^^  Cairns Post, 12 September 1992 
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obstruct efforts to procure better conditions and infrastructure 
30 
for this electorate. 
This sense of neglect also contributed to her state parliamentary aspirations, on the 
basis that "[state] govemments have to be thinking more and discussmg more with 
T 1 
Councils before they make ... fundamental decisions." Clearly, Cunningham acted 
as the vehicle and conduit for local perceptions of neglect. 
Mundingburra was the only case in which this characteristic was muted, possibly 
because, by the time ofthe 1996 by-election, the state govemment was actively 
offering projects to Mundingburta in an apparent effort to secure votes. But the sense 
of neglect remains an underlying characteristic of Townsville, as demonstrated when 
Tony Mooney stated that this perception goes beyond "a general feeling" and is at the 
forefront of local policy: "We spend a lot of time ... doing comparisons of funding 
allocations and projects and so on." 
4. The town may have locally-oriented print and electronic media outlets. 
Again, this indicator is a matter of practicality, as locally-focussed news services 
provide an addhional forum for connectional candidates to demonstrate their local 
commitment. All ofthe cases studied had a local newspaper which was published at 
least twice a week, and all except Gladstone had locally based broadcast media. 
°^ quoted m Gladstone Observer 13 February 1996 
' Cunningham Interview 
32 Mooney Interview 
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5. Towns such as these seem to occur more, the further one travels from Brisbane. 
This indicator is the weakest of the town-based indicators, which explains its 
relegation to last place. Reynolds indicated that communities close to Brisbane (for 
instance, Ipswich) can become venues for connectional politics. However as a matter 
of practicality it is more likely that a city or town which is geographically distant can 
be portrayed as politically irtelevant and neglected. Additionally, communities 
distant from the capital are more likely to be self-contained and self-conscious, 
enhancing the sense of community and its inter-connecting networks. 
Caims and Townsville are far from Brisbane. To give an indication of relative 
distance, Caims is approximately as far from Brisbane (via the Bmce Highway) as 
Brisbane is from Melboume (via the Newell Highway). Impressionistically, Caims 
and Townsville residents are proud to be so far north, and colloquially regard 
Brisbane residents as "Southemers" in the same manner that Brisbane residents might 
regard residents of New South Wales or Victorians as "Southemers" or "Mexicans", 
coining from south ofthe border at Tweed Heads. 
Gladstone and Maryborough are less distant, and Toowoomba is only 90 Minutes' 
drive from Brisbane, albeit over the Great Dividing Range. However, the political 
cuhure of these towns, as noted in the cases, still focuses on the distinction between 
the local community and the capital. These communities still bear clear animosity 
towards the capital city, and in particular towards the govemment and bureaucrats 
who work therein. 
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Indicators Focussing on the Electoral Circumstances 
1. Connectionalism is only one aspect of electioneering. 
In all the cases the connectional candidates, with the possible exception of Liz 
Cunningham, have utilised connectional factors as one element (among several) m 
their campaigns. In most cases, for instance, they also claimed votes from a local 
party base, fr is clear, for instance, that in 1998 the bulk of John Kmgston's support 
in Maryborough simply reflected the support which One Nation obtained across the 
state. 
Connectional polhics was clearly not Healy's only means of campaigning m 
Toowoomba North. He identified with Horan and the other members ofthe "Darlhig 
Downs Team", often sharing advertisements with them to emphasise their strength as 
a team. From this perspective he had tied his campaign to a wider (although not 
33 
necessarily state-level) National Party campaign. 
In Caims, Ryan certainly did not limh himself to connectional forms of 
electioneermg. He conducted a fairly broad campaign, making use ofthe local media, 
state and federal level political figures, specifically Joan Sheldon and Senator Ian 
MacDonald when he could, and state policies (law and order). However the use of 
connectional electioneering - activating networks, continuous doorknocking, 
voluntary associational activities - underpinned the other forms of electioneering 
Ryan undertook. 
" This co-operation between Darling Downs MPs has a long history which can be traced back to 
sunilar co-operation among Darling Downs MPs in colonial Queensland. 
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For Cunningham, however, connectionalism was the primary form of electioneering. 
She did not represent a class-based party, did not address major policy issues, and 
eschewed an image-based campaign. She put together virtually her entire vote via 
connectionalism based on her networks in the community and the reputation 
established as a community leader during her service on the local council. 
2. Connectionalism will minimise adverse national or regional trends. 
Great care must be exercised when considering this indicator for the case studies. As 
noted in Chapter 5, the cases were selected partly on the basis that they showed 
variation from the expected outcomes. To explain their results from their variance as 
per wider trends, risks a circular argument. Against this, all five case studies 
demonstrated some level of connectional politics. 
Cunningham's success in 2001, however, provides an interesting demonstration of 
this indicator without the risk of circularity. Her case was chosen for this study 
because of her results in 1992 and 1995, and the research was in progress when she 
won in 2001. In this campaign. Labor gained a large statewide swing of just under 10 
percentage points. Despite this, Cunningham retained her seat, attracted a swing from 
Labor, and won on primary votes for the first time. That she did not run a high profile 
campaign, made few promises, and did little to raise her profile higher, it appears that 
the strength of her connectional support held up against a strong adverse state trend. 
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3. Connectional candidates extend beyond their class-party base, regardless of how 
strong this base may be. 
There is a logical association between this indicator and the one immediately above. 
If connectional candidates are to have results which vary from the outcomes produced 
by wider political forces, they must establish support beyond that which is obtained 
by party affiliation. 
While Kingston clearly won Maryborough in 1998 partly as a result of support for 
One Nation, he still goes some way towards demonstrating this indicator. In 1995, 
Dollin won 46.37% ofthe primary vote for Labor, and Maddem (National) 44.97% 
for the Coalition. In 1998, Dollin's primary vote was down 10.67% to 35.70% and 
Mahoney won just 18.87% for the Nationals, a fall of 26.1%. So, while the bulk of 
Khigston's support came from the Nationals, a substantial portion came from Labor. 
Kingston noted that: 
/ know that a lot of my silent supporters are in fact long term 
members ofthe Labor Party. 1 don't often hear this from them, 
but 1 hear Ufrom other people. At the last election there were 
a lot of joking threats: "The bastard better win, I voted for 
him last time and I'm gonna vote for him this time, I'll strangle 
him if he doesn't. " That sort of comment was usually from 
290 
labourers in the cane industry, or labourers down at 
Walkers. 
Through his broad associational involvement with Caims groups representing Catholic 
parents and war veterans, Ryan may have had a high and respected profile "in a 
number of areas which were not traditionally Liberal-leaning." ^ The broad cross-
section of people who Ryan came to know as an army reserve leader has already been 
discussed. The result was twofold: first, it may have given Ryan the potential to draw 
votes from the Labor party (and the 6.5 % swing against De Lacy went to Ryan); and 
second, it may have allowed Ryan to straddle successfiilly the old Caims/ new Caims 
social cleavage, drawing support from both elements of the community through 
religious and secular connectional support. Moreover, Ryan extended beyond his 
class/party base simply because the Liberals lacked a substantial organisational branch 
structure, notwithstanding the political affiliations of some newcomers. 
Cunningham was not directly associated with a class-party base. Clearly, however, 
her support was based upon a conservative vote - by 2001 she had attracted virtually 
all the conservative vote, reducing the Nationals to just 2.35% of primary votes. 
However Zussino claims that her support extended well beyond the conservative vote, 
and that it is at once "extreme left wing and extreme right wmg, supporting 
environmentalism on one side and gun rights on the other." If that is so, 
Cunningham may be the quhitessential connectional politician. 





In Toowoomba North, many responses to Healy were, at least partially, based on 
voters' opinions about his radio program, reaching well beyond traditional National 
Party supporters. While the case does not reveal direct examples of Healy extending 
beyond the Nationals' class-party base, his campaign was universal, based on issues 
of concem across the community. On balance, h is likely that this indicator is 
demonstrated. 
4. Connectionalism tends not to withstand concerted shifts in the forces of party 
politics. 
The cases considered for research for this indicator produced some startling results. 
Healy seemed to provide a partial demonstration. In 1998, One Nation polled 
strongly in Toowoomba North (24.13%) and, in 2001, Healy was a casualty ofthe 
landslide to Labor. So in the elections where concerted shifts did occur in state level 
party politics, in Healy's case connectional factors were overcome by those stronger 
political forces. 
However Kingston, standing as an Independent hi a seat he won in 1998 from Labor 
as a One Nation candidate, held his seat against the Labor landslide of 2001. He 
suffered an adverse swhig of 9.08%, much of which went directly to Labor, which 
increased hs primary vote by 6.31 percentage points. The balance went primarily to 
the Chy Country Alliance (CCA), a successor to One Nation. These CCA votes very 
nearly cost Kingston the seat, as 48 percent of them then expired. Ofthe 3029 second 
preferences cast, all but 385 went to Kingston, resulting in an extremely nartow 
victory by just 212 votes. Notwithstanding this, Kingston, standing as an 
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Independent, was only able to retain the seat as a result of surprisingly resilient 
connectional politics. 
Cunningham, as noted elsewhere, did even better. Given the slim two-party preferred 
majority of 1.36% after the 1998 election and, that prior to Cunningham's victory, 
Gladstone was a Labor seat, the 10 percent statewide swing towards Labor in 2001 
should have unseated her. In fact, she increased her primary vote. As a result, it can 
be seen that in at least two cases, connectional politics has proven surprisingly 
T "7 
resilient. 
5. Connectionalism becomes critical in knife-edge situations. 
This indicator was important in three of the cases studied. Toowoomba North 
represented a very marginal victory for Labor hi 1989, and was always likely to be a 
close contest in 1992. Given the Liberals' poor performance in 1992, a substantial 
number of those previously Liberal votes were available to either Healy or Flynn. 
Healy was connected to the community, had a high public profile and had acted as a 
community champion. He doorknocked extensively and manipulated his connections 
through local voluntary associations and his high profile radio based personal 
recognition. Flynn, on the other hand, had a high public profile but had taken the side 
of the Labor Govemment against the community on some occasions. He did not 
doorknock extensively, did not undertake other forms of campaignfrig to help him to 
meet the electors, and was not actively involved hi community associations. 
" This argument is also strengthened in 2001 by the performance of Peter Wellmgton, Independent 
member for Nicklin who, in 2001, nearly doubled his primary vote, taking support from both sides of 
politics. While Nicklin was not taken as a Case Study for this report, Wellmgton's campaigns also 
have connectional features. 
293 
Furthertnore, any connectional support he may previously have obtained from his 
medical practice is likely to have declined, given that his practice was three years in 
the past, h is plausible to suggest that, when the election was in the balance, these 
connectional factors became the difference between Healy and Flynn. 
This factor was relevant in all the campaigns Cunningham conducted in Gladstone, hi 
1992, Liberal and National preferences put Cunnuigham within two percentage pomts 
of victory, hi 1995, Bennett led Cunningham by 3.56% on primary votes; in 1998 
Zussmo led by just 0.37%; and in 2001 Cunningham led by 5.52%. 1992, 1995 and 
1998 were clearly "knife-edge" elections, when relatively small changes in votes could 
have changed the seat. In each case after 1992, Cunningham's connectional support 
was sufficient for her to claim the seat. 
6. Connectionalism is strongest when married with wider political forces. 
This indicator was present to some degree in each case - connectional candidates 
were more successful where their connectional activity reinforced wider political 
forces in operation during the campaign. However the cases also indicate that this 
indicator is not particularly useful, as the evidence for hs support has largely been 
presented to satisfy the indicators of electoral circumstance listed above, in particular 
the first indicator, that connectionalism is only one aspect of electioneering. For 
instance, the combination of a connectional vote for Kingston and the state vote for 
One Nation delivered the seat in 1998. The argument does not require repetition, but 
it demonstrates the combination of connectional and other political forces. 
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Summary 
Overall, the indicators drawn from Reynolds' initial discussion of connectional 
politics were a useful guide for the assessment ofthe five case studies presented in this 
thesis. They are also likely to provide a useful framework for ftiture analysts seeking 
to explain electoral outcomes in connectional terms. However, these indicators 
present different facets of connectional activity in a somewhat piecemeal fashion, and 
at the conclusion of this survey, further analysis is required in order to present a 
coherent account of the operation of connectional politics in Queensland. The next 
chapter will draw on the information obtained using this framework, and present a 
more complete account of connectionalism. 
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CHAPTER 9 - CONNECTIONAL POLITICS 
The analysis presented hi Chapter 8 indicates that, in each case study, there was at 
least one candidate who, based on the criteria established in Chapter 5, acted in a 
connectional manner, and who was observed to claim some electoral benefit as a 
resuh. So the case studies, individually and as a group, indicate that there was 
electoral activity consistent with Reynolds' explanation of connectional politics. The 
case studies in themselves do not, however, enhance an understanding of why 
connectional politics took place in those cases; or the dynamics which were involved 
in (either successfully or unsuccessfully) attempting to campaign connectionally. As 
a result, they provide additional field-based evidence to support Reynolds' argument, 
but do not develop that argument. This chapter will endeavour to use the theoretical 
basis provided in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 to do so. 
This chapter begins by examining the factors which (using the notions of community 
in mral Australia which emerged from Chapter 4) predispose an electorate and a 
candidate towards connectional politics. The communities observed were much 
larger than those described hi Bradstow, Smalhown or the Two Towns, but 
observation through fieldwork indicates areas remarkably consistent with those 
authors' observations. The chapter will then examine the role which voluntary 
associations play in the case study communities, again noting similarities with 
previous community studies. In particular, this chapter will consider the important 
role which voluntary associations have in developmg and providing overt roles for 
community leaders who, in tum, provide a pool of potential connectional candidates. 
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The second part of this chapter assumes that a campaign is hi progress; the candidate 
has chosen to stand for office, and both the candidate and the community possess the 
necessary predisposing factors. Those factors, h will be suggested, are insufficient in 
themselves to provide any connectional support, much less a winning vote. For those 
predisposing factors to be activated into connectional electoral activity, active effort 
on the part ofthe candidate is required. They must choose an issue, or a series of 
issues, on which to base their campaign. Such issues are usually contained and easily 
comprehensible in the local community; and they are invariably instrumental, 
focussing on a service or facility which the govemment ought to provide. Also, they 
will usually be valence issues, where all candidates agree on the policy position, and 
the contest centres around which candidate is most likely to deliver the required 
outcome. To be seen as the one most likely to deliver, the connectional candidate 
should seek to be identified as a community "champion", representing it in battle with 
wider forces and, in particular agahist the capital, reinforcing populist negative 
notions of a faceless, unresponsive bureaucracy. A successful career as a leader of 
local associations, or in local govemment, may provide a "track record" enabling 
challengers to assert themselves as the town champion. This perception is also 
enhanced by several modes of communication, through the local media, local 
associations, word of mouth, and by doorknocking. If these tasks are undertaken , the 
candidate should obtain connectional support. 
Finally, this chapter tums its attention to theoretical issues, placing the observations 
made about connectional politics within both the Funnel of Causality and the Lifetime 




The communhies observed during fieldwork were all in some sense isolated from the 
capital in Brisbane; Caims, Townsville (Mundingburta) and Gladstone by distance, 
Toowoomba by the Great Dividing Range which has allowed it to establish its culture 
largely independent of Brisbane's influence, and Maryborough which, although 
within driving distance of Brisbane (300 kilometres), is not a dormitory community 
for the Capital. This sets the scene for their varieties of political culture. In Chapter 
3, the isolation of Queensland communities was discussed as the basis for the political 
ideal of development, the notion of country life as morally superior to city life, and a 
populist rejection of outsiders. If this is valid, these themes should emerge in the five 
cases studied. 
The political ideal of development, of politics as an instrumental exercise in providing 
services, emerged in each campaign, usually by providing the basis for the issues 
"championed" by connectional candidates. The instrumental politics which emerged, 
combined with the sense of moral entitlement discussed below, led to a political 
demand that the communities studied should obtahi their "fair share" of state 
govemment services. The state govemment (and by extension the capital) were 
perceived as neglecting, or failhig to respond to neglect of services in regional areas. 
Therefore the role ofthe candidate was to attack this neglect, and thereby "deliver" 
services to the community. 
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In the data gathered for this study, the notion of country life as superior to city life 
was not emphasised in this comparative sense, however candidates were expected to 
emphasise and celebrate the community's perception of itself as vibrant and positive. 
This factor is also expressed as a sense of entitlement; that the region and its way of 
life were important enough to be worthy of particular attention from govemment. 
Cunningham, for instance, complained that "throughout the past 15 years or so, no 
recognition has been given to [Gladstone's] economic significance through a shadow 
Ministry or similar."* In a similar vein, Mooney stated that "The bottom line is really 
that Townsville people have the basic right to expect the same quality services that 
people in the south enjoy." Finally, the populist rejection of outsiders was clear 
whenever outsiders intmded on the political life ofthe community, most notably in 
Toowoomba North during the "Gynther Affair", and during the preselection of 
Graham Healy. 
To this point then, it appears that connectional politics flourish in regional centres and 
towns which are isolated from cities and which, as a result, exhibit political 
characteristics of instmmentalism, a sense of their own worth and importance; and a 
rejection of outsiders. All of these factors are consistent with earlier discussions of 
Queensland towns, and all have a role to play m supporting connectional politics. 
These roles should become clearer during this chapter. 
Chapter 4, when considermg Smalltown and the Two Towns, noted that the small 
populations and relative isolation ofthe towns led to "role redundancy", that is, the 
' Gladstone Observer, 12 September 1992 
^ Townsville Bulletin, 15 January 1996 
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requirement that people fill a number of social roles in order to ensure that all 
necessary roles were filled despite a small population base. The tovms from which 
these case studies were drawn were all much larger than either Smalltown or the Two 
Towns, so this effect was less pronounced. However, like Smalltown and the Two 
Towns, and to a lesser extent Bradstow, these communities had thriving voluntary 
organisations and associations, ranging from sporting clubs and social clubs through 
to politically active "watchdog" groups and business councils. At one level, these 
associations play an obvious role, by providing a service or environment which 
enriches the local community, be it by providing organised sports for children, meals-
on-wheels for the elderly, or lobbying for new community facilities. In a second 
sense, these groups aggregate "particular sets of people who share ... a particular 
activity or interest." As a result, during political campaigns, their meetings provide 
candidates with opportunities to deal directly with a subset ofthe electorate who share 
at least some common views and perspectives. Whilst important, this campaigning 
factor is not unique to connectional candidates, as it could be utilised by any 
candidate who could procure invitations to address the meetings. 
Finally, however, field study observations suggest that these associations provide the 
means by which the community can identify, develop, and legitimate its community 
leadership. It is clear from previous research"* that, while membership in these 
voluntary associations is encouraged, and often demanded, from all members ofthe 
community, access to leadership poshions within them is much more restricted. A 
key quotation in Chapter 4 noted that "It is generally only acceptable for a 
' Boissevain (1984) op cit 28 
"* Seepage 107 above 
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"newcomer" to aspire to office [in an associational activity] if he does not seek a 
position reserved for long term residents." Clearly, access to these leadership 
positions is restricted by social mores. Observations from the case studies, combined 
with those from the previous community studies, suggest that access to leadership 
positions is controlled by two factors. First, most positions are reserved for "locals" 
who have been involved in associational activities for a considerable time. Second, 
where "outsiders" fill leadership positions, they should do so after being invited. Kel 
Ryan, for instance, "was ... approached by the president ofthe sub-branch to join the 
RSL, which I hadn't done at that stage, and to become the treasurer ofthe sub-branch 
and the RSL club."^ Ryan was deliberately recruited into the RSL to fill a leadership 
position. 
An additional question is raised by Ryan's invitation to fill leadership positions, and 
frideed by the notion of people being "asked" to fill leadership positions. Who 
extends such an invitation? Based on Ryan's experience, it does not appear that 
leaders appointed in this manner are raised by a general consensus among association 
members; rather, he was called to the position by a group of people who fill other 
leadership roles, in that association or another. 
It is also important that hi Ryan's case, desphe the considerable size of Caims, the 
city's associational groups were "lookhig out for leadership, they were looking out for 
someone to drive them."^ It is also clear that many of these associational leaders were 
involved in more than one such group, usually hi leadership positions. The concept of 
^ Dempsey 1990 op cit 49 
^ Ryan Interview 
' Ryan Interview 
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role redundancy can plausibly explain this observation. While role redundancy, m 
these studies, may not exist to any substantial degree at the membership level ofthe 
associations, h clearly exists within the leadership roles. In some cases, there are 
more leadership roles required than adequate leaders to fill them. This need is 
handled through role redundancy, where leaders take on leadership roles in more than 
one association, and by recruhing suitable "outsiders" to this group of leaders. It also 
follows that the leaders, as a resuh of their leadership activity in a number of 
associations, share muhiplex relationships and these become a means to increase 
community cohesiveness. 
Associational leadership is not proposed as the only route to community leadership. 
Leadership in local govemment, and success in a socially valued business or career, 
are also means to leadership, but observations in the field suggest that community 
leaders, however established, take on leadership roles in associational groups. 
Zussino, for instance, was a recognised leader in the Gladstone business community, 
and this led to involvement in organisations such as the Gladstone Area Promotion 
and Development Authority. Healy, through his radio career, was clearly an opinion 
leader, and also a leader in the local turf club. Cuimingham, during her local 
govemment career, was also a leader in the Concemed Citizens for Industrial Control 
and the Calliope Tax and Ratepayers' Association. 
Thus, observations made during field research suggest that associational activity m 
regional communities is important in instmmental terms, for providing services and 
infrastructure valued by the community. However, from a connectional perspective, 
the critical role of these associations is that they become a crucible for the 
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development ofthe community's leaders, who are raised to those poshions by 
consensus among the other leaders, and who often fill a number of leadership roles in 
order to satisfy the needs of role redundancy. 
The factors discussed to this point, namely communities with an instrumental set of 
political values backed by local chauvinism and a feeling of local neglect; supported 
and led by a network of associational groups whose leaders themselves form a 
network, give some clue as to the type of local person in these towns who will 
become a successfiil connectional candidate. 
Clearly, the candidate must be a communhy insider, a "local". If "outsiders", either 
decision-makers in the capital or competitors for resources in other regions, are seen 
as the community's political opponents, then it is axiomatic that the community's 
direct representative must come from within. This requirement - that candidates in 
regional Queensland be local - is far from new, and was discussed in Chapter 5 
above. However, the arguments advanced above supply plausible reasons as to why 
the candidate must be local. This argument was clearly supported by the case studies. 
The only candidates observed at length who were not locals were Tanti, Ryan and 
Flynn. Tanti compensated for this lack of local history through extensive 
doorknocking. It is therefore questionable whether his victory in 1995-96 was 
connectional in nature. Ryan, on the other hand, had a relatively short local history, 
but had occupied a prestigious position in the town and was quickly absorbed into the 
local leadership. By 1992 it is probable that Ryan was considered a local. Flynn's 
lack of local history was abject, and was probably one ofthe reasons he lost his seat in 
1992, against a candidate with much stronger local connections. 
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Second, the observations discussed immediately above suggest that connectional 
candidates are likely to occupy, or have occupied, leadership poshions in local 
community associations. The position of an MP, viewed from this perspective, is 
another communhy leadership poshion. Candidates who have successfully led 
community organisations and become recognised among the community's leaders, 
tend to obtain local respect from that activity, thus increasing their vote. Importantly, 
they may also obtain some level of respect and support from the other community 
leaders, bound by the multiplex relationships which emerge as a result of role 
redundancy in leadership positions. Given that community leaders are also leaders of 
local opinion, their support may bring compound results. Every candidate discussed 
during fieldwork as a potentially connectional candidate was extensively involved, 
and had held leadership positions in, local associations. A substantial number had 
also held local govemment office, and had successful personal careers. It can be 
demonstrated, therefore, that successful connectional candidates are likely to emerge 
from the pre-existing network of community leaders. 
Finally, h should be noted that party affiliation has not been discussed in this 
argument. While many connectional candidates will be party members, and will 
benefit from partisan aligned voting, thefr party membership is not of prime 
importance when establishhig their connectional credentials. Kingston, for instance, 
stood for preselection for the Nationals in 1998, stood on behalf of One Nation in the 
1998 election, and won again as an independent hi 2001. The near-irtelevance of 
party affiliation to the connectional element ofthe vote emerges because candidates 
are recmited from among the community's leaders (as described above) and because 
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their pohtical purpose fits in with the community's instrumental pohtical orientation. 
Their objective is to gain instrumental outcomes for the community, rather than to 
advance a party philosophy. At the very least, their local focus has a higher priorhy 
than any commitment they may have to party philosophy. 
Notwithstanding this argument, h is notable that the connectional candidates studied 
are predominantly anti-Labor, either according to their party label or general political 
orientation. Mooney and Bennett were examples of Labor candidates acting in a 
connectional manner, yet both of these lost seats they might have been expected to 
win. The most likely explanation for this anti-Labor bias in the current case studies 
was foreshadowed in Chapter 5 above, where it was noted that the selection 
methodology used to select the case studies appeared to favour anti-Labor candidates. 
There appears no reason why Labor, which has often dominated the provincial cities 
which supplied the case studies, could not supply connectional candidates. 
This concludes the discussion of those factors which predispose a community towards 
connectional activity, and those antecedent qualities which must be possessed by any 
candidate wishing to gain political support by connectional means. Such a candidate 
should already be regarded as a local leader, and should be part ofthe network of 
multiplex relationships binding those leaders together through their occupancy of 
senior positions in business, local govemment and voluntary associations. The 
chapter now moves on from these general, background factors to make observations 
about candidates' activities leading up to the campaign itself. 
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Connectional Campaigning 
The first step hi the campaign, party preselection, is immediately comprehensible 
when h is considered that the local pohtical party branches are voluntary associations 
like any other in the town. Their leadership poshions are filled in the same manner as 
any other voluntary associations - by recruiting from among knovm leaders or 
potential leaders. Zusshio, for histance, was Electorate President ofthe ALP during 
Bennett's 1992 and 1995 campaigns, whilst also holding a number of other voluntary 
association poshions. Within parties, the poshion of "endorsed candidate" also 
appears to be a leadership role, to which a person should be recruited in the same 
manner as any other position. In almost all cases, the recmitment ofthe connectional 
candidate to become the endorsed candidate followed the characteristics outlined 
earlier in this chapter: to fill a vacant leadership position, other leaders in the network 
recmit a known leader or a suitable outsider. Ryan in Caims was preselected 
unopposed, based upon his leadership of a local govemment campaign in 1991. 
Tanti, in Mundingburta, states that local party leaders "decided to move me on to state 
politics because of how well I performed in the Council election." Zussino, though 
requested to stand in 1998 by Peter Beattie, had already been asked to stand in 1992, 
by locals. Kingston was approached by senior figures to stand for National Party 
preselection in 1998 before eventually standing for One Nation. Healy, in 
Toowoomba, provides a textbook case of this dynamic. Horan, on realising Healy 
might be interested in filling the candidate's position, and his suitability to do so, 
began pushhig him towards the role as soon as Healy discussed joining the party. 
^Young(1999) 35 
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The only candidates not observed to have been recruited in this manner were 
Cunningham, who did not face preselection, and Mooney, whose preselection, 
effectively by the decree ofthe Queensland Labor Administrative Committee, was 
strongly criticised both within and outside the party. 
To this point this analysis has observed community leaders, recruited in a manner 
consistent with that community's usual leadership dynamics, standing as candidates 
for election. Possession of these cormectional characteristics, however, were not 
observed to be sufficient alone to ensure that the candidate received connectional 
support. Mooney, for instance, was selected as an ideal connectional candidate, and 
possessed all ofthe connectional qualities one could expect, but failed to defeat Tanti. 
Bennett, similarly, was connectionally strong but was defeated by Cunningham at the 
second attempt. Instead, the case studies reveal certain pattems of campaigning 
which are typically connectional, and which together provide a model for 
connectional campaigning. The steps are relatively simple: the candidate must find 
appropriate issue, use this issue as the basis to promote themselves as the 
community's "champion", and promulgate this image through communication 
channels appropriate to the community. 
The requirement for a connectional candidate to choose a signature issue sounds 
deceptively simple. However, observations from the case studies suggest that this is 
probably the most important decision the candidate will take. The candidate's 
signature issue becomes their "war cry", their means of attracting the attention of 
voters, and the content they use to demonstrate their connectional quahties. If, as 
suggested below, it is vital that cormectional candidates become the community 
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"champion", then the chosen issue represents the dragon the champion sets forth to 
slay on the communhy's behalf 
The issue chosen should emerge from several factors already discussed hi this 
chapter. It has been noted above that the communities observed for this thesis all had 
an mstrumental approach to state govemment: the state was expected to provide 
goods and services. On this basis, then, the issue chosen by the connectional 
candidate must directly focus on the provision of something for the communhy, and 
valued by the communhy. Second, this chapter has noted that the observed 
communities felt neglected or under-served by the state govemment, and that the local 
MLA was required to remedy this neglect. As a result, the connectional candidate 
should seek an issue which focuses on instrumental outcomes which have been 
demanded by the communhy but not provided by the state, and which therefore 
reinforce the community's views of its neglected status. Such issues provide the 
candidate with the perfect opportunity to act as the champion, representing the 
community in an effort to overcome the capital's neglect, to provide a much-needed 
facility or service. 
The following table lists the issues chosen by the successful candidates in the case 
studies. In every case, the connectional candidate promised to endeavour to convince 
the state govemment to provide somethhig tangible for the local community. In each 
case, the issue had existed well before the campaign, and in each case the state 
















Safety on the Caims "Esplanade"; a Police Reserve 
New High School for Wilsonton 
The position of independents; 
School and hospital facilities 
Off-street parking at a local State School 
Development of a Prison near Maryborough 
It is important to note that all of these issues are valence issues; that is, one would not 
expect there to be any dispute among candidates as to the virtue ofthe proposals *°. 
All candidates might reasonably be expected to support a new high school, or safety 
in public places. Indeed, in all ofthe issues listed above (other than the position of 
independents), all the major candidates were in agreement. Where such valence 
issues exist, the policy contest cannot focus on the basic position of candidates for or 
against a proposal - they are not differentiated. Instead, the contest focuses on such 
matters as the means by which candidates propose to achieve the desired outcome, the 
priority they will give to this outcome compared to other desired outcomes, and the 
electorate's perception ofthe likelihood that the candidate will deliver on the promise. 
The campaign task for the connectional candidate, then, is to hidicate that these issues 
of local importance are their prime focus, and that thefr candidature is the one most 
likely to produce the desired outcome. A strong connectional candidate who becomes 
Ryan was not successfiil in winning the seat, but is included here on the basis ofthe large swing he 
generated. 
'° This was so even for the prison proposed for Maryborough. Although prison developments are often 
controversial, and there was sporadic oppositions from some citizens in Maryborough, all candidates in 
1998 supported the proposal. 
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the local champion, pursuing these instmmental policy outcomes, has substantial 
advantages in a contest with the last two of these foci. 
The connectional advantage in terms of priority is quite simple: because connectional 
campaigns focus strongly on these local level issues, and are less focussed on state-
wide campaign issues, they give a perception to the voter that achievhig local 
outcomes is a high priority. Tanti, who lacked connectional antecedents but 
campaigned in a connectional manner, gained this advantage over Mooney, who ran a 
state-based campaign. The case study notes Mooney's fmstrated attempts to engage 
Tanti on issues of state policy, and Tanti's ready acknowledgement that he knew little 
about Liberal Party policy; this did not affect Tanti's campaign, because he focused 
entirely on local-level issues, and thus engendered the impression that his focus, if 
elected, would be on local issues. 
The advantage connectional candidates may have in terms of promoting themselves as 
most likely to produce desired outcomes may not be immediately apparent, but shows 
most clearly when the coimectional candidate is the challenger rather than the 
incumbent. In this case, they can successfully advance the argument that the 
mcumbent, who agrees with the need for the proposal to proceed, has been in office 
and has not delivered the required outcome. Thus, even though the capacity ofthe 
connectional candidate to deliver the required outcome remains unproven, the 
incumbent's lack of capacity is demonstrated. This results in a comparative 
advantage to the connectional candidate. This form of argument was used in 
devastatmg fashion by Cunningham in a 1995 newspaper advertisement, which ran: 
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The Power Of An Independent 
The Goss Government reduced police numbers and NeU 
Bennett had to accept the decision. 
The Goss Government closed Gladstone hospital wards and 
NeU had to accept the decision. 
The Goss Govemment allowed the standard of education 
(teacher numbers; class sizes; rural teacher conditions) to 
deteriorate, and Neil had to accept the decision. 
A vote in caucus is of no value unless it's a vote in the ruling 
faction, as they decide where the money will go. Neil is not 
in the ruling faction. 
Neil can't over-rule party decision, but an independent can 
fight for community will. For your voice in govemment, vote 
1 Liz Cunningham. 
Valence issues have an additional impact which is important for connectional 
campaigning. Because there is broad community consensus on a valence issue, it can 
cut across traditional lines of cleavage and therefore across the usual aligned voting 
base. To the extent that there were stratified classes in the towns, all of those classes 
would benefit from the proposals advanced as priorities by the connectional 
candidate. If these proposals are not also advanced as priorities by party-based 
candidates, then the connectional candidate may be able to draw away some 
previously aligned voters. The connectional tendency to campaign on valence issues 
" Advertisement in the Gladstone Obeserver, 14 July 1995 
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may therefore contribute to connectional polhics' observed capacity to move outside 
Imes of political cleavage. 
Having selected an appropriate issue as the basis for their campaign, the connectional 
candidates in the case studies then set about establishhig themselves as local 
champions. This strategy emerges from the populist aspects of Queensland pohtical 
culture, as described in Chapter 3: that successful leaders can generate support by 
behig seen to personify the polity's needs, wants and ambhions. Given a political 
culture with a demonstrated tendency to populism and state chauvinism, an 
instrumental approach to polhics, a sense of neglect by wider forces, and a sense of 
community defmed against notions of "outsiders", there is the potential for a 
candidate to emerge, to embody and champion the community's efforts to overcome 
the neglect shown by outsiders in the caphal in order to deliver desired instrumental 
outcomes. A connectional candidate, as a community leader with a local focus, is 
well placed to assume that position. In the case studies, the candidates who were able 
to do so successfully reaped electoral rewards. 
The case studies fridicate two key factors for candidates to become the community's 
champion: a record of achievement on behalf of the community and the consistent 
use ofthe rhetoric appropriate to this form of campaigning. 
If candidates are to credibly establish themselves as the champion, they must provide 
the community with some assurance of their capacity to win histrumental outcomes. 
This is critically important where two candidates may be competing for the 
champion's mantle. A candidate who can point to acknowledged achievements which 
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have been to the community's benefit is in a poshion of strength to promise to deliver 
more. For incumbents, this is a position of double-jeopardy. If they have achieved 
outcomes for the community during their term of office, they have an ideal basis upon 
which to campaign. In the case studies, many ofthe incumbents spent a great deal of 
effort demonstrating what they had achieved for the communhy, with the implied 
suggestion that the community could continue to receive those benefits by retaining 
the incumbent in office. Premier Wayne Goss, speaking on Davies' behalf prior to his 
dismissal in late 1995, "pointed to the new bridge over the Ross River, to the opening 
of two new Police Beat shopfronts in Townsville, to work at Townsville's hospitals, 
and to road ftinding as delivering the goods. 'This is not pork barrelling,' he said. 
'This is what we promised - and what you're entitled to.'*^ However, if the 
community judges those efforts to have been lacking, the incumbent is open to attack 
from a challenger who can point to their failures as reasons for change. 
Cunningham's successful use of this tactic has been discussed above. 
For challengers the task is somewhat more difficult. Without a record in office to 
demonstrate their capacity to deliver outcomes for the community, they must look to 
other activities in their past. At this point, the critical importance of connectional 
candidates emerging from the community leadership comes into focus. As a leader of 
a local association, a local govemment representative, or a successful local business 
operator, a community leader has opportunities to build a record of accomplishments 
on the community's behalf Mooney and Cunningham had achieved this through their 
local govemment activity; Kingston and Zussino through their business activity; 
'^  Townsville Bulletin, 13 December 1995 
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Healy through his advocacy of community values on air; and all of them (except 
Mooney) through their leadership of local associations. 
Therefore, leadership roles in the local communhy do more than simply expose a 
potential candidate to the other members ofthe leadership network and accredit them 
with leadership status; they also provide potential candidates with opportunhies to 
demonstrate their capacity to improve the community by providing services, facihties 
or wealth. 
This discussion of achievements can, however, be slightly qualified. It was noted in 
Chapter 4 that, even if community champions are unable to achieve the desired 
outcomes when fighting larger, outside forces, they may still achieve widespread 
support for fighting a valiant but hopeless battle against such forces. In these cases, 
the outcome confirms the community's view of itself as neglected by the state 
govemment, and builds on the proposition that the (unsuccessful) advocate was still 
prepared to do battle on behalf of the community. 
Observations from the case studies suggest that a record of community achievement, 
alone, is a valuable campaign tool. However, the electoral impact of that record, and 
the candidate's position as "champion", is amplified when the candidate employs a 
body of rhetoric associated with connectional campaigning. The first aspect of this 
rhetoric emerges from the practice of "exclusionary discrimmation," described in 
Chapter 4. In this process, the equalhy and virtue of those within the community is 
confirmed and enhanced by discriminating against those from outside the community, 
and particularly those from the capital. Connectional champions, as observed in the 
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case studies, appear to invoke a degree of crhicism of outsiders. Zussino, for 
instance, discussing industrial job-creation opportunities, observed that "major project 
facilitation [has moved] from the local authorities to Brisbane based bureaucrats. I 
shall ... ensure project facilitation, both large and small, is handed back to local 
authorities who have the knowledge, experience and desire to ensure both industry 
and the local community receives the best deal."*^ 
This dynamic achieves its greatest effect when it leads the "champion" to attack 
outsiders who are in their own political party. Such rhetoric confirms to the local 
community that the candidate is willing to put them first, even to the point of breaking 
with party discipline. The rhetoric promises that the candidate will be a local 
politician rather than the local representative of a political party. Thus Mooney's 
early-campaign rhetoric provides a good example. 
The second aspect ofthe connectional champion's rhetoric is more positive, and 
focuses on emphasising the perceived positive aspects ofthe community. The 
coimectional candidates thereby emphasise their pride in the local community, and 
further demonise outsiders, who are implicitly held to lack those virtues, and who are 
also neglecting the local community. 
These two forms of rhetoric fit neatly with the rural/urban cleavage which has, as 
noted in Chapter 3, traditionally been a feature of Queensland politics. Because the 
connectional commimity is a mral or provincial one and the capital is urban, the 
" Gladstone Observer, 9 June 1998 
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connectional candidate's rhetoric of exclusionary discrimination resonates with long-
standmg political culture, and is thus strengthened. 
Finally, all of these factors - the candidates' chosen issues, their record of 
achievement, their connectional rhetoric - must be communicated to the community if 
they are to have any impact on voters' electoral decisions. Most connectional 
candidates had some local profile as a resuh of other leadership activities, but durhig 
the case studies, there were three notable means of communication used as direct 
campaigning tools: the local media, networks and associational activity, and 
doorknockfrig. 
The local media was probably the most important of these. Dempsey notes that, m 
communities such as Smalltown, the community press invariably had a local focus, 
interpreting state and national news in terms of its impact on the community, and 
providing close coverage for the activities ofthe local leadership. During 
preparation ofthe case studies, many editions ofthe local newspapers, in each ofthe 
communities studied, were read. In every case, the newspapers followed the pattem 
observed by Dempsey. Front page news stories were almost invariably local news 
stories. Most newspapers had a single page each devoted to state and national news, 
and up to ten pages of community news. In order to closely service the community, 
the newspapers shared, or at least appeared to share, many ofthe community's 
cultural values. The newspapers reflected the local sense of neglect from the capital; 
they shared the instrumental approach to politics; and they also presented abundant 
stories which emphasised the virtues ofthe local community. 
'" Dempsey 1990, op cit 111-112 
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Given this, the local media are powerful potential allies for a connectional candidate. 
They are the principal forum for such candidates to campaign on their chosen issue, 
and to develop the image of themselves as the local champion. The Toowoomba 
Chronicle's "Candidates Forum" is a clear example, and Flynn's failure to participate 
in that fomm meant that Healy's message about the need for a high school at 
Wilsonton drowned out Flynn's message that planning for the school was already 
underway. The "Mundingburra Mole" fri the Townsville Bulletin was lighthearted, 
but ran on the front page ofthe newspaper every day ofthe campaign, and helped to 
build the image of Tanti as hardworking and honest (consider the quotation "Does 
Frank Tanti never sleep?"* ). Ofthe candidates discussed in the case studies, 
Cunningham was probably the most effective at manipulating the media hi this 
fashion. Although they followed her election in 1995, articles carrying headlines such 
as "Liz: Fierce New Independent Ready to Face the Challenges"*^ and "A Look at 
our Woman ofthe Moment" indicate the manner in which an enthusiastic media can 
help the candidate to become the champion, embodying the community. Zussino, 
who opposed Cunningham as campaign director in 1992 and 1995, and as a candidate 
in 1998, was scathing about the role ofthe Observer in building her image, claiming 
that the local media "never assessed her, probed her or criticized her," and "made her 
into a saint."*^ 
In the case studies, all the candidates also attended many meetmg of local voluntary 
associations - for histance, parents and citizens' groups, service clubs, and sportmg 
'^  Townsville BuUetin, 8 January 1996 
'* Gladstone Observer, 18 July 1995 
'^  ibid, 22 July 1995 
Zussino Interview 
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clubs. Given the multiplex nature of community leadership, they were already known 
to the leaders of such groups, and this appeared to make it easier for them to attend 
these meetings, deliver a speech, and meet local people. By ensuring that both the 
speech and the small-talk focussed on their chosen issue and their wish to resolve it, 
the candidates could continue to build the image of themselves as the local champion. 
Finally, all ofthe candidates discussed (with the exception of John Kingston) 
participated, to some degree, in doorknocking, that is, the process of travellmg from 
house to house to meet constitutents individually to solicit their vote. My initial 
expectation was that this would be the primary tool ofthe connectional candidate, 
because it gives the candidate a ready opportunity to connect on an individual basis 
with voters. The case studies, however, revealed a much less decisive set of views 
regarding the importance of doorknocking. A number ofthe candidates were very 
positive about the role of doorknocking, from the extreme of Tanti to less extreme 
commitments by Ryan, Cunningham and Mooney, yet a number of candidates were 
also quite reserved. Healy, for instance, stated that: 
/ don't believe in doorknocking per se. If you 're the local 
member, and you've been elected as the local member, you 
should never need to doorknock. If you do, you 're not doing 
your job properly, you 're not getting out to the people. 
You 've got the resources once you 're the member, to be able 
to get to the people and communicate with them, through 
letterbox drops, through direct maU, all of that sort ofstuff.'^ 
19 Healy Interview 
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Kmgston was adamant that doorknockmg was not a useful tool for him. "It's a matter 
of going in telling people how good you are and what you'll do for them. And I don't 
like that ... I get embarrassed. It's horses for courses." 
For those who participated in doorknockfrig, there were two principal benefits. The 
first was the direct benefit of increasing voter identification of them as a candidate, 
and communicathig the message that they were the local champion who could deliver 
on their selected important local issue. In this way, doorknocking simply provided an 
additional medium for transmitting the same information disseminated through the 
media and association meeting speeches. During this activity, doorknocking had the 
additional advantage of being well targeted. Based on booth voting outcomes from 
previous elections, candidates could focus their doorknocking efforts strategically. 
Flyim, for instance, doorknocked extensively in the new areas added to Toowoomba 
North in 1991. Tanti doorknocked the Labor heartland, as they were the votes he 
needed to win. Mooney concentrated on Labor areas, but used a team of 
doorknockers to screen homes and identify swinging voters. 
The second advantage of doorknocking is indirect but important. By makhig the 
effort to meet people face to face at the door, the candidate sends the message that 
they are prepared to work hard, that they are prepared to listen, and that they are 




asked them what they were concemed with. I was talking to people who hadn't seen 
[a pohtical candidate] hi ten years, m a lot of cases. ,21 
Balanced against these advantages, however, are some disadvantages. Doorknockmg 
is time consuming and labour intensive. The effort which goes mto winning each 
individual vote is so great that hs efficiency as a tool must be in serious doubt. It 
carries with h the potential for confrontation with angry voters, and increasingly 
carties with it dangers associated with protective dogs and home security systems. 
Healy notes that: 
You really do take your life into your hands sometimes when 
you doorknock around some suburbs these days, because 
either people won't want to talk to you - they don't know who 
you are and don't want to know who you are, and there's a 
screen door in front of you. And they won't unlock that 
screen door for anything. And then you 've got the rottweiler 
around the side ready to tear your leg off if you come 
anywhere near the place. 
Based on the case studies, the need to doorknock appears to be mversely proportional 
to the inhial profile and status ofthe candidate. It is most useful for challengers 
makmg their first effort to enter parliament, and whose connectional activhy may not 





was a virtual unknown when he began campaigning by doorknocking extensively in 
the local govemment elections of 1993, and was still essentially unknown when he 
repeated the effort m 1995 and 1996. Doorknocking allowed him to bmld his 
personal profile without relying on the media, or on opportunities to address meetings 
of voluntary associations. Healy is also an interesting case. Although he was high 
profile as a name and a voice, it was clear during his first campaign that few people 
knew him by sight, so doorknocking gave him an opportunity to fill this gap in voters' 
awareness. Even Kingston, who rejects doorknocking outright, saw the benefit in the 
tool for candidates unknown to a portion of their electorate: 
Dorothy Pratt in the last election [2001], Dorothy had a huge 
change in her electorate, and she went out and physically met 
all ofthe new people [by doorknocking]. Worked like a dog, 
won very well and deserved to win very well. So in Dorothy's 
situation it was a very good tool, and Dorothy's got the 
character and personality and so forth to do that very well, 
and she did do it very well. 
Connectionalism in Theoretical Context 
One final observation which emerged from the case studies was that connectionalism 
was almost never a stand-alone election tool. Every campaign considered during the 
^^  Kingston Interview. He refers to Dorothy Pratt, who has since 1998 been Member for Barambah 
(then Nanango from the 1991 redistribution), whose electorate shares a boimdary with Maryborough. 
Like Kingston, Pratt was a One Nation MP who became an Independent in early 1999. She was also 
One Nation's first Parliamentary leader. 
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case studies contamed connectional elements concurtently with other factors, such as 
aligned voting (based principally on class and on the rural/urban cleavage), the artay 
of state-wide party politics and issues, together with party campaigning. Chapter 2 
introduced two conceptual tools to meld disparate influences on voter behaviour 
showing their interaction, to produce a single voting outcome. Observations made 
during the case studies can be usefully placed in these frameworks. 
The first discussed was the Funnel of Causality, which places events relevant to the 
voting outcome in a funnel-shaped construct, with events in the far past in the wider, 
open end ofthe funnel, narrowing gradually until a few key events occurted 
immediately before the vote. This model allows for multiple influences on voting 
behaviour to act simultaneously, and also at different times through the longitudinal, 
chronologically based axis ofthe funnel. All of these factors are held to gradually 
refine the voter's voting intention, until a final decision is made. 
A similar model was the Lifetime Leaming Model, which holds that different 
influences on voting behaviour are "cumulative and sequential", across four period of 
the voter's lifetime: childhood socialisation, adult socialisation, the previous term of 
office, and the campaign itself The effect ofthe Lifetime Leaming model is similar 
to that ofthe Funnel of Causality, but with more discrete division of chronological 
periods. 
The funnel provides an excellent tool with which to consider connectional politics, 
because it demonstrates how the preconditions for connectional politics, as observed 
in the case studies and described in this chapter, are progressively refmed through a 
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clear set of circumstances to produce a connectional impact. This has been mapped in 
Figure I, which shows how the long term preconditions for successful connectional 
politics - a suitable community culture and political culture, and a candidate with a 
long history in the town, and occupancy of leadership positions, progressively lead 
towards a connectional campaign. The figure has been broken into four discrete 
periods, which approximately match the Lifetime Learning Model's four sequential 
periods of childhood socialisation, adult socialisation, previous political term and 
political campaign. The results indicate the reason for connectional politics' 
unexpected strength - connectional votes are built upon a lifetime of cultural factors 
which, properly harnessed during the campaign, can express themselves in a 
compelling manner at the ballot box. 
Figure 1 - Connectional dynamics mapped with guidance by the Funnel of Causality 
and the Lifetime Leaning Model 
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However, for a full appreciation ofthe factors influenchig the vote, the ftinnel should 
also contain notations buildhig towards class based voting, or towards rural/urban 
split voting, with state campaigns and statewide media issues, with factors such as the 
image ofthe party leaders, fitting into the more nartow sections ofthe funnel, 
competmg for mfluence with connectional voting. A voter might find that all ofthe 
connectional factors listed move them towards votmg for the National Party, but they 
cannot support the Nationals' leader, or their stance on , for example, gim laws. They 
have also been a habitual Labor voter. The combination of these factors may be 
sufficient to overcome the connectional influences moving them towards a National 
Party vote, but even if they cast their vote for Labor, the vote is less assured because 
the connectional factors have opposed what would otherwise have been a clear votmg 
choice. This aspect ofthe Funnel of Causilty has been more fully described in 
Chapter 2. 
Figure 2 illustrates the complex interaction of these forces of influence, by combining 
the funnel from Figure 1 with the more general funnel adapted by Jaensch from earlier 
work by Dalton '^*. It is clear from Figure 2 that the connectional aspects of a vothig 
decision are not immune from more general influences, but rather are irrevocably 
bound up with other factors of influence. This funnel could be made even more 
complex - for instance, no attempt has been made to illustrate relationships within 
each (vertical) cross section ofthe funnel - and successive generations ofthe model 
could be developed to bmd in even more detailed arrays of mfluential factors. 














hi cases where the forces of state politics are extremely strong - such as the 1989 
election which saw the end of National Party rule, the One Nation success m 1998, or 
the Labor landslide in 2001, the other factors in the nartow end ofthe funnel - factors 
impacting on the voter in the weeks preceding the poll - may well overwhelm 
connectional influences. This may resuh in a phenomenon recognised by Reynolds, 
who hidicated that "While h may be the case that connectionalism can occasionally 
demonstrate the failure of class-party polhics to dominate every electorate at all 
elections, nevertheless, even in Queensland, class based polhics has an overwhelming 
tendency to reassert hself" In the case studies, this is best observed by Healy's loss 
of a substantial portion of his vote to One Nation in 1998, and loss of his seat to Labor 
in 2001. 
Summary 
The observations made during the five case studies detailed at length in preceding 
chapters indicate that connectional politics was a real and significant influence in the 
outcome of those campaigns. In this chapter, those observations have been reflected 
by the theoretical explorations undertaken above conceming electoral behaviour, 
community sociology, and Queensland political culture. 
Observations suggest that connectional politics occurs most strongly in communities 
which are isolated from the capital, and which have a sense of need for, and 
entitlement to, services and facilities which can only be provided by the state 
govemment. Such communities consider that this govemment is predisposed to 
neglect their needs and entitlements, and perceive that the role ofthe local Legislative 
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Assembly Member is to overcome this neglect in the delivery of goods and services to 
the community. Communities fittmg this model do not appear to be rare, and the five 
communities studies showed remarkable similarhy one to the other, as they resonated 
with the communhies and political values described in chapters 3 and 4. 
Such communities tend to have a range of voluntary associations, which provide 
services for the betterment ofthe community, and which also facilitate development 
of a network of community leaders. There appear to be too few leaders to fill the 
leadership roles available, resulting in role redundancy and a network of multiplex 
relationships. One ofthe community's leadership roles is that of Member of 
Parliament (or political candidate), and where connectional politics occurs, this role is 
usually filled by a person who has already emerged as a community leader (through 
associational activity, local govemment or business), and who has already been 
responsible for improvements and development within the community. Such a 
candidate can then conduct a connectional campaign by choosing an easily-
understood, instmmental local issue which reflects public perceptions of community 
need and govemment neglect. If the candidate then becomes the community's 
champion in the fight to obtain satisfaction on this issue, they will also obtain 
connectional support at the ballot box. The case studies indicate that this support can 
be substantial and that, as a result, in these electorates and others like them, 
connectional politics is a significant political tool which parties and candidates ignore 
at their peril. 
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CHAPTER 10 - CONCLUSIONS 
This study set out to determine whether connectionalism, as described by Reynolds*, 
provides a viable tool for understanding electoral outcomes hi Queensland. In short, 
this study asked whether the concept can help us to understand why people vote the 
way they do. If this initial challenge were resolved in the affirmative, then the study 
undertook to discem the mechanics and dynamics of connectional politics, and the 
conditions under which connectional campaigns are successfully conducted. Both of 
these questions - does connectionalism exist, and how does it work? - were addressed 
using a series of case studies, developed from documentary searches and interviews 
with the main players. 
First, it can be stated with some degree of confidence that connectional politics is 
practised in some electorates in Queensland. In each ofthe case studies undertaken, 
at least one candidate contested a state election on the basis of a pre-existing position 
as a local community leader. In some cases this local leadership position led to state-
level ambhions and, hi other cases local, leadership provided them with an 
apprenticeship for state office. 
In hself, the fact that connectional politics was observed in five electorates does not 
provide evidence that the phenomenon exists elsewhere. But a number of factors 
afford some confidence that connectional politics is more widespread. The first of 
these factors is temporal - Reynolds observed connectional politics takhig place as far 
'Reynolds (1991) ope// 
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back as the 1960s; this research found h in operation through the 1990s, and into the 
first election ofthe twenty-first century. A phenomenon observed across several 
decades is less likely to be an abertation or accident, than a phenomenon observed 
singly or sporadically. Second, during this research connectional politics was 
observed in a number of culturally distinct, spatially distant parts of Queensland. A 
phenomenon observed in Caims, Gladstone and Toowoomba during the same 
election, is more likely to be a widespread characteristic than one observed hi few, 
concentrated, or culturally homogenous areas. Third, connectional politics was 
observed at work for the Liberal Party, the Labor Party, the National Party, the One 
Nation Party, and for Independents. A phenomenon observed in the employ of all 
political parties is more likely to be a significant electoral characteristic than is one 
used by a single political party. Finally, this research demonstrated that connectional 
politics conforms with the more general political culture of Queensland, and the more 
general social culture of rural communities. While it is certainly possible for 
communities to act politically in a manner inconsistent with their cultural 
characteristics, behaviour, such as connectionalism, which accords with these features 
is likely to be widespread. 
It is clear from this research that connectionalism exists in Queensland. At the very 
least, it existed in the five cases presented, but there are sound circumstantial reasons 
to suggest that the dynamics of connectionalism exist more widely. 
The mechanics and dynamics of connectional politics have been assessed by 
examining the community and electorate, the candidate, and the electoral 
circumstances. Examinmg each of these will allow an analyst to identify connectional 
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politics in action, and to assess critically hs conduct. The first set of characteristics 
examined related to the community. To provide a natural forum for connectional 
pohtics, a community must have a sense of umequited needs and wants, and must see 
state politics as an appropriate means of satisfying those ambitions. These wants are 
as varied as the communhies which profess them, but they may hiclude new schools, 
roads, industries to provide jobs, new irrigation way, cleaner water, and so forth. This 
sense of need can be sharpened by a sense of "enthlement", which builds resentment 
against those withholding the claimed entitiements. These sentiments are also likely 
to occur m isolated communities, where standards of living may be lower, and 
therefore the level of need - both professed and actual - much higher. Such 
communities, then, are an ideal place to begin seeking connectionalism. 
A connectional candidate need satisfy only two criteria: he/she must be regarded as a 
leader within the community, and he/she must - at least in rhetoric - seek to address 
the community's instrumental wants and needs. The first of these criteria is the 
harder to satisfy. Leadership positions within the community often arise from a 
network of voluntary associations, from local govemment, or from participation in 
local business. Leaders emerge from the community, and have usually spent many 
years in the community, though mvited exceptions occur. It is imperative that a 
connectional candidate establish themselves as a community leader before they 
endeavour to stand for office.^ 
Finally, calm electoral circumstances are most conducive to connectionalism, because 
Tanti provides an example of a candidate who was not a community leader prior to his candidacy, and 
who was therefore largely unable to obtain connectional support. 
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(as noted by Reynolds and supported by this research) connectional polhics can be 
fragile in the face of substantial shifts in state politics. Mooney and Healy in 
particular found that their connectional support was insufficient to overcome state 
factors. However, the cases of Cunningham and Kingston suggest that connectional 
politics can also display a surprising resilience. 
To summarise, this research indicates that a community leader, who emerges from a 
community with a sense of instrumental needs and entitlements and who seeks to 
satisfy those needs and wants, can obtain electoral support irrespective of their party 
colour. This conclusion both confirms and extends the initial inferences and 
observations of Reynolds, which this research sought to test. 
Implications of the Findings 
If, as described above, the notion of connectionalism appears to satisfactorily describe 
some aspects of Queensland electoral politics, then an understanding of both the 
concept and mechanics of connectional politics can provide a useful tool for future 
analysts of Queensland elections. In Chapter 2, two theoretical models were 
introduced: the funnel of causality, and the lifetime leaming model. These models 
suggest that voters (and, by extension, electorates) do not simply respond to one form 
of influence. Instead, their votuig choice is hifluenced by a multitude of hiter-related 
factors. The reduced importance of class based party alignment exacerbates this 
situation, by mcreasing the potential for other influential factors to be effective. The 
funnel of causality and lifetime leaming models, however, are primarily frameworks 
which show how different sources of electoral influence might be artayed 
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conceptually. It is open, then, for analysts to fill those models with observed agents 
of hifluence, and to consider the mter-reactions between them. 
At this pofrit, the conclusions of this research become theoretically significant. 
Connectional polhics is one factor which can fit into the theoretical frameworks, there 
to interact with other factors - such as image, issues and class - to produce a voting 
outcome. By providing a little more detail to fill the theoretical frameworks, 
connectional polhics incrementally advances the discipline's overall capacity to 
explain the vote, and mcrementally decreases that portion ofthe vote which remains a 
mystery. 
From a more practical perspective, this thesis provides future analysts with an 
additional tool for the analysis of Queensland elections. An observer seeking to 
predict or explain the outcome of an election in a seat in regional Queensland could 
consider the connectional indicators outlined in this thesis, to determine whether the 
electorate is a suitable location for connectional politics; whether a candidate with 
connectional credentials stood (and actively sought to exploit those credentials); and 
whether the electoral circumstances were conducive to connectional politics. If 
analysts do so, and observe ftiture occurrences of connectional politics, then 
confidence in (and understanding of) connectionalsm will gradually accumulate. 
The findings of this research also carry implications for broader aspects of pohtical 
science. While these are interesting and potentially hifluential, great care should be 
taken not to read too much into this section - the findings suggest material for further 
consideration, rather than a compelling case for change. 
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First, connectional politics emphasises the role ofthe candidate. This is in stark 
contrast to the received electoral wisdom which holds the candidate to be little more 
than the local flagbearer ofthe state party. In electorates with the potential for 
connectional politics, the candidate can be the party's most important asset, and ought 
to be the focus ofthe campaign. Of course, connectional politics is likely to be 
significant in a relative number of cases, but it can no longer be assumed that 
candidates are essentially irtelevant during campaigns. 
Second, the existence of connectional politics challenges the "presidential" style of 
campaign seen recently in Queensland and elsewhere in Australia. This point is 
closely related to the point immediately above. A connectional campaign may be 
waged in the context of a wider state campaign, but may be quite dissimilar in tone 
and rhetoric. Such an occurtence presents each contesting party with a choice: to 
accept the connectional challenge (and therefore potentially fight a collection of local 
campaigns rather than a single state campaign) or to pursue a state-based contest, 
relying on those state-level forces to overwhelm connectional factors. 
The nature of connectional politics has implications for political parties, which extend 
well beyond the election campaign. Australian political parties are tightly disciplined 
and well controlled by their intemal bureaucracies: this is possible because most MPs' 
first loyalty is to the party (which is responsible for havmg them elected). The 
loyalties of a connectional candidate are more complex. While they too may owe a 
substantial portion of their vote to the party, they owe another substantial portion to 
their position as a community champion fighting for benefits for the electorate. In 
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order to allow the connectional candidate to honour this mandate (and retain those 
voters for the next election), parties - especially parties m govemment - must relax 
their discipline sufficiently to produce two resuhs. First, the connectional candidate 
must deliver on their "signature issues" during the campaign. If they promised a 
police station, they must be seen to win a police station, and fr must be seen as their 
personal victory, not just as the good work ofthe Party. 
Second, this paper highlighted the importance of connectional "champions" having 
room to act as a "maverick" when her/his party is hi office. This may require parties 
accepting some unusual behaviour from hs connectional members. They may need to 
publicly criticise party leaders, and possibly even cross the floor ofthe Assembly to 
"stand up for their community." Such behaviour would be regarded as outrageous 
now, and would probably cost the connectional politician their endorsement, because 
ofthe accepted wisdom that (a) people voted for the party not the candidate, and (b) 
the perception that disunity costs votes. Accepting that a backbencher crossing the 
floor could gain votes would require a sea change in political party attitudes. 
This thesis highlights the potential for independent candidates to successfully wage 
connectional campaigns. The recent increase in the number of independent members 
in the Legislative Assembly is not fully explained by connectional politics, but 
connectional politics clearly provides tools to understand some portion of their 
success. An understanduig of connectional politics may also clarify Independents' 
political objectives (particularly where they act as a local champion, seeking 
instmmental outcomes). 
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Finally, this thesis demonstrates the potential of qualitative, case study based research 
to add to the collective understanding of electoral outcomes. While detailed statistical 
analysis of electoral outcomes will continue to be important, there is a place for 
quahtative, nartative analysis. 
Directions for Future Research 
This research advances understanding of connectional polhics substantially from the 
base established by Reynolds. Yet at the conclusion of this paper, connectionalism 
remains far from a mature theory. A more complete and confident understanding of 
connectional politics may emerge from future research. A number of areas with 
potential for such research can be readily discemed. First, replication of case studies 
such as those undertaken here, would gradually build confidence in the presence, 
relevance and strength of connectional politics. Such studies need not be done simply 
to "test" connectionalism, but may instead develop if the concepts outlined in this 
paper are used by researchers completing more general assessments of Queensland 
elections. 
Second, there remains the potential to develop a statistical framework to underpin the 
qualitative understanding of connectionalism. A number ofthe indicators herein 
discussed may lend themselves to quantification, and the rigour of a statistical 
framework may further enhance confidence in the concept of connectionalism. It may 
be, for instance, that the factor analysis methods attached to the Lifetime Leaming 
Model might be used to ascertain the presence and relative importance of 
connectional factors. 
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Finally, this research clearly addresses politics m Queensland, as did Reynolds' mhial 
discussion of connectionalism. This does not imply that connectionalism is only 
found in Queensland; rather, Queensland is the only place h has been sought. 
Impressionistic evidence suggests that Westem Australia and New South Wales are 
quhe likely to host connectional politics, as are some (particularly provincial level) 
polities in Europe: in Wales, France and the German Lander, for instance. At the 
State and County level, the USA is likely to be replete with examples of connectional 
politics. This is, of course, speculation, but it highlights substantial potential for 
further study of connectional politics. 
These areas for future study are well beyond the scope of this thesis, which has 
demonstrated, and with increased confidence, that connectionalism exists and can be 
electorally potent; and has made a start to detail how Queensland connectional 
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